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Abstract 
This research examines the impact of bus degregulation at the level of 
the company. It follows a case study approach. The findings are 
analysed in the context of contestability theory and organisation theories, 
as well as empirical evidence. 
The first part of this research views the bus industry in terms of the effects 
that the regulatory system has had on the industry's suppliers, and 
examines the roots of the legal provisions of the 1985 Transport Act. 
The second part focuses on the organisational context. It establishes the 
challenges that bus companies face by reference to the pre-1985 
situation, and provides an interpretation of strategic responses in the 
early post-1985 era. In addition, it introduces the type of strategic options 
open to companies operating in declining markets, and outlines a 
theoretical organisational framework within which this case's 
organisational changes are to be analysed. Finally, the research design 
and research methods are presented. 
The third part consists of a detailed analysis of the selected case study 
company: Midland Fox Limited. It introduces the local market structure 
and basic data on the company. The major patterns of corporate 
strategy are presented and analysed, and key areas of managerial 
activity studied. The competitive behaviour of the company is then 
discussed in the context of competitive events that have occurred in the 
market. 
The fourth and concluding part of this case study research discusses the 
most significant issues arising from this investigation in terms of their 
implications for future developments in the bus industry. 
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Preface 
There has always been wide interest among academics in the study of 
strategic decisions made by organisations. The nature of the decisions are 
invariably related to internal and external factors. Public transport policies 
are a means of influencing the conduct of suppliers that operate in the 
industry. 
This research examines the impact on the degree and nature of strategic 
changes at company level as a result of the policy change of 1985 in the UK 
bus industry. This investigation follows case study methods. The data for 
this study were collected during 1990 mainly through extensive interviews 
with key members of one company, Midland Fox Limited - including 
Directors and Depot General Managers. The Directors were responsible for 
corporate decisions, for the overall functional areas of the organisation 
(Commercial, Engineering and Financial) and shared the supervision of the 
business units - the Depots. The Depot General Managers in turn were in 
charge of the production and sale of services in areas with marked 
differences in geographical and demograhic characteristics. Prior to the 
interviews, data were gathered on local environmental factors (the structure 
of the local market and demographics) and organisation-related records 
were made available in the course of the fieldwork. Together these two sets 
of data proved important in the conduct of the interviews as they permitted 
the adaptation of some of the more general issues addressed in the 
interview guide to the specific reality of the company studied. Furthermore, 
the review of the relevant empirical and theoretical literature undertaken 
prior to the study of the case helped to shape the ambit of the main research 
instruments and allowed for the information provided in the interviews to be 
judged as it was being generated. The evidence gathered in the case study 
is analysed in the context of the most relevant postulates of contestability 
theory and of organisation theories, as well as of general empirical 
evidence. These theoretical and empirical contributions establish the basis 
for the understanding of the patterns of change observed in this study. 
The structure of the research reported here is as follows. The first part is 
concerned with the impact that the regulatory system has had on the 
industry's suppliers. It also examines the roots of the legal provisions of the 
1985 Transport Act by outlining the way in which the political reasoning that 
dominated British politics during the 1980's is interrelated with the 
propositions of the theory of contestability. 
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The second part of this, project is divided into two more chapters. In the first, 
the organisational challenges facing bus companies are established by 
characterising the organisational settings that prevailed in the period prior to 
1985. In addition, it provides an interpretation of the early trends in 
corporate strategies reported in other studies. In the second chapter, the 
general strategic options for organisations competing in a declining industry 
are considered and particularised to the case of the bus industry. 
Concomitantly, the contributions of the main organisation theories are 
introduced as a reference for the study of this case's organisational 
changes. 
The third part of this research comprises a detailed case of one ex-publicly, 
owned bus company. The first two chapters establish the overall context of, 
this case study by characterising the local market structure and by 
presenting the basic data of the company studied in this project. Chapter six 
provides an analysis of the main trends in corporate strategies by adopting 
the model of 'patterns in strategy formation'. Chapter seven concentrates on 
the study of key areas of managerial activity that, because of the new legal 
framework of the industry and legal status of the company, assume a critical 
role in furthering the understanding of change. . 
Chapter eight examines the strategic competitive behaviour of this 
incumbent in the light of the competition rules contained in the 1985 Act and 
of the influences of contestability theory. It also analyses the role of 
leadership and organisational culture in this process. 
The fourth and final part of this investigation comprises of the main 
conclusions of this research in the light of the implications that the observed 
patterns of response have for future developments in, the industry. 
It 
Part I- The Bus Industry in Context 
Chapter 1: The Changing Role of Regulation In the Bus Industry 
1.1 The effects of the regulatory regime 
The performance of firms depends on their management, managerial 
attitudes and ultimately on the quality of decisions which are made. But the 
level of performance that can be achieved is, to a considerable degree, 
influenced by external factors. It is external factors which determine working 
environments and they include the economic -climate, the competitive 
regime, the legal framework and the state of technology in the industry. 
Public transport policies have been designed to affect market behaviour by 
means of influencing the conduct of suppliers (Button and Gillingwater, 
1986). This section examines the extent to which public policies have 
affected the bus industry. 
Regulatory controls over the bus industry have characterised public 
transport policies during the period between the early 1930s and late 1970s. 
The argument most widely used to justify this policy is that of the need to 
protect the public interest. The management of public transport was felt to 
be too important to be left to its own devices and a free market was clearly 
understood to be unable to supply a socially acceptable service. State 
intervention was thus needed and desirable. 
By 1930 there was a clearly identifiable area in which the market had proved 
to have failed: that of keeping safety standards. The first legislative act 
concerned with public transport dealt with this area. The 1930 Transport Act 
established basic legal and administrative rules in this regard. Not only 
were operators, drivers and vehicles affected by these rules, but concern 
about safety standards went a step further and road service licenses were 
introduced. 
The idea was that control over safety required a market composed of a 
relatively small number of units (Button and Gillingwater, 1986). To this 
end, the country was divided into 13 Traffic Areas, with local 
government-appointed Traffic Commissioners having the duty of ensuring 
the system was to work according to plan. The licensing procedure thus 
generated was geared to the creation of a quasi-monopoly in the public 
transport system. The powers granted to the local Traffic Commissioners 
were in fact used to regulate entry by giving the established operator priority 
over any new applicant, thus protecting stage services from incursions by 
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other operators. This facilitated the establishment of a monopoly structure, 
itself coherent with the public interest type of argument. 
In fact, for a transport system to work in accordance with the public interest, it 
requires a public policy whose primary objectives must consist of controlling 
not only the quality of supply - to ensure that levels of safety and information 
are high - but also the quantity of supply, to avoid wasteful competition. 
Wasteful competition constituted a major reason for regulating the transport 
market. The increasing returns to scale arising from the necessary 
development of a monopolistic structure were seen to be in the public 
interest. Competition was considered to lead to reductions in load factors 
and hence a rise in unit costs. Therefore, by erecting effective barriers to 
entry and exit - to the extent that they deny potential entrants access to 
profitable routes and exit from unprofitable ones - regulation control was in 
effect creating a protected and stable market. It was, as a matter of fact, in 
the public interest to maintain and sustain a planned and co-ordinated 
system of services and fares, and this required minimum levels of risk and 
uncertainty to be brought into the system. It is thus not surprising that by 
1938 the licensing procedures had become a standard and routine 
occurrence (Button and Gillingwater, 1986). In the post-war period and 
throughout the 1950s, the problems facing public transport were growing 
fast and the transport policy which had generated some consensus in the 
1930s now began to be questioned. 
It seems reasonable to say that the objective - regulation in the name of 
public interest - was indeed attractive. Who in fact could dispute the 
benefits gained by the public of having a stable transport system, composed 
of well co-ordinated services and low integrated fares? The truth of the 
matter, however, was that the cost of such a plan (which it is argued never 
became fully realised) was becoming unacceptably high. 
Competition from private transport certainly played its role in the decline of 
the bus industry - if only because its effects were being ignored - but what 
was now under consideration was the policy itself. In fact, it is when 
decisions have to be made about the allocation of scarce public resources 
amongst the sectors of the economy deemed to be under state intervention, 
that aspects of performance are more likely to be considered. The problem 
became much more acute for the public transport sector, as it was 
simultaneously being subjected to increased competition from private 
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transport and to increased demand for more public resources to be shifted 
into investments in new roads, on the basis of a national strategy. The more 
regulation placed transport under state intervention, the more it became 
exposed to political decisions. ' This was probably more so, if one accepts 
the argument that the development of licensing controls was always more 
associated with political and administrative factors than any economic 
rationale (Button and Gillingwater, 1986) 
The last major legislative attempt before the breakdown of regulatory control, 
was made in 1968. The 1968 Transport Act emerged as an essential tool in 
preventing further decline in the bus industry. The solution for the industry's 
problem was to engage in major structural reorganization: the National Bus 
Company (hereafter referred to as NBC) was brought into the public sector 
and Public Transport Authorities (hereafter referred to as PTA) were set in 
four metropolitan areas, which together with the Public Transport Executive's 
(hereafter referred to as PTE) were given the power to take over and control 
all services within their designated areas. 
Despite the fact that Traffic Commissioners began to adopt a more flexible 
approach to rural services, encouraging some new operating experiments, 
and permitting differentiate fare scales much more rapidly than before, 
(Gwilliam and Mackie, 1975) the bus industry never seemed to recover. 
The problem by the late 1970s was how to explain to the taxpayer that the 
results of the policy being pursued were in accordance not only with the 
amount of money spent, but also that more public resources were going to 
be needed in the future. The fact that between the early 1970s and early 
1980s less people were using buses (passenger miles accounted for by 
buses fell from 13% to 8%), and that total receipts were falling (a drop of 
12%), the fact that in the same period, fares were increasing fast (a rise of 
about 30%) and revenue support was increasing (E31 m in 1972 compared 
with £435m in 1982), and finally the fact that unit costs rose in that period 
well above the general level of inflation (Button and Gillingwater, 1986), was 
the most likely reason for the need for more public money to be made 
available to the public transport sector. This came to play a decisive role in 
the arguments for deregulation in the late 1970s. 
It is often cited that the established bus operators were quick to adapt to the 
norms and rules imposed on the market by regulation (Hovel et al, 1975). 
The fact is that the public interest type of argument was intended to influence 
the market behaviour of suppliers and thus their performance. Basically, 
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public sector operators worked within a system of road service licensing and 
subsidy arrangements. As a whole the regulatory control system was 
expected to supply safe, integrated and co-ordinated services at socially 
desirable prices. At the same time, it was supposed to ensure that the 
market remained firmly protected. Similarly, bus operators were expected 
to produce planned networks to meet the requirements of the regulatory 
institutions. Cross-subsidization between profitable and unprofitable routes 
was an acceptable practice if only to help sustain a comprehensive range of 
transport services. Innovative actions by management were thought to have 
been impeded by tight state control over bus operations. The apparent 
dilemma facing management, was that even if they were to run their 
business on rigorous economic lines, this would probably mean higher fares 
or the suppression of unprofitable routes, which was clearly in conflict with 
the objectives that the regulatory institutions set out to achieve in the first 
place. 
In fact it is often argued that regulation controls over the provision of services 
had a distorting effect on business priorities, in that they provided little 
incentive for supply to meet changes in demand. There appears to be, 
therefore, some consensus to the idea that the restrictive aspects of the 
regulatory control influenced management behaviour. Non-professional 
people-dominated the decision making processes and politicians showed in 
many instances that they were more interested in the political gains from a 
policy, which would show the electorate their concern for the transport 
problems facing those households which did not have access to a private 
car. But at the same time they were too ready to bend to public outcries 
about the amount of money being spent on public transport, and easily 
changed their minds and decided to drastically reduce their revenue 
support. 
Furthermore, public transport is not an isolated activity and other external 
factors may have influenced its performance. Increasing urban dispersal 
must surely bring important operating difficulties. Periods of economic 
recession may lower load factors on services supplied for work journeys. 
Mid-day work trips were also reduced as commuting distances increased 
and people preferred to stay on near their working places. The number of 
journeys made for social visits declined as the number of private telephone 
installations increased. The number of evening journeys decreased as 
television viewing increased. These are just a few examples of the 
mounting competitive forces for which management seemed unable to 
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provide'-adequate responses. -What'is not clear is-whether management 
could, under the current operating arrangements, have achieved higher 
levels of performance. The general feeling is, however, that they were as 
much dependent on local authorities for deciding on the kind of networks 
they wished them to supply, as on their general policies, designed to curtail 
the influence of external competing factors (Hovel et al, 1975). 
However, it is recognized that by the mid 1970s some important steps were 
being taken to improve staff productivity. Since the bus industry is labour 
intensive, and wage costs account for as much as two-thirds of total costs for 
the main public sector operators, these actions proved to be highly relevant. 
One man operations became common practice and this has helped to 
achieve important reductions in real costs per vehicle kilometre. But if the 
bus industry showed any signs of recovery, it probably came too late, and by 
the late 1970s the political commitment to support a regulatory regime was 
fading rapidly. 
In the early 1980s the newly elected Conservative Government was clearly 
committed to a policy of reducing public spending. The Government was 
particularly concerned about the amounts of public resources that were 
being 'consumed' by the large public sector of the economy. The electorate 
had accepted the Conservative Party message on the need to find a more 
effective way of allocating the money it collected through taxation. The right 
to more freedom of choice via public spending cuts and lower taxation was 
clearly understood by the people, and the Government now had the duty to 
ensure that this was going to be achieved. 
The basic idea was that Governments should behave like any ordinary 
household - they should not spend more that they earned. The Government 
also believed that there was only one way by which it could fulfil its 
promises: by providing for a more competitive economy. 
1.2 The lessons of the experimental areas 
The 1980 Transport Act was the first attempt to test whether major reductions 
in public subsidies could be obtained without major losses for the users, in 
terms of not provoking a socially unacceptable decline in the provision of 
services. The major changes introduced were the abolition of road service 
licensing for express services on which passengers were to be carried for 
more than 30 miles, and of road service licenses for all stage services in 
pre-established areas. The Government's idea was to gauge the industry's 
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response in the express market - and this would be done on a nationwide 
basis, and also to evaluate the developments in the stage service market - 
and this was to be done on a regional basis. 
Three Trial Areas were designated in parts of Norfolk, Hereford &Worcester 
and Devon. The common feature of these Trial Areas was that they were 
mainly rural, except for parts of the Hereford Trial area. This proved to be of 
great importance in analysing the subsequent behaviour of bus operators. 
In fact the most profitable services run by the established operators were 
kept under regulation control. In the Norfolk area, for instance, the major 
inter-urban services, which were an important profitable component of the 
existing bus network, were protected from competition (Fairhead and 
Balcombe, 1984). This fact enabled established operators to sustain, for a 
sufficient period of time, retaliatory actions against private operators who 
had decided to enter some of their unregulated, profitable routes. 
On the other hand, the tendering system adopted by the County Councils in 
order to maintain some of the services abandoned by the incumbent 
operators who regarded them as unprofitable, but which was considered by 
the Councils as socially necessary, provided most of the private operators 
with a way into the stage service market. Perhaps because of the NBC 
subsidiary's policy not to tender for Council contracts, in the Hereford Trial 
Area, most of the contracts were awarded to a small-independent operator - 
Flashes Coaches - which was new in the area. When those small operators 
attempted to simultaneously run the awarded Council contracts and 
compete for unregulated profitable routes, they were manifestly 
unsuccessful. Midland Red, an NBC subsidiary operating in Hereford, was 
able to force Flashes Coaches out of the market by forcing it to use its 
resources to exhaustion and to eventually have its Public Service Vehicle 
(hereafter referred to as PSV) operators licence revoked (Fairhead and 
Balcombe, 1984). This showed that this operator - like many other small 
ones whose previous experience had been linked to stage carriage and 
private hire - was, under the current arrangements, operationally unable to 
engage for long in-road competition. 
In general though, it can be said that the established operators' responses to 
attempts made by private operators to enter profitable sections of their 
networks were based on a number of financial and operational advantages 
they enjoyed prior to the introduction of the Trial Areas, and which they were 
subsequently allowed to use. They were , also characterised by 
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reductions/matching fares and increased frequencies. The established 
operators tried to force new operators out of the markets by attempting to 
make services unviable. The typical example was provided in the Hereford 
Trial Area where the first response of Midland Red to Stretton Coaches' (an 
entirely new operator) cheap local services, was to operate free buses in 
front of Stretton's services (Fairhead and Balcombe, 1984). It also seems 
clear that where competition did occur - however timid - it did not lead to any 
major changes in operating practices or indeed to more efficient use of 
resources on the part of the established operators. It did not contribute to 
any major innovative changes either. In fact, the few timetable and route 
changes that Devon General - the NBC subsidiary in the Devon Trial Area - 
introduced during this period appeared to be unrelated to deregulation. 
Also,, Autojade, a private operator in the same area, made use of the return 
dead mileage journey of a particular commercial route, to run a competitive 
service. The idea was that it enabled him to collect fares and be eligible for 
fuel duty rebate. However, this experience came to an end when the main 
reason for the original journey could no longer be justified (Fairhead and 
Balcombe, 1984). 
Competition did not develop in the way the Government had hoped for. In 
fact, the 1984 White Paper admitted that one of the main causes for the 
absence of any significant competition having occurred was largely because 
... large operators have used their financial strength, based on their existing 
licences or the public purse... (Department of Transport, 1984). However, it 
has been suggested that private operators were willing to compete with 
large established operators if they were given equitable conditions 
(Fairhead and Balcombe) -' and this had not been provided in the 
arrangements leading to the establishment of the Trial Areas. They were 
also aware that by entering into competition with large operators this would 
certainly mean the end of subcontract work and to the use of bus station 
facilities they enjoyed. 
Nevertheless, the most encouraging sign from the Government's public 
spending point of view, was that the level of rural services did not decline 
significantly, and at the same time important savings were achieved in the 
form of reductions in subsidies paid out by Councils (in the Hereford & 
Worcester Area, the Government claimed that the County Council was 
paying 38% less subsidy to rural services). However, these reductions in 
subsidy levels were believed to have been the result of independent 
operators submitting bids that were too low for the tendered services in their 
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desire to retain their traditional work. 
However, the performance of the bus industry was, as a whole, still 
characterized by downward trends in patronage and rising costs and fares - 
not that the 1980 Transport Act ever aimed at remedying these facts. By 
1984 the Government decided that ... we can't go on like this (Palmer, 1987) 
and that there was an urgent need for change. However, emphasis shifted 
to expounding the virtues of competition. Competition would not only 
reduce public spending but it would also provide better services and lower 
fares as it would force costs down. The Government saw the results of the 
Trial Areas and of the express market, together with the results of the 
deregulation of air services in the United States, as significantly 
encouraging to further push for deregulating the bus industry: ... the 
deregulation of long distance coaches in 1980 ... led to better quality of 
service and lower fares; ... the trial areas 
in England had shown the 
opportunities for changes in local bus services ... there were grounds to say 
that competition could sustain and improve services to the satisfaction of 
customers ... despite the NBC's attempts to stifle competition ... the 
deregulation of air services in the United States had a very large impact in 
generating new patterns of service, a wider choice and overall lower costs 
and lower fares ... and this in a market in which the costs of entry are high 
(Palmer, 1987). But the low fares policy adopted by many Labour dominated 
local authorities - following their election success in 1981 - and the 
consequent continual demand for more public subsidies, was proving to be 
a real obstacle to the Government's plans. The Government also believed 
that ... in major cities, decisions on the operation of bus services have more 
often been informed by political considerations than by ones of efficiency 
(Department of Transport, 1984). 
But after the ensuing period of judicial battles through which the Government 
tried to obtain supplementary powers destined to reduce local public 
spending - mainly via amendments or sanctions - proved to be generally 
unsuccessful, the Government in 1985 decided to take major legislative 
measures. The Metropolitan County Councils were abolished and their 
public transport functions were transferred to the PTA's - composed of 
members nominated from the constituent District Councils - to whom the 
PTE's became responsible. The Secretary of State for Transport was given 
the powers to prescribe the maximum expenditure of the PTA's. 
But the most important fact was that the Government's political 
understanding of the benefits of competition in public transport had gained 
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by this time a strong ally: the economic reasoning behind the theory of 
contestability. This theory provided the instrument for the much desired 
political changes. In fact it proved to be consistent with the government's 
general ideas of more freedom of choice being achieved via the market 
mechanism, and with the very nature of the bus industry, in so far as it does 
not rule out the provision of continuing regulatory procedures. 
1.3 The 1985 Transport Act and the theory of contestability 
1.3.1 The relationships 
The 1985 Transport Act constituted the first major legislative initiative 
towards the attainment of the Government's objectives for the public 
transport sector. (A summary of the provisions of this Act is contained in 
Annex 1. ). The relationship of the 1985 Transport Act to the theory of 
contestability will now be examined in more detail. 
The theory of contestability aims at proving that the recognized benefits that 
competition can bring to both producers and consumers can be attained 
without the restrictive assumptions of the theory of perfect competition. The 
theory also claims its applicability, without modification, to monopolistic and 
oligopolistic markets (Baumol et al 1982). The first major requirement for a 
market to be perfectly contested is that entry into and exit from it should be 
easy and costless. Simultaneously, firms should be free to set the prices for 
their products. Regulatory regimes are characterized mainly by the 
existence of legal barriers. 
The 1985 Transport Act's first provision was to remove road service 
licensing on stage services throughout Great Britain, except London. It 
simultaneously ruled that prices in the commercial routes should be ... a 
matter of commercial judgement (Department of Transport, 1984). 
However, the effect that the actions of the public sector operators had had on 
potential entry by independent operators in the Trial Areas was widely 
noticed (Palmer, 1987) and needed to be minimized. The Government 
therefore decided to introduce major changes in the existing structure of the 
industry. The NBC was to be reorganised into smaller parts and then 
transferred to the private sector. The PTE's were required to break down 
their operations into smaller units which were to become independent 
companies (Public Transport Companies - PTC's). Municipal bus 
operations were to be incorporated into companies still owned by their 
District Councils, but after a transitional period together with the PTE's they 
were to stand 'on their own feet'. The district councils were prohibited from 
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providing further funding to subsidize the companies operations. 
According to the Government, this package of legislation was designed to 
give a fair start to both existing and potential market interventionists. 
But the Government did not intend to leave the market exclusively to its own 
devices. The 1985 Transport Act established the framework within which 
the market was to function. The theory of contestability also assigns a 
specific role to regulation. Regulation is considered important not only to 
enhance freedom of entry and exit but also to provide rules in areas where 
public welfare is endangered, or where new entrants are forced to incur 
heavy unrecoverable costs, or even where there are activities which are 
socially desirable but fundamentally unremunerative (Baumol, 1983). 
The first set of rules relates to safety. The 1985 Transport Act maintained all 
previous arrangements in this regard: operators, drivers and vehicles were 
kept under tight quality supervision. There was a genuine concern about 
the possibility that competitive operators would not adequately commit 
themselves to maintaining acceptable safety standards. In addition to the 
safety conditions placed on individual operators, the Government introduced 
general traffic regulation. The Traffic Commissioners were to this extent 
able to apply restrictions on the use of particular routes or stops. This was 
to be monitored by the requirement of all operators to register the services 
they wished to operate. A service could only start after 42 days of being 
registered (although some exceptions were made). The registration process 
consisted mainly of providing detailed information of the conditions under 
which a service was to be run. But, in fact, registration of services was not 
only intended to control the behaviour of operators, but it was also intended 
to help the local authorities in the process of selecting tendering services. 
Thus, traffic planning, service reliability and network planning appear to 
have been the main aims for the introduction of this set of rules. 
The second set of rules deals with the problem of subsidies. Contestability 
theory favours the allocation of subsidies but it is very clear in limiting the 
scope of this kind of policy. The main concern is that subsidisation in 
general provides the means for firms to operate inefficiently, as they feel 
protected and so this can become an important barrier to entry. However, 
there is a general consensus on the need to maintain certain routes which 
bring benefits to users but whose running costs are greater than the revenue 
that can be obtained from the price system. Subsidies are therefore needed 
to provide for larger outputs. The 1985 Transport Act assigned to the local 
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authorities the specific role of deciding which services were to get subsidies, 
but they were required to seek competitive tenders for them. Contestability 
theory postulates that markets can remain contestable only if subsidies are 
made available to any firm and to any prospective entrant for a given level of 
performance of an activity (Baumol, 1983). 
The behaviour of established and potential entrant operators was also 
subject to rules regarding fair trading and restrictive practices. The Offices 
of Fair Trading and of the Restrictive Practices Court were to deal with any 
anti-competitive behaviour of bus operators. Anti-competitive conduct may 
occur, for instance, when operators engage in restrictive agreements on 
fares or on maintaining complementary but not competitive services or even 
by recognizing each others tickets. All these instances are now liable to 
come under the scrutiny of the Restrictive Practices Court. The Government 
asserts that the outcome of these issues, if they emerge at all, will reflect 
what is best for the customer and reaffirm that this is the heart of its policy. 
The Government sees virtue in making this conduct (which clearly affects the 
workings of the market), registerable, for the market in itself does not exclude 
the possibility of arriving at restrictive solutions through its own mechanism. 
A further crucial condition of the theory of contestability is that there must be 
no sunk costs. Sunk costs are defined as unrecoverable costs. They 
constitute an important barrier to entry as they influence potential entrant's 
decisions to contest a particular profitable market (Baumol, 1983; Bailey, 
1981). It is the risk associated with the possibility of not being able to 
recover these costs that constitutes a major deterrent to entry into a market. 
The experience in the Trial Areas has shown how important they may 
become. In fact, the established public sector operators often denied 
potential private competitors access to their own bus stations. Bus stations 
are important not only for users to obtain information on services and 
therefore for bus operators to market their products, but they also constitute 
important centers for operating networks. If potential entrants are denied 
access to these facilities, that represents increased difficulties for them to 
penetrate the market. The Government therefore ruled that bus stations 
were to be operated on ... a commercial basis under arrangements which 
will provide for all operators to have equal opportunity of gaining access to 
them (Department of Transport, 1984). 
The major legislative changes brought about by the 1985 Transport Act have 
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been outlined so far and the relevant relationships with the requirements of 
the theory of contestability have been shown. According to Beesely and 
Glaister (1985) the policy objective of the 1984 White Paper was in fact to 
provide for conditions for the market to be easily contestable. 
In perfectly contestable markets, the absence of entry barriers and in 
particular of sunk costs means that the market will work under continuing 
competitive pressure. Firms will be forced to operate at least costs and will 
produce outputs at which prices will equal marginal costs so that they can 
only earn zero profits i. e., a normal rate of return on capital (Baumol, 1983). 
In an industry comprised of two or more firms, if one of them is producing an 
output at which prices are greater than marginal costs, a potential entrant 
will enter into the market and sell a sufficiently larger quantity of the product 
at a lower price 'and gain more than the above normal profits previously 
earned by the incumbent. If the established firm decides to reduce its price 
below that of the entrant, the latter will exit from the market as he can no 
longer obtain profits. But he will do so without having incurred costs that he 
will not now be able to 'recover. Alternatively, a firm might be earning 
non-negative profits while producing at costs greater than necessary. A 
potential entrant, by operating more efficiently will then be able to reduce 
that firm's prices and earn a positive profit. On the other hand, if prices were 
set below marginal costs, this will probably mean that the firm was engaging 
in cross-subsidization. Cross-subsidization will not be able to persist in 
contestable markets for the potential entrant only needs to concentrate on 
supplying the renumerative services which are priced at higher levels than 
they need be (Baumol, 1983; Bailey and Baumol, 1984). However, the 
process of pricing responses and adjustments may not be as peaceful as 
described. In fact, punitive pricing responses on the part of incumbents can 
strongly inhibit entry if sunk costs are present to a significant degree. In 
these cases, the theory favours some sort of policy measures, namely the 
need to freeze continual price reductions as they may be quickly withdrawn 
after the competition threat has passed (Baumol, 1983). 
But the theory of contestability also claims that the competitive outcome can 
be attained when the industry is a natural monopoly. The undesirable 
welfare consequences associated with this configuration are solved by the 
presence of potential entrants. There may in fact be no need for actual entry 
to occur in order to force the monopolist to operate efficiently and earn zero 
economic profits. All that suffices is the presence of potential entrants on 
the fringe of the market to prevent the exercise of market power. In the US, 
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the Federal Trade Commission (1985) asserted in one of its decisions that 
... 
in the absence of barriers to entry, incumbent firms cannot exercise market 
power, regardless of the concentration in the nominal 'market' and indeed if 
the market has been 'monopolised' by a single firm... Therefore, in 
contestable markets, potential entry competition for the market is seen as 
being as effective in disciplinary behaviour as actual competition within the 
market (Baumol, 1983; Bailey, 1984). 
1.3.2 The early trends 
The theory of contestability has influenced some recent public policies. In 
the US the domestic airline industry was deregulated and public policies 
concentrated on providing conditions for the contestability of the market. 
The assumption was that the aviation markets if freed from regulatory 
intervention were naturally contestable. The capital costs - the aircraft - 
although costly, were not seen to constitute sunk costs. Their mobility - which 
allows the carrier to move from one market to another in response to 
profitable opportunities - and the possibility of an easy sale on a second 
hand aircraft market, or indeed the possibility of returning the rented aircraft - 
thus allowing the carrier a low cost exit altogether - were understood to 
constitute significant conditions for contestability. 
However, the experience of the post-deregulation period suggests that both 
incumbents and potential entrants were not behaving according to the 
theory's expectations. The immediate price responses by incumbents were 
not consistent with the theory's stand that they must be relatively 'sticky'. An 
econometric study by Graham, Koplan and Silby (1983) on route-by-route 
prices, revealed that in markets where there was a new entrant, prices were 
reduced 22% relative to costs and in cases of four carriers flying the same 
route, the figure was 18%. The main reason for this kind of result is 
attributable, according to the advocates of contestability, to the emergence of 
structural supply imperfections (Baumol and Willig, 1986). Congested 
airports and long aircraft delivery periods were seen to be major constraints 
on entry and expansion. Also, new entrants were enjoying cost advantages 
relative to the established carriers as a result of favourable labour contracts. 
Although the increase in the number of carriers per route appears to have 
been moderate, competition, it is claimed, has led to significant 
improvements in the services offered to. customers in the form of reductions 
in travelling times. Actual and potential entrants have also forced prices to 
be more in accordance with costs, which in turn have been reduced by 
reductions in pay scales and in a more efficient fleet configuration. Airline 
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management, it is argued, has been given freedom to restructure their route 
networks which in the presence of competition has reflected the real needs 
of travellers. 
In the UK the 1984 White Paper made a number of specific predictions on 
the results that the Government expected the bus industry to achieve from its 
deregulation policy. The Government expects that competition on 
commercial services will provide new and better services as it is in the 
operators' interests to meet the users' needs and therefore to offer stable 
and reliable services. There will also be pressure to keep costs down 
through increased efficiency and changes in the operating structures of bus 
companies - the Government believes that costs can be reduced by up to 
30% - and lower fares will thus emerge. Traffic offences from less 
recommendable actions on the part of the operators, are expected to be 
suitably dealt with by the authorities, and congestion may not constitute a 
major problem as the improved bus services will succeed in attracting 
people away from using cars. Equally important is that ratepayers and 
taxpayers can now expect to know exactly how their money is being used, 
and important savings will be attained for competition for tender services will 
result in low cost contracts being awarded. 
However, the Government's policy for the bus industry has been criticised 
from those that do not believe in the suitability and adaptability of the 
industry to a competitive environment (eg. Gwilliam et al, 1985). In fact they 
predict that competition will not occur, at least not on the scale forecast by 
the Government. This is because the established operators have 
considerable cost advantages over potential entrants, fares are likely to 
increase with the end of cross-subsidization, and the level of services will 
probably decrease (in particular the early and evening services in the 
sub-urban areas and week-end services). Instability and the absence of 
integrated services will be the dominant characteristics of the resulting 
market. Furthermore, general traffic conditions will worsen and safety 
standards will be low as there are incentives for covering up vehicle 
deficiencies and for not providing adequate staff training. 
The task of analysing the effects of the 1985 Transport Act is a difficult one 
as it only came into full effect in January 1987 and current trends may 
constitute immediate, temporary responses to specific local pre-deregulation 
patterns of operations or indeed of attitudes. There are, however, some 
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common indicators in the way the bus industry has responded to what the 
Government believes is the challenge of a new competitive environment. 
In general, it can be said that competition has not in fact occurred on the 
magnitude the Government had predicted. Although there have been some 
significant instances where particular markets have been contested, 
competition has been limited. The structure of the industry has been 
characterised by the existence of large ex-NBC operators and a few medium 
and small sized independent operators. One of the first responses to 
deregulation by the established operators was to abandon some of the 
unprofitable sections of their networks and concentrate their resources on 
the potentially contested, profitable routes, which they have registered, with 
small alterations, as commercial services. On the other hand, for the 
independent operators whose main activity had been supplying stage 
contract carriage, the possibility of entering new profitable markets must 
have been considered as an attractive proposition. - - But previous 
experience has shown that major, committed attempts to contest profitable 
routes had been generally unsuccessful as the established operators were 
ready to demonstrate their financial and operating supremacy. It also 
seems clear that these markets could only be adequately contested if 
potential entrants were able to introduce innovative and sufficiently 
favourable alternatives to important aspects of their supply, and be prepared 
for a long fight with the established operators. 
Recent studies suggest that the small independent operators have opted for 
entering into the stage market through secured service contracts. This 
experience - if it is not proved that it has been achieved by them incurring 
significant losses - might give potential entrants the possibility to strengthen 
their resources, the opportunity of an inside view of the workings of the 
market, and possibly the chance of gathering relevant information on the 
characteristics of demand. 
However, it might also prove that entry into the stage service market requires 
the sinking of important resources. Contestability theory asserts, in this 
regard, that the risks associated with sunk costs can be reduced by potential 
entrants previously securing contracts; and that the longer they hold them, 
the lower will be the risk. It is known that many independent operators have 
expressed their concern about the current duration of the tendered contracts. 
It is also known that established operators were probably aware of this 
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process as they came to register important parts of the contracted routes as 
commercial services, thus forcing the authorities to withdraw them from the 
services they put out for tender. 
Although there have been some significant increases in the independent 
operator's market shares for the commercial services, the large established 
bus companies still dominate the market. It is difficult to clearly identify the 
main reasons for this outcome. 
Firstly, the concept of deregulation must be considered. If it is to mean 
absence of control, then the 1985 Transport Act is better defined as a 
delicensing process, as most of the regulatory institutions still exist and are 
able to exercise some of their previous powers over controlling the industry's 
behaviour. 
The possibility that there are still major obstacles to entry and exit may 
reinforce this statement. Legal costs and delays to obtain permission to 
enter into a market is, according to the theory of contestability, a substantial 
entry barrier. It asserts that ... regulators should not interfere with the timing 
or manner of entry, and that ... contestability requires that firms have what 
can be described as standby authority to enter a market - authority that can 
be used quickly when unsatisfactory incumbent performance offers entrants 
the prospect of profit ... (Bailey and Baumol, 1984). Existing legislation 
requires that if a new operator wishes to enter into the industry, they have 
first to obtain a licence by satisfying the authorities that they are ... fit persons 
to operate public services. (Department of Transport, 1984). The drivers 
have to be ... of good character and technically competent and the vehicles 
have ... to meet statutory requirements concerning construction, dimensions, 
equipment and general conditions. Furthermore, before any operator can 
start a service, he is required to submit a detailed proposal to the Traffic 
Commissioner and give at least 42 days notice. This time limit only starts 
when the Traffic Commissioner is fully satisfied that the registration form 
contains the necessary information. The length of time between planning a 
new service, filling in the required form, correctly submitting it to the Traffic 
Commissioner, waiting for his decision and allowing 42 days before the 
service can actually start appears in fact to be far too long. Moreover, after 
entering a particular market, the operator is only allowed to change the 
timetable by five minutes either way from the times registered without having 
to apply to vary registration and be again subject to the 42 days notice. 
Finally, the same period of time is required if he concludes he can no longer 
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earn profits and wishes to exit from the market. It is fair to say that this 
process applies to all operators, but it is also fair to argue that it has affected 
the potential entrants more than the incumbents. 
At the beginning of deregulation, all operators had to register the services 
they wanted to run on a commercial basis. . It is known that the large, 
established bus companies have registered, with small alterations, most of 
the routes that were known to them to be profitable. The independent 
operators, on the other hand have kept to their limited traditional services, for 
their registered commercial services were largely a continuation of their 
earlier ones, and were later able to guarantee an important share of the 
tendered services. It appears therefore, that an independent operator that 
wishes to enter into a particular market is aware of the opportunity costs 
associated with the length of time required to commit his resources, not only 
human and material resources but also those involved in providing sufficient 
information about their services to the public. There is evidence that the 
PTEs in their role of promoting public transport, have been providing most of 
the information, particularly on changes introduced to services, in a clear 
manifestation of the operators' inability to fulfil this important'task in a 
competitive market. It also seems plausible that established operators may 
be gaining competitive advantages by running more comprehensive and 
integrated networks in so far as they are able to offer attractive ticketing 
systems. They are meant to assure users fidelity which some operators feel 
unable to match. There is thus the possibility that potential barriers are 
being erected by the established operators in order to make entry into their 
profitable routes more difficult. 
According to the theory of contestability, regulators ... should keep their eyes 
open for entry barriers erected by firms and take steps to discourage the 
maintenance of those barriers (Bailey and Baumol, 1984). The response by 
incumbents of reducing the level of fares as soon as a new operator entered 
a profitable route has been a common feature not only in the UK 
deregulation case but also in the US domestic airline industry process. 
Contestability asserts that this behaviour should not be allowed to happen 
as it may indicate that nonprofitable fares are being charged. On the other 
hand, and probably because they realised that a continuing low fares policy 
was becoming an important financial restraint - since cross-subsidization 
was now virtually impossible - the incumbent firms may have found reason 
to believe that they would be better off if they were to co-exist with new 
entrants under rather dubious agreements. 
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Recent evidence suggests that ... bus companies are running 
anti-competitive and illegal fare-policy schemes and that they have been 
agreeing on timetables and fares in secret anti-competitive deals 
(Commercial Motor, 1988). This kind of behaviour is also not expected to 
happen in a perfectly contestable market, for although it ... may only relate to 
particular routes, the overall effect is to undermine the drive for more 
competition in the bus industry (Bailey and Baumol, 1984). In addition, in 
the Tyne-Wear area for example, the Operator's Panel that was set up with 
the PTE is reported to be effectively deciding the level of fares even though 
operators are free to opt out if they wish. 
However, the deregulation - or rather the delicensing - process has brought 
some important changes to the supply of public transport. As far as services 
are concerned, competition has led to duplication rather than the expected 
spread frequency pattern. This has meant that the denser markets then 
become more congested and reductions in evening, early morning and 
week-end services have been registered. Frequent changes to services 
have also been a common characteristic and have led to considerable 
instability, worsened by the absence of appropriate information to the public. 
There has been, however, some innovative aspects to the services being 
offered. A new approach to routeing has taken bus services into sub-urban 
housing estates and the practice of having pre-established bus stops has 
greatly reduced. It is not certain though that this has led to increased 
patronage, as it might mean a better service is being offered to actual 
demand rather than in the capture of new demand. There must also be 
increased costs associated with frequent stopping and increased efforts 
being put into making all drivers aware of the route details. 
Competition on the most profitable routes has forced fares down but the 
general trend has been for fares to be levelled in relation to inflation rates. 
Some forms of special ticketing facilities were introduced by some operators 
but in some cases this has increased confusion amongst users, as their use 
has been restricted to certain sections of the network and to the buses 
belonging to those operators. 
Safety standards have remained high, and the fears expressed in this 
regard by those who opposed deregulation in this case appear to be 
unfounded. 
18 
Congestion, however, has occurred in the main urban areas but the PTE's 
have been successful in making bus operators aware of the overall 
disadvantages, not only in terms of general welfare but also in their 
operating concerns. 
Finally, the new legislation appears to have provided management with the 
opportunity for introducing important changes in the operating structures of 
their bus companies. If the PTC's were slow in adopting new managerial 
approaches, probably because their boards are still dominated by 
non-professional members (Button, 1988b), the ex-NBC and other 
independent operators have embarked on a number of actions designed to 
respond to different market conditions. 
One of the major concerns for all the operators in general was to reduce the 
magnitude of their overheads. To this end bus companies decided to close 
their central workshops, and instead have them separated into engineering 
companies which were encouraged to take on external work to help cover 
overhead costs. New operators have, on the other hand, tended to operate 
with no central workshop and subcontracted everything from maintenance 
and major repairs to vehicle cleaning (Button, 1988b). 
A second major concern was the attainment of reductions in operating costs. 
An important change in fleet configurations has occurred as an increasing 
number of minibuses is used. It is known that NBC registered before 
deregulation 26,230 minibus miles compared with 79,650 for the period after 
deregulation (Button, 1988b). Minibuses were designed to provide rapid 
and frequent services and at the same time to constitute a major source for 
cost savings. It is thought that they tend to be more fuel efficient and are 
associated with lower maintenance costs. Additionally, important 
favourable labour agreements on pay and working procedures were 
obtained. Minibus drivers are paid lower wages and drivers in general 
have been prepared to perform other jobs around the depot when not 
employed driving. Part-time staff have also been contracted as a response 
to the peaks in demand. 
It also appears that the new market situation has led to important 
experiments in departmental structures. The-need to respond to consumer 
requirements more rapidly and more adequately has forced greater 
autonomy to be given at operating levels. 
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The separation of engineering and operating divisions may also reflect the 
emphasis in providing for a more demand-orientated concern. But as 
pointed out before, current legislation does not leave many opportunities for 
engaging in trial-by-error experiments and information on demand patterns 
may become a lengthy, costly and uncertain process. 
It seems, therefore, reasonable to argue that current policies have been 
characterised by the operators' eagerness to capture actual demand by 
supplying slightly improved services to a well identified market. It also 
appears that the previous experience of local market conditions which the 
established operators enjoy has played a significant role. It also seems 
clear that the potential demand's willingness to use buses depends heavily 
on the quality of supply reaching levels that operators have found difficult to 
meet. It could in fact be said that the decision to use private transport, 
passed on from one generation to another, has induced the increased 
potential market for buses to remain somewhat insensitive to improved 
public transport services. On the other hand, it could be argued that current 
legislation has not created the ideal conditions for markets to become 
contested, and has on the contrary provided adequate instruments for the 
economies of scope enjoyed by the large established operators to develop, 
and eventually enable them to recover the market from the small 
independent operators (Button, 1988b). In fact it is possible that less of the 
current kind of legislation is needed, in the sense that it has not helped the 
development of the required auxiliary conditions. For example, costless 
exit may still be unattainable - namely where it requires that ... durable 
capital goods be easily transferable by secondhand sale or alternative 
deployment that recovers their cost ... and that ... the industry-specific human 
capital should be transferable from market to market to avoid large 
personnel costs from hitting and running (Bailey and Friedlaender, 1982b), 
which makes entry unattractive. However, there is the possibility that the 
incumbent firms do face competition from potential entrants currently 
engaged in exploring other profitable segments of the market (e. g. express 
services) who may be willing to enter into further profitable opportunities, 
and thereby constitute an important policing element on the behaviour of 
incumbents. Nonetheless, it is quite plausible for the current levels of 
public subsidy will rise again - as indeed they already have done in some 
areas (Button, 1988b) - and force the Government to re-think its policy. If on 
the other hand, the Government insists on not intervening in the market 
whilst simultaneously enforcing further cuts in public spending, then more 
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people will face increasing difficulties in matching their transport needs with 
the services being supplied. Perhaps after 50 years of regulatory control it 
is not reasonable to expect instant results from the recent legislation, and 
one should comply with the general political idea that 'for things to get better, 
they have first to get worse'. 
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Annex 1 
Summary of the Provisions of the 1985 Transport Act 
1 Local Services 
1.1 Abolishes road service licensing for bus services except in Greater 
London. 
1.2 Defines a local service as a service which carries passengers at 
separate fares and on which passengers can be carried for less than 15 
miles. 
2 Operating Requirements 
Rules that operators must/may: 
2.1 Hold a public service vehicle'O' license or a community bus permit. 
2.2 Register with Traffic Commissioners the particulars of the services they 
wish to operate providing they give 42 days notice. 
2.3 Operate in accordance with the registered particulars. 
2.4 Vary or cancel any registration but give 42 days notice in both cases, 
although it prescribes cases when these changes can become effective 
before this period of time has elapsed. 
2.5 Appeal to the Secretary of State against decisions of the Traffic 
Commissioners, namely on traffic regulation conditions imposed upon 
their operations. 
3 Traffic Regulation Conditions 
Establishes one Traffic Commissioner for each Traffic Area who must/may: 
3.1 Impose conditions on the operation of the services registered, namely on 
routes stopping places and length of stopping. 
3.2 Attach any traffic regulation conditions to the public service '0' licenses 
prohibiting the operator from providing any local service or a specific 
local service. 
3.3 If requested by any traffic authority, impose further traffic regulation 
conditions applicable to local services. 
3.4 Hold public inquiries in exercising their duties. 
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Part II - The Organisational Context 
Chapter 2: Bus Operators and the Deregulation Process 
2.1 The structure of the industry 
For nearly 30 years the basic features that characterized working conditions 
in the bus industry remained relatively unchanged. The market was kept 
stable and protected and political control over the industry's activities 
remained untouched. The changes introduced during the period prior to 
1986 were more of an institutional nature, with the main objective of halting 
the industry's decline: grouping different operators under a sole controlling 
body, or encouraging co-ordination of services amongst central and local 
politically controlled companies, cannot be considered as constituting a 
radical environmental change. They, on the contrary, caused the diversion 
and subsequent concentration of resources on tasks specifically related to 
the attainment of those objectives. An example of this situation can be 
clearly identified in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the main 
managerial preoccupation of the PTEs was to implement the basic 
requirements of the 1968 Transport Act (Novell et al, 1975). 
In spite of the views expressed by (a) the ultra free market economists, who 
argue that th1985 Transport Act only meant a shift from a highly politically 
controlled environment to a less regulated one, and (b) by those who 
strongly believe in the social role of the industry and argue that the 1985 Act 
has, in fact, opened the market to fierce, profit-making private enterprise, 
there is an underlying acceptance that the legislation has, nonetheless, 
changed the industry's working environment and has forced bus operators 
to adapt to the new conditions. 
This chapter is particularly concerned with understanding the industry's 
current adaptation mechanisms following the full implementation of the Act 
in 1986, by focussing on the specific role of organizational restructuring in 
the decision making processes. The aim of this analysis is not, however, to 
question the contribution of normative microeconomics, but rather the belief 
that the conventional theory of the firm is not primarily concerned with factors 
that may influence its behaviour. There can be little doubt that the concept 
of rational behaviour is important, and perhaps it is the underlying aspect for 
many organizational decisions. But one cannot ignore the existence of 
many factors that affect the assumed rationality of decisions, and they ought 
to be understood (Simon, 1957). 
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The process of adapting to a changed environment can be said to be the 
result of choices made by those involved in the activities of an organisation, 
choices that involve devising a structure for a system of interrelated parts 
that compose an organization (McCaskey, 1979). The importance attached 
to the issue of organizational structures resides in the fact that they not only 
play a significant role in the orientation of the organization - by assisting in 
the process of setting the organization's main goals - but they also provide 
the mechanisms for carrying out the specific tasks that follow (Covin and 
Slavin, 1988; Caplow, 1983; Child, 1977; Williamson, 1970). In fact, the 
form that an organisation takes can facilitate or impede an adequate 
understanding of the organization's major weaknesses and strengths, and 
therefore facilitate or restrict the correct acknowledgement of the 
opportunities and threats that it faces (Argenti, 1980). In a similar way, the 
characteristics or properties of the chosen formal organization have a 
powerful impact on the behaviour of people within the organization, and 
decisions are the result of bargaining processes generated by the 
relationships and rules established by the organization's structure 
(Huseman and Carrol, 1979). But when major changes in environmental 
conditions occur, organisations may be forced to introduce alterations in 
their structures, as these represent an important tool in the mechanisms of 
adaptation. It can be argued, for example, that it is no longer possible for 
organizations to ... resist the impact of complex and changing environments 
by having isolated research and decision making units empowered with the 
duties of thinking for the rest of the organisation, controlling and integrating 
the overall organizational activities (Morgan, 1986). Therefore, 
organizational structures can be seen as providing the means by which 
organizations manage to bridge their individual capabilities with reference to 
existing and prospective resources and their environments. It must, however, 
be realised that there is no best way of designing structures, and attempts to 
generalise procedures can cause misleading results (McCaskey, 1979; 
Morgan, 1986). The reality is that the factors which influence the responses 
of individual organisations vary considerably. Environments differ in many 
respects - the geographical location of an organisation may determine the 
kind of service supplied and condition the mechanisms for improvements; 
economic development can cause important differences in demand patterns 
and affect the kind of measures needed to meet the needs of users and thus 
the methods chosen to achieve them; political control affects organisations 
in varying degrees, which can influence attitudes during the process of 
adaptation; the level of competition can influence the ways and methods 
that are envisaged for the development of organisations. 
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Following the implementation of the 1985 Transport Act, private 
entrepreneurship has to contend with two major aspects that characterize 
the bus industry. The first one concerns the unique feature of the industry's 
product. Up to 1985, bus operators could supply services that were not 
used but for which they were able to receive payments (Grigg, 1988). Under 
current arrangements, this can only be attained in the subsidized parts of 
their networks, which in any case only represents a small proportion of the 
operator's total receipts. The fact is that public transport is a product that 
cannot be stored, and instant excess of supply occurs whenever the amount 
of demand is less than forecasted and can never therefore produce revenue 
(US Department of Transportation, 1984). On the other hand, to supply less 
than the amount demanded now means, particularly in routes where several 
operators compete, to forego revenue. Before 1986, monopoly power 
granted by the politically controlled authorities would protect the operator 
from the results of these situations by increasing the amount of subsidies 
paid and/or enforcing cuts in services or by causing an increase in the total 
time of travel and/or ultimately driving users out of public into private 
transport. Private entrepreneurship has therefore to work in an industry 
which has a highly complex product, and still be subjected to close public 
scrutiny, for socially unfavourable decisions do not pass unnoticed. 
Secondly, private entrepreneurship has to contend with an industry which 
for historical and institutional reasons has been dominated by essentially 
conservative and risk averse managerial attitudes, which in some cases 
were directly solidified by those who are seeking to introduce major 
changes. 
The main organizational features encountered in the politically controlled 
bus companies were not the result of coincidental factors. They were the 
product of the political approach with regard to the characteristics of the 
industry's output, and in particular its impact on public opinion, reflected by 
the environment that was intentionally created for that effect. In fact, it can 
be argued that the various legislative initiatives passed during the period 
prior to 1985 concentrated on retaining two basic objectives associated with 
the public interest type of argument. The first was that the public interest 
was best protected by ensuring that the democratic system kept a decisive 
role in the running of the industry. Locally elected representatives and 
representatives of the elected central government became the central 
figures in applying the general policies for the sector, dictated by the 
councils and/or the central government departments. The second was that 
the industry required protection from outsiders' incursions and at the same 
25 
time concentration of resources for exclusively running bus services. Traffic 
Commissioners were appointed and given the appropriate backing 
legislation to ensure the maintenance of monopoly status for the established 
operators, and Acts of Parliament were passed to clearly define the 
industry's parameters. It seems, therefore, clear that political attitudes were 
gradually but firmly brought into the industry. The main goals were never 
clearly defined, as ambiguity constitutes an important characteristic of 
political behaviour. Maintaining the number of passengers carried and 
extending or preserving existing networks at reasonable costs constituted, in 
most cases, the intended targets (Novell et al, 1975). But these were, 
however, clearly operational objectives which nonetheless provided the 
basis for most decisions as far as the allocation of the organisation's 
resources were concerned. They are, however, in accordance with the kind 
of ambiguous goals set by the politically controlled running bodies. At the 
same time, they also reflect the preference for short-term solutions, as 
political obligations usually require quick results (Meyer, 1983; Hovell et al, 
1975). Both these two aspects led, in the majority of cases, and in varying 
degrees, to bus operators adopting ad hoc opportunist responses to specific 
problems without having a clear sense of direction. 
The kind of organization that prevailed, and which was common to many 
bus companies, can be said to have been consistent with what one would 
expect in an industry run under tight state control. In fact, the nature of the 
political process was such that political control over the bus industry 
demanded both control over its activities, whilst at the same time granting 
the industry some degree of autonomy. Thus political triumphs could be 
claimed whenever there was success in the industry, for political control was 
highlighted. However, the effect of failure in the industry was minimized in 
the political arena by spotlighting the autonomy enjoyed by the bus industry. 
Before the full implementation of the 1985 Transport Act, four distinct 
sectors could be identified within the bus industry, outside of greater 
London: PTAs/PTEs and municipal companies, both subject to local 
authority control; the NBC -a nationalised holding company responsible for 
the strategic control of a group of individual operators which worked under 
more discrete but certainly decisive central government control; and a 
number of small private independent companies. Nearly all local stage bus 
services were however, provided by the public sector operators. The data 
in Table 2.1-1 outlines the main characteristics of the major types of 
operators in the industry, outside of greater London. 
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Table 2-1: 
Main Characteristics of Bus Operators -1983 
(excluding London and Scotland) 
a) Basic data 
Type of Operator No. of Operators No. of Buses Average Fleet Size Staff Employed 
PTE 7 9600 1370 5629 
NBC 37 14600 400 1375 
Municipals 49 5300 109 357 
Private 5497 30000 (Estimate) 67 
b)Turnover (£m) 
Type of Operator Stage Non- stage Total Turnover/Operator 
PTE 546 7 553 79 
NBC 567 87 654 18 
Municipals 213 6 219 5 
Private 65 393 458 0.08 
c) Vehicle Kilometres ('000s) 
Type of Operator Stage Express Exc. Tours Contract Hire Total 
PTE 474 -1 63 485 
NBC 821 84 18 25 24 972 
Municipals 222 -1 45 232 
Private 163 32 100 399 383 1077 
Source: Department of Transport (1984) 
2.2 The major organizational features 
The industry was characterized by vertically integrated forms of 
organizations, whose main areas of activity were divided into administration, 
traffic operations and engineering. The variations and/or extensions to this 
kind of division depended mostly on the size of the operator, and on the 
nature of state control. However, both the strategic and day-to-day 
management were closely monitored by either a Board of Directors, 
Transport Committees or the PTAs. 
The PTEs, the largest of all operators, with an average fleet size of 3.5 and 
12.5 times that of an average NBC subsidiary and of a municipal company 
respectively, were responsible for the provision of passenger transport 
services in the metropolitan areas and were set up by the 1968 Transport 
Act, which also created an entirely new controlling body - the PTAs. Each 
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PTA was composed of elected Councillors nominated by local Councils in 
the area and was responsible for the appointment of the PTEs, which had 
the responsibility of running the public services. Planning and integrating 
local public transport in their areas appears to have been their main 
objective, given that the PTAs determined the overall land use and 
transportation policies. In each of the PTEs, an executive had overall 
responsibility for operations, but the detailed supervision of service provision 
largely devolved upon the heads of divisions, whose boundaries were 
determined by political, geographical and fleet size considerations. The 
kind of goals that these organisations set out to achieve was the reflection of 
the clear predominance of the non-professional but elected members in the 
controlling bodies. The structure of the PTEs reflected the characteristics of 
an externally imposed approach with regard to bus operations. Transport 
planners and operational staff gradually acquired dominant status. The 
organizational structure highlighted the fact that they were in command of all 
but an insignificant proportion of total labour and capital resources (Novell et 
al, 1975) Research techniques on scheduling and traffic control became 
the dominant priorities and the organizational structures were built around 
these principles. Tasks involving overall planning consisted mainly in the 
elaboration of budgets which illustrated the emphasis on the way existing 
resources were expected to be exploited. Marketing activities were, on the 
other hand, restricted to advertising and public relations exercises, as they 
were clearly unable to compete with cost reduction schemes for 
organizational resources which produced small but relatively immediate 
benefits to passengers. An example of a typical PTE organizational 
structure is shown in Figure 2-1. 
Political control of the NBC was exerted by central government through its 
Department of Transport. It was managed by a Board appointed by the 
Minister of Transport, which then appointed another Board whose members 
were responsible for the actual running of the different companies. (Hibbs, 
1972) These companies were themselves arranged in regional groups, with 
a regional manager responsible for the companies in each group. The 
overall policies were designed and decided upon at Headquarters and were 
meant to reach the local bus operator in any town or village. In turn the bus 
operations were managed locally by individual companies. On average, an 
NBC subsidiary employed four times less staff than a PTE concern but four 
times more than a municipal company. Its organisational structure 
comprised a Board of Directors appointed by the Board of the NBC, and a 
Chairman, usually one of the senior staff of the owning company or group. It 
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also comprised a General Manager who was responsible to the Board for 
the operations of the concern. The activities of each company were divided 
in the traditional manner of Traffic, Engineering and Administration, each 
under the authority of a Traffic Manager, Chief Engineer and Company 
Secretary respectively. Within each of these divisions, there were separate 
sections responsible for specific activities and their number depended upon 
the size and the nature of the business. The formal organisation of the NBC 
can be illustrated as shown in Figure 2-2. 
As far as municipal companies were concerned, they operated about 12% of 
the total vehicle kilometres for stage services. Their average fleet size was 
100 vehicles, which was 20 times more than the average fleet size of a 
private independent operator. Political control was exercised through the 
workings of a Council-appointed Transport Committee whose members 
were elected according to the balance between the political parties 
represented on the Council. The Chairman of this Committee was not a 
full-time officer and the Municipal General Manager was responsible to this 
Committee. He was compelled to specify every item of expenditure and 
receive not only prior sanction from the Transport Committee, but also from 
the policy and finance committees. He engaged in a number of meetings 
either with the Committee Chairman or the full Committee, or with any 
subcommittees of it. He was also expected to attend Council meetings. 
These are just a few examples of a far more reaching set of bureaucratic 
procedures that were imposed on the operators in order to exert control over 
their activities (Lambden, 1969). Lower down the structure, there was a 
Traffic Superintendent who was responsible for the day-to-day traffic 
operations. The compilation of duty-schedule was one of his main duties. 
On the Engineering side, the duties included those one can expect in this 
sort of department: ensuring that vehicles were kept safe for use, were 
economic on the road, and that the traffic department had always sufficient 
units of the right kind of vehicles to meet its operating needs. However, 
much of the accountancy work was dealt with by the Town or City 
Treasuries. The Town clerk looked after legal matters and arranged the 
presentation of cases to the Traffic Commissioners. The links between the 
operation side of a typical municipal company and the political control 
exercised by the County can be represented as shown in Figure 2-3. 
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Finally, the independent operators. They represented only a small share of 
the total stage service market, but operated about 90% of the total vehicle 
kilometres on contract work and private hire. The great majority of them - 
about 97% - owned fewer than 25 vehicles and 62% of their total operated 
with less than 5 vehicles. The simple organizational structure that could be 
found in many of the small-scale independent operators, indicated both the 
existence and at the same time, an expressed willingness to maintain the 
small family business atmosphere. The relationship between management 
and employees was thus much closer than in the larger public sector 
operators and it was not uncommon to find the proprietor acting as general 
manager with probably one assistant responsible both for traffic operations 
and secretary/accountancy duties. At the same time, a greater amount of 
responsibility was delegated to drivers and in some cases a vehicle was 
allocated to an individual driver who, besides the driving duties, was also 
expected to service it (usually by following a checklist under the supervision 
of a foreman). Moreover, many of these operators contracted part-time 
drivers on a casual basis as a means of coping with peak requirements. 
However, the major maintenance and repair work was undertaken in most 
cases by a commercial garage (Button, 1988b) and the year-end accounts 
were prepared by a firm of professional accountants (Hibbs, 1972). The 
environmental constraint placed on these operators was not a political one 
but rather one of restricted access to the market. This is expressed both by 
their scale of operations and by their more flexible and informal approach to 
organizational design, which is depicted in the following illustration (Figure 
2-4): 
Figure 2-4 
Organisational Structure of a Typical Independent 
Board of Directors 
i Managing Director/Company Secretary 
I I 
Engineering Traffic Administration 
Three main aspects must be highlighted in relation to the organizational 
charts. Firstly, the form and the level at which political control was exercised 
on the different bus operators differed in some respects. The NBC was 
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clearly subjected to central government policies and politics, whilst the PTEs 
and the municipals were clearly under more regional or local political 
control. There was a greater distance between central government and the 
operational level of the NBC than between local government politics and 
the PTE's or municipal companies. Political control over the former thus 
tended to be more diluted than over the latter. The small independent 
operators were, on the other hand, always free from direct political authority 
although they were a very interested party to the political changes at central 
and local level. Secondly, the complexity of the organizational structures of 
these operators varied significantly. The NBC, an organisation which 
comprised several companies operating in different geographical areas, 
required rather complex means to attain the overall integrated unit. The 
PTE's were the largest of all operators, whose vertical form of structure 
demanded complex hierarchical relationships. The municipal companies, 
on the other hand, were rather smaller units, clearly integrated in the overall 
structure of the District Councils and their activities were closely 
co-ordinated with the Councils' other departments. The small independent 
companies, however, adopted the simplest structures of all operators, as the 
running of the different activities rested in many cases mainly on the 
proprietors' themselves. Finally, there is a clear division of labour and 
responsibility in the main public sector operators which is not to be found in 
the small independents. 
So far the analysis has concentrated on the role of formal structure in the 
workings of an organisation. But however important this aspect is, it does 
not illustrate the way in which informality - as an expression of the internal 
relationships that are built in the structure - can affect the overall behaviour 
of an organization. The structure-of an organisation can thus be seen as 
providing not only the order by which its parts operate, but also the system 
by which resources can be exploited. As the public sector managers 
worked with structures that were not of their choosing, the system that 
articulated its parts was also somehow imposed and clearly identified with 
the attitudes of those who controlled and took the ultimate decisions. The 
existence of a pattern of defined jobs, organised in a hierarchical manner, 
through clearly defined lines of command or communication, illustrates the 
kind of rigidity and formality that could be observed in the public owned bus 
companies. Discipline and subordination constituted the dominate patterns 
of authority. The need to restrict activities in certain directions and 
encourage it in others without the occurrence of much debate exemplifies 
the advantage of fostering this kind of pattern. The way to achieve it, was 
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by clarifying work-responsibilities. Managers and other staff alike were 
often given specific tasks to perform and their actions restricted to those 
previously allocated to them. This system of accountability led them to 
adopt defensive attitudes and to circumscribe their role in the organisation to 
the duties that they were assigned. Gradually, the resistance to any kind of 
change increased as they come to regard their expertise, however limited, 
as their personal bargaining power in the structure of the organisation. 
The compartmentalization created by divisions between hierarchical levels, 
functions and people, erected important barriers and facilitated the 
formation of blocks, which together with the absence of appropriate 
coordinating mechanisms, prevented the creation of an overall orientation of 
the organization. In fact, empire building, and the defence of departmental 
interests and pet projects, subverted the workings of the whole. - Although 
they may be able to survive for relatively short periods of time, they can 
nevertheless have devastating effects on the future development of an 
organisation for, as Pettigrew (1973b) points out, they provide the ... source 
of many internal conflicts and are able to pursue subunit goals by 
successfully making unjustifiable but substantial claims on the 
organization's limited resources. Furthermore, as Leibenstein (1966) 
argued, even if inputs or factors of production were to be allocated to the 
right units in an organization, it did not necessarily mean that they would be 
used as effectively as possible. He called X-inefficiency the ... difference 
between maximal and actual effectiveness of the utilization of inputs, and 
added that in the absence of a system of monitoring and incentives, the 
members of an organisation may adopt levels of effort which do not 
correspond to those required to attain least costs, but which from their point 
of view yield greater utility. It is reasonable to say that there appears to 
have been no suitable mechanisms in the public transport system as a 
whole, and in the individual operator's forms of organization, to encourage 
members to use their efforts to a maximum, and therefore to shorten the gap 
between their own interests and those of the organisation (Keasey and 
Mulley, 1986; Bly, 1987; Perry et al, 1988). Competition creates pressures 
to reduce X-inefficiency by forcing increases in effort. Providing that there 
are no large inert areas, costs will tend to fall (Liebenstein, 1966). 
The main aim of the 1985 Transport Act was to introduce competition into the 
bus industry by freeing it from direct state control. What remains to be seen 
is whether it has in fact guaranteed the development of what the 
Government hoped to achieve - the creation of a contestable market. 
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Although there are some economists who regard the market as potentially 
contestable, they at the same time point out that this does not necessarily 
mean that all the conditions to attain contestability have been met (Button, 
1988a) or that it will ever be possible to attain them. However, the present 
analysis is not concerned with an interpretation of the possible causes of 
competition not having developed in the way the Government had 
forecasted. It is sufficient to say, that for the operators currently involved in 
the industry, the 1985 Transport Act has meant the end of subsidisation for 
most parts of their networks. Bus operators can now choose the services 
they wish to supply and are free to set their own prices. They are also 
relatively free to enter and exit from the market, and there are no longer 
restrictions on market-product scope, on geographical expansion or on 
labour, pay and working agreements. But there are a number of important 
constraints, namely on the quality of certain inputs (drivers, vehicles), on 
market conduct (agreements which may be regarded as being of an 
anti-competitive nature), and on the relative timing of responses, either to 
demand patterns or to competitors' actions (the registration process). 
Furthermore, the industry continues to depend to a certain extent on political 
decisions, namely with regard to product substitutes. Policies for restricting 
the use of private cars and for the continuing subsidisation of rail services, 
are both still very much under local or central government control. 
2.3 The major trends in strategic responses 
The implementation of the Act in 1986, saw a series of different responses 
amongst the main suppliers in the industry. But it must be realised that the 
changes that have inevitably occurred in the industry have been 
increasingly difficult to identify, as competitive pressures naturally restrict the 
availability of information. The analysis at this stage is therefore limited to 
an interpretation of the concrete actions followed by individual operators. 
It should also be pointed out that although changes in the industry have 
developed on different time scales, it can be argued that the method chosen 
by the Government to introduce and implement them, may have 
intentionally influenced the kind of responses that took place in the early 
stages. There were three important points to the privatisation of the main 
public sector operators: the tight timetable in which it was to be achieved, 
the emphasis on breaking up the large concerns into smaller, more easily 
manageable units (whereby, as Button and O'Donnel (1985) suggested, 
important cost advantages could be achieved), and the preference given to 
management and/or employees' buy-outs. The period between the 
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publication of the White Paper and the full implementation of the policy 
expressed in it, was, it is generally accepted very short. The length of time 
to the first definite - although relatively short-term - registration of commercial 
services was also fairly short. From the Government's point of view, this 
process meant that the industry would, at least in the short-run, still be 
managed by those who had gained experience in the formerly regulated 
market. Major disruptions to public services, especially unpopular social 
ones, were to a great extent avoided. Commercial services were quickly 
identified, and in the cases where they couldn't be justified as viable, they 
were still registered as part of a short-term objective to retain customer 
loyalty. Probably more important was the fact that reductions in operating 
and overhead costs could be achieved more quickly, for this constituted one 
of the main cornerstones, in the Government's argument for deregulation. 
As a matter of fact, it can be said that the established operators were quick to 
deploy their economies of experience (Button, 1988a) and engaged in 
rather short term actions directed at creating barriers to entry into their 
markets, a situation that was so characteristic of the previous period and all 
too familiar to the 'new' management teams. Production staff also played 
their role in combating the competition of their opposite numbers, as they 
possessed superior knowledge of the services. It can therefore be said that 
operational and planning staff were able to retain their status, as the focus of 
the business still involved procedures related to their activities. The 
provision made in the Act which required 42 days notice to start or end the 
registration of most commercial services was novel, and meant that in the 
early stages bus operators did not have much choice but to rely on short 
term planning to ensure that the commitment imposed by law would be 
operationally possible, and probably more importantly, that competitive 
advantage would be guaranteed. At the same time, it became clear that 
competition - regardless of its intensity - prevented a significant rise in the 
level of fares. This meant that fare receipts could not meet the costs that 
were being incurred, and that the gap between the two was widening. It 
appears however, that the decisions to reduce costs were not, at this stage, 
part of a clearly defined strategy directed at achieving overall market cost 
leadership. They were the result of a genuine awareness of the rather 
complex and heavy cost structure associated with the requirements of the 
previously externally imposed operational system. 
But as the intensity of competition eased and the operators were gradually 
able to grasp the workings of the new system, namely the 42 day cycles, it 
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became apparent that management was willing to mobilize the 
organizational resources in search of steadier long term solutions. In fact, 
current trends show an underlying concern for the formulation of strategies 
which respond best to changes, and enable bus operators to best anticipate 
them. This reflects a significant switch in emphasis away from the 
characteristic short term operational planning to an overall, long term 
strategic commitment. 
It is difficult to assess in detail the ways in which this process has developed, 
for most of the information available only refers to actions after they have 
taken place, or in other cases to a set of intentions expressed by companies' 
representatives. It is nevertheless possible to identify major trends. These 
are better illustrated by relating them to the main long standing problems 
facing the industry and to the specific facets of the environment in which they 
developed, and also to past experiences. 
One of the most important problems which the new, or reformulated, bus 
companies faced was the decline in revenue. The supply of bus services 
was not creating or indeed maintaining sufficient quantities of demand. It is 
in this context that the type of responses aimed at generating more traffic are 
probably better understood. An improvement in the key areas of quality and 
quantity of bus supply was felt by many operators to be a suitable means of 
attracting potential demand and/or increasing market shares. 
However, the quality and quantity of supply was stimulated in varying 
degrees according to existing operational conditions and patterns of 
demand. In fact, operators who were able to maintain their previously 
satisfactory record of reliability, concentrated on aspects of accessibility by 
re-routing some of their services. On the other hand, particular patterns of 
demand favoured actions by other operators aimed at reducing travelling 
times via the implementation of express, limited stop services. At the same 
time, the policy of increasing bus frequency, pursued with some degree of 
success during the period immediately after the full implementation of the 
1985 Transport Act, was maintained if only to guarantee the loyalty of those 
who were initially attracted by this kind of policy. But the most important fact 
was that whatever innovative actions were taken to develop the product, 
they were now receiving some promotional backing. 
There can be little doubt that the new environment has forced bus operators 
to adopt more market - oriented postures. They had a product to sell and 
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were aware that it was probably no longer sufficient to provide a reasonably 
reliable service of basic quality in order to generate more demand. The 
need. to monitor the changes in demand more closely has probably 
highlighted other important characteristics of that demand. Conditions were 
created to break with the idea that standard prices and services could be 
offered regardless of the areas exploited, or indeed of the time of day, week 
and year. As a consequence, many operators felt that within the market 
there were segments with significantly important prospects for growth. The 
purposes for bus journeys vary considerably amongst those who do not 
have access to a car, and who use this means of transport for commuting, 
education, shopping or leisure trips. Even within these general segments of 
the market, there are important differences that reflect different tastes, 
spending power and indeed the ages of potential or actual users. The role 
of marketing resides, to a great degree, in the identification of these market 
segments which are growing faster, and in assisting bus operators to satisfy 
their needs by supplying the most appropriate mix of prices and quality 
services (Hovell et al, 1975). Market segmentation has in this way become 
an important strategic option for many operators. Decisions related to the 
renewal of the fleet have for example included the preference for buses 
which offered easy access, reflecting a clear concern for the needs of the 
elderly. At the same time, the greater flexibility achieved by certain types of 
buses, namely the minibuses, were seen as providing means of satisfying a 
growing demand for leisure trips. 
But the industry's attempts to halt the decline in revenue have not been 
limited to actions aimed at generating more traffic. As a matter of fact there 
appears to be a growing interest in alternative ways of creating revenue 
beyond the strict scope of the supply of local bus services. The Government 
in its appraisal of the industry's early responses, anticipated that the new 
legislation had created conditions for market specialization, and that there 
were encouraging signs that bus operators were in fact using this 
opportunity as a means for generating extra revenue (Palmer, 1987). They 
were seen as possessing not only the assets and resources to do so, but 
also the expertise to compete. 
Many bus operators have decided to develop existing activities more 
intensively, namely those associated with the process of producing bus 
services. Engineering work was soon identified as one of the most valuable 
specialised services, and sufficient demand was judged to exist, to justify the 
allocation of important organization resources to this area, and thus 
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influence major corporate decisions. The underlying objective of being able 
to market a highly specialised and competitive package of repair and 
maintenance work, has in fact brought major implications for the whole of the 
organisation. It meant in the first instance the need for quality infrastructure, 
and secondly the availability of workshop space and engineering staff. The 
existence of recently modernized facilities was not, however, a prerequisite. 
Neither were old fashioned, unfitted engineering depots a determinant 
constraint, providing they had a highly rateable value, for this contributed 
significantly to the decision for re-location and to the subsequent 
improvements needed to meet the main market requirements (eg. 
Badgerline Ltd). In both cases though, the fact was, that many operators 
were working with a fast ageing fleet which meant longer and more frequent 
use of the engineering facilities. Although the commitment to specialise 
cannot be seen as being the most significant factor in the decisions for 
renewing the fleet, it may however have borne an important influence on the 
direction of those decisions. The choice made to lease or rent vehicles, was 
probably based on rather more important considerations, namely those 
associated with the financial constraints faced by many operators as a result 
of management or management/employee buy-outs, or indeed it was part of 
a broader strategy with regard to the new competitive environment . But the 
fact is, that it granted the engineering depots the capability to deal with 
outside maintenance contracts. On the other hand, if the decision was to 
buy new buses, either as a result of a more permanent commitment towards 
the markets, or indeed after the trial period offered by the leasing or renting 
arrangements, there appears to have been considerable interest in securing 
maintenance contracts with the suppliers and thus releasing their own 
engineering facilities to provide contract work for others (eg. Badgerline Ltd) 
It becomes clear therefore that, the decision to specialise is part of a broader 
corporate strategy designed to overcome some of the industry's chronic 
trends. An alternative, or in some cases concomitant strategy for creating 
more revenue, and one which has been developed by many bus operators, 
is that of diversification. The 1985 Transport Legislation granted bus 
companies the opportunity to widen their product scope. The decline in the 
demand for public transport might have encouraged many operators to find 
alternative ways to reduce the impact on their organizations as a whole - the 
impact not only of dramatic changes in the product's demand, but also in 
their own competitive positioning (Penrose, 1959). At the same time, the 
unfavourable movements usually associated with the demand for public 
transport which cause periodic under-utilization of resources and significant 
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fluctuations in earnings, might have justified the development of 
supplementary products whose demand varied inversely with that of the 
existing product (Johnson and Scholes, 1988). 
Therefore, diversification in the bus industry can be said to have been 
pursued mainly to overcome specific problems of demand. But as Argenti 
(1980) points out, decisions ... to increase the range of business interests 
and to specify the types of business the companies should enter constitute a 
strategic response of the most general sort. They have involved decisions 
as to whether to keep within the broad confines of the industry (entering into 
or indeed broadening their presence in a related market), or to develop a 
product which bears no close relationship with the existing one. It has also 
involved the decision on whether to acquire companies already operating in 
the chosen markets or to develop through the company's own efforts. 
There have been several cases of related diversification in the bus industry, 
of which the rental of minibuses and the supply of cash services to the retail 
trade, are just two examples. But it has been in the coach industry that the 
main developments have taken place. This reflects the situation whereby 
two activities complement each other, and which at important stages, require 
a similar productive service, ' which is especially valuable in the new activity 
(Johnson and Scholes, 1988). More specifically, current levels of demand 
for public transport may lead to some factors of production not being fully 
utilised but because they were previously procured for the production of one 
output - that of supplying local bus services - they may now also become 
available to aid in the production of other outputs. The prevalence of high 
peak/off peak ratios during significant periods of the week and of the year, 
has significant implications for the productivity of important resources over 
their life span (Chapman and Jenkins, 1977). By deciding to supply a new 
product - e. g. planning excursions during this period by using dual purpose 
buses - bus operators are thus able to generate extra revenue. Some, 
though, have taken a rather longer term commitment with regard to coaching 
revenue, by acquiring companies on the European Continent in the 
expectation of further opportunities following the inauguration of the 
Channel Tunnel, and the freer movements of people and services in the 
European Community by 1992 (eg. Eastern National). 
But it is probably in the unrelated product diversification that the more 
innovative strategic options have taken place. According to Badgerline Ltd, 
....... We felt it sensible to reduce dependence on bus operations, because it 
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was too high should there be a shift in trends, and people generally view it 
as a declining industry. We therefore wished to have a broader base and 
considered all sorts of other opportunities: travel shops, newsagencies, 
hotels, pubs, filling stations, property companies. We aimed to have a 
company long-term with a 70: 30 split on buses against other activities ... 
(Bus & Coach Management, 1988). This statement provides the basis for 
understanding some of the current trends in the industry. Firstly, there is the 
idea that the production of many different, relatively depression-proof 
products constitute the most 'effective' hedge against all kinds of adverse 
changes for it broadens the depth of the company. At the same time, it 
contributes to the improvement of the image of the company. In fact, the 
acquisition of a well established travel agency may, for example, be used to 
re-launch the image of an owned enterprise, as does the development of a 
network of well located newsagencies trading under the same name. 
Secondly, there appears to be an interest in developing diversification into 
products which can be promoted and sold through common channels, for it 
allows ... to keep 
in-house various costs which would be lost, such as 
commissions and off bus sales (Badgerline Ltd), of which the travel and 
hotel products are examples. Finally, it demonstrates the way in which some 
operators seized the opportunity to further develop some services which 
were previously provided strictly for their own purposes, to the extent of 
selling them openly on the market. The formation of property companies 
constitutes a clear example (eg. Badgerline Ltd). 
But diversification cannot be seen as the easy way to solve the industry's 
problems. According to Provincial Ltd, ... It would be very easy to burn our 
fingers and get rid of a lot of cash very quickly, to do something which we 
don't really understand. So our, immediate policy will continue to 
concentrate on one thing we know we can do: buses! (Bus & Coach 
Management, 1988). This statement expresses the unease felt by some 
operators with regard to the perspectives of diversification. As a matter of 
fact, markets which offer satisfactory rates of return can become highly 
competitive. An operator, by entering into a particular innovative and 
technologically demanding industry, is required to develop sufficient 
expertise to maintain or improve its position in the new market. The 
commitment to enter into a new field thus demands the existence of sufficient 
resources to sustain a rate of investment which may be required to keep up 
with competitor's innovations and expansion, not only in the operator's 
existing main field but also in the new one (Penrose, 1959). This is 
probably the reason for diversification being associated with well 
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established concerns with efficient managerial resources, operating in a 
reasonably well worked-out administrative structure (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 
1986). But this concept cannot be over-generalised for there are successful 
companies which lack the incentive to diversify and prefer to re-invest their 
retained earnings in the primary industry rather than branch out. 
Some bus operators have in fact discounted the idea of developing new 
products and have decided to concentrate on strengthening their position in 
the industry. There is increasing evidence, for instance, that bus operators 
are acquiring other companies which run common portions of their networks 
(e. g. Eastern National). 
The merger between operators has enabled the larger unit to re-evaluate 
the allocation of resources in those areas and also to re-arrange 
connections within the enlarged network. This fact appears to endorse the 
idea that there are economies to be achieved by the rationalisation of 
services, or network re-configuration, which can be expressed as the 
proportion of the cost of joint production that is saved by joint production 
(Bailey and Friedlaender, 1982b; Meyer, 1983). 
However, all bus operators have shown a common concern - that of dealing 
with the increasing costs which have been a characteristic of the industry for 
a long time. The existence of old fleets, very heavy overhead structures, 
restrictive labour agreements and overstaffing, defective information systems 
and a highly rigid, vertically integrated organizational structure, have all 
contributed in one way or another to rising costs in the industry. Not that this 
constitutes an atypical picture of many transport systems in other parts of the 
World, but the distinctive feature is the fact that public resources were no 
longer to become available. - The fact is that once the commitment to 
deregulate the industry was taken, there were no, at least in the nearest 
future, prospects for returning to the traditional state subsidising industry and 
this has probably made bus operators realise the need for longer term 
strategies. The problem though resided in reconciling the short term 
pressures on the organisations' resources with the more fruitful longer turn 
commitments. 
The growth in the leasing and rental sectors has probably granted some 
breathing space to many operators. Market opportunities and innovative 
actions were able to mature before a more permanent commitment was 
needed. The apparent adaptability of minibuses to patterns of demand 
43 
eased the pressure on maintenance costs, as did the decisions to establish 
maintenance contracts with the main bus suppliers. There are, however, 
some operators that believe minibuses do not provide better financial results 
than the traditional full-size vehicles, and stress the major objections 
expressed by the public, with respect to the former, namely that they are 
unpleasantly fast in traffic and lack luggage space (e. g. Stevensons of 
Uttoxeter). These operators have, however, been forced to incur additional 
costs by contracting conductors to keep up frequency levels (e. g. East 
Yorkshire). This was considered less costly than allocating extra buses to 
particular services. In spite of most fleet configurations tending to confirm 
the rise in the use of minibuses, they still show that significant numbers of 
full-size vehicles have been maintained. This fact, together with the 
evidence that the industry is becoming increasingly dominated by smaller 
numbers of large, well-established companies (Dodgson and Topham, 
1988), operating in well-defined areas, probably under some sort of tacit 
mutual non-aggressive arrangement, may raise the question of whether 
there is now more incentive to exploit further network economies. If one 
accepts that there is a difference in the cost per mile in providing a seat 
between small buses and greater capacity ones, it may be possible to 
organise service provision in order to attain economies from the scope of 
operations (Rowley and Mulley, 1983; Panzar, 1983). All that is needed is 
to 'enforce' a one-stop service. The smaller capacity buses can, for 
example, be used to bring passengers from diversified less-dense origins, to 
either a central strategic point, or somewhere along the route, where a 
larger bus has been allocated to carry the total of users to a common 
destination (Bailey and Friedlaender, 1982b). 
But the industry has not been concerned only with possible ways of 
achieving economies of networking, for the 'required' market structure may 
not be attainable. In any case, these economies may have further 
detrimental effects on the levels of patronage of individual operators. 
Furthermore, the Government, through its existing monitoring institutions, 
seems determined to impede the 'development of quasi-permanent 
'operational' arrangements amongst bus operators with unforeseeable 
consequences for the industry. 
The Government was, however, clearly determined to demonstrate that the 
1985 transport legislation had created the most favourable conditions for the 
industry to achieve radical reductions in its operational costs, of which 
labour was the largest contributor. In fact, the Government pointed out that 
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... in an industry where the largest single cost is for labour (usually about 
70%) ... during the decade 1972-82 unit costs (measured in terms of costs 
per bus mile) among public sector operators outside London rose by 
between 15% to 30% more than the general level of inflation, much of this 
due to the growth in relative wages in the industry ... and claimed that ... in 
Hereford, the pressure caused by the Trial Area enabled Midland Red 
(West)'s management to negotiate a local improvement in productivity of 25 
to 30% ... (Department of Transport, 1984). 
The Government also provided what it believed constituted further evidence 
of the effect of labour agreements on cost by reference to a joint report by 
NBC and the Leeds Institute of Transport Studies, in which it was claimed 
that ... the variation in cost caused by varying the labour agreements 
(expressed as a% increase in the more expensive arrangements over the 
cheapest) lay between 23% and 77% ... this indicates that whatever the 
pattern of services being provided, there is significant scope for savings 
even within the range of existing labour agreements (Department of 
Transport, 1984). The fact is that following the implementation of the 1985 
Act, many operators were able to reduce, in some cases dramatically, their 
work forces (e. g. Greater Manchester) and at the same time enforce labour 
agreements characterized by more flexible working practices. In general 
terms, the changes that have taken place, included the diversification of the 
tasks of direct labour, the need to work longer hours to maintain previous 
earnings (or alternatively accept a reduction in pay), and the ability to 
contract drivers on a part-time basis in an attempt to reduce peak costs. 
Furthermore, the introduction of computers and microprocessing, or the 
replacement by outside contractors of some of the previously internally 
produced services, has also meant a significant reduction in the category 
related staff. This fact has probably contributed to the growing importance of 
drivers within individual organizations. 
But it was the new market that highlighted an important dilemma for the bus 
operator as far as labour costs and relations are concerned. Competitive 
pressures demanded an increased commitment on the part of the labour 
force but at the same time they demanded levels of productivity which 
meant, if compared to past practices, considerably less favourable working 
conditions had to be offered. 
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This apparently contradictory situation can be further reinforced if at some 
stage the operator decides to spend large amounts of resources by 
acquiring another concern, or indeed by initiating a major marketing venture. 
The fact is that low morale and high levels of turnover can have detrimental 
effects on productivity (Wintrobe and Brenton, 1986), which is exactly the 
reverse of what bus operators wish to attain in the first place. The need to 
develop strategic actions directed internally toward reducing the gap 
between corporate goals and the interests of individual parties becomes'an 
important priority. The fact that bus drivers are the most direct and 
permanent link with an operator's customers, and that they have a wide 
range of different interests, aims, motivations and ways of behaving, has 
encouraged many bus operators to develop important internal marketing 
strategies. Bus drivers play, in effect, an important role in the success of the 
individual company's operations. , They are not only the most privileged 
group within the organisation concerned with promoting its image, but also 
an important vehicle of information on the quality of the service supplied, 
and on the changes that frequently occur in the market. They are, however, a 
vulnerable group. They have to work with increasingly complex equipment, 
and above all have the responsibility for carrying people who, like 
themselves, often fail to see beyond their own immediate interests. 
Common to most management initiatives has been the encouragement of 
participation as a means of transmitting the main corporate goals (e. g. 
Go-Ahead Northern). Strategic changes can thus become more easily 
assimilated and implemented. Participation can also become a guarantor 
of increased commitment. It is in this context that more autonomy and 
responsibility have been assigned to the individual, or group, as an 
expression of the participation process, and more customer-care 
programmes have been incorporated in training schemes. But the process 
of increasing participation has caused important changes in the 
organizational structures of some operators. The main feature has been the 
re-organisation of large groups - namely bus drivers - into smaller units 
(mainly according to service areas), whose work is coordinated by a'leader 
who is responsible for service performance. The underlying idea of small 
groups and their leaders, is that they are better able to deal with the 
uncertainty in their specific market environment. For Go-Ahead Northern, A 
significant part of the success the company has achieved in the last 18 
months in adjusting to the new environment, can be attributed to the 
activities of group leaders and the very much improved communications they 
have facilitated with staff and passengers alike (Bus & Coach Management, 
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1988). It is not clear, however, according to Button (1988b), whether 
... changed attitudes to work and growing levels of labour force participation 
will offer countervailing forces, for at this stage, the dominant concern of 
many operators, appears to be that of creating internal mechanisms which 
offer sufficient probabilities of success, regardless of the direction they 
choose to go in. In fact, market segmentation and/or expansion, related 
and/or unrelated diversification, are all strategic choices which require 
changes in the way internal resources are organised (Johnson and 
Scholes, 1988; Rumelt, 1986). The underlying emphasis has been on the 
superior ability of smaller units to turn local environmental constraints into 
major opportunities for the organization as a whole. Although more 
responsibility and autonomy have been devolved to newly formed centres, a 
large element of central control over strategic decisions appears, however, 
to have been retained. Nevertheless it constitutes a major innovation to the 
way in which the bus industry has been managed. 
This chapter has shown how the two major transport policies can affect the 
general workings of the individual bus operator. It has not, however, 
provided an analysis of the process by which a deregulated market has 
induced the changes, or the extent to which bus operators have been able to 
meet the challenge of the new environment, nor has it been possible to 
assess the influence that the values and ideologies of those who run the 
new, or re-formulated, bus companies might have had on the major strategic 
decisions. 
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Chapter 3: A Case of Change 
3.1 The competitive challenges in a declining market 
The bus industry has long been viewed as operating in a declining market, 
a'decline which has been characterised by both changes in the nature and 
profile of demand and in the resources within the organisations themselves. 
Of the variety of causes that have been put forward to explain the decline of 
the industry, it is important to single out two, since it is considered that they 
will contribute to a better understanding of the current market strategies that 
have been pursued in the industry by individual bus companies. 
The first major factor relates to the nature of the product itself. It has seldom 
been pointed out that one of the main reasons for the long-term decline in 
patronage is due to the fact that the product has become what is called an 
increasingly alien product. Services were designed and marketed without 
an adequate reference to the user's needs. The consequent fall in receipts 
was also accompanied by excessive wage settlements, inflexible labour 
practices, deferred maintenance and artificially low fares. A policy aimed at 
maintaining the largest possible network by encouraging 
cross-subsidisation among services appears to have been a dominant 
strategy in the face of this long-term declining demand. 
The second factor concerns the role played by other products which provide 
an alternative to both the industry's existing and potential customers. The 
activities of the bus industry's substitutes, as in any other industry, are 
important to the extent that they succeed in influencing the buyer's value 
chain and enhance the propensity of buyers to switch modes of transport 
(Porter, 1985). Private transport has probably benefited from increased 
affluence and from more dispersed employment and residential locations, 
which to a certain extent have allowed journeys to be made on less 
congested roads at higher speeds. But public transport in general has 
never seriously addressed the aggressive marketing campaigns - which 
usually stress the benefits and attractiveness of their products - employed by 
most car manufacturers. At the same time, the intense competition among 
the substitute providers has helped boost the overall demand for private 
transport. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that while accounting for 
only 8% of the total U. K. passenger market - in terms of passenger-miles - 
the bus industry is still a substantial one with an estimated annual turnover 
of over £2200m (Fawcett, 1989). It was in this context that the current 
Conservative Government - inspired by the wave of deregulatory moves 
initiated across the Atlantic - decided to privatise the publicly owned bus 
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companies operating outside London; and at the same time introduce a 
new regulatory framework for the industry. 
The relatively wide interest demonstrated in the sale of the main public 
group - the NBC - was quickly claimed to reflect investor's confidence in the 
industry and ultimately confirm the Government's prediction with regard to 
the industry's new prospects for development. In effect, a major 
contributing factor for the industry's decline was, in the view of the 
Government, due to the growing involvement of the state in running the 
business. Private entrepreneurship was thus judged to be the force 
capable of reversing the declining trends of the industry, and the (relatively) 
free market the place where the success or failure of the industry's suppliers 
was to be decided. 
This new environment obviously created a whole range of new issues for the 
industry's 'new' management teams. The most challenging one involved 
decisions on which corporate strategies to adopt, in order to exploit the 
opportunities presented by a declining market. The underlying belief 
behind those decisions must be taken to be that these opportunities offered 
viable prospects for the individual concerns. 
To this extent, it was of little surprise that the immediate concern for most 
bus companies was finding ways by which the level of costs could be 
substantially reduced and the characteristics of services significantly 
improved. The degree to which success was obtained in these two areas 
proved crucial for subsequent developments in the market. 
The move towards lower operating costs and in particular labour costs (for 
they represent the largest proportion of bus companies operating costs), 
took place on a wide scale throughout the industry. There were in fact 
unique opportunities to enforce lower wage rates and improved scheduling 
flexibility and utilization. The difficult financial conditions faced by most bus 
companies together with whatever the levels of competition that occurred in 
local markets after 1986, posed a real threat of job losses -a situation 
which has probably never been faced before (except when 'one person 
operations' were introduced). This fact exerted a , persuasive pressure for 
moderating pay demands and for accepting new employment conditions. 
At the same time, there was also a general impetus to introduce major 
changes in the services provided. New routes were created to allow 
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improved accessibility, adjustments were made to minimise the need for 
transfers, and frequency levels increased (especially in the more dense 
areas). These changes were based largely on the need to respond to 
competition, but they also reflected an awareness of the need to 
substantially improve the (poor) transport services provided in the past. If 
the declining levels of demand were to be halted and/or if the product was to 
stand any chance of "revitalization" this was essential. Recent data reveals 
that in effect the number of passengers carried during 1986/87 declined over 
7% but the drop in 1987/88 was smaller at just over 2%. 
Although it has been suggested so far that the broad strategies adopted by 
bus companies since 1986 have concentrated on very similar areas i. e., 
followed similar patterns of generic strategies, there are many differences to 
be found in terms of the extent to which opportunities have been exploited. 
Whilst the reductions in operating and other overhead costs and the 
changes in the characteristics of services are important, the degree of 
improved scheduling, labour efficiency improvements, product design 
modifications and the degree of capacity utilization achieved in this process 
can in effect make the difference between profitability and non-profitability. 
In other words, a major factor for profitability resides in a combined, efficient 
utilization of both labour and vehicles which constitutes an important 
grounding on which to base market strategies. The ways in which the 
problem of a peaking demand, identified as a major source of the industry's 
deficits in the past can be overcome, illustrates the scope that exists for 
achieving different results. This period of operation usually requires a 
number of vehicles and drivers for only a few hours a day. The services 
provided during the peak hours have been estimated to cost 33% to 40% 
more than off-peak services. The introduction of split shifts and the 
contracting of part-time drivers (although this solution not always solves the 
excess capacity in the periods immediately before/after the peak) can 
reduce the costs of operating these services, although these measures can 
generate less visible, but equally important costs in terms of large staff 
turnovers, absenteeism or in fact commitment. But, most importantly, it is 
the capability to practice service integration - to combine commuter services 
with other operations (e. g. contract services, private hire) - that determines 
the biggest differences in the level of costs. The economies of scope that 
can be achieved from the fit between a set of different operations means the 
costs of operation by two operators can differ widely. It is also clear that 
different patterns of operations lead to differences in capacity utilization. 
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Even in the case of two companies attaining the same average utilization, 
they may be incurring different costs depending on whether one changes its 
utilization frequently and the other is able to keep it relatively constant. 
The process of designing services is of course crucial for generating a 
product which is utilized to capacity. In this context, the degree of success 
greatly resides in the ability to create or review the most important elements 
in bus journeys. A single-service approach has proven unsuccessful in the 
face of a real heterogeneous market which rewards packages of services 
that meet the needs and desires of its different segments. It is clear for 
example that a professional-managerial segment values service 
improvements to a greater extent than cost savings, whereas for the elderly, 
accessibility and costs are more important than savings in travel time. 
However, it must be realised that the attractiveness of a segment is not only 
a function of its size and growth, but also of the match between the 
capabilities of the individual operator and the needs of the segments. This 
obviously requires certain attributes - namely regular monitoring of the 
changes in the characteristics of demand and assessment of own potentials 
- which are not present in many bus companies. The market niche which 
most operators appear to be exploiting recently - that of frequent (minibus) 
services - has led in some cases to an overstretching of resources, reflected 
by growing reliability problems. Many bus companies in their pursuit of 
greatly reducing costs have in the process failed to recognize the longer 
term advantages of continued investment in important indirect activities, of 
which maintenance and in particular preventive maintenance is of the 
utmost importance. 
There are many more factors that could be considered in order to enhance 
the understanding of the current trends in competitive strategies being 
pursued in the bus industry. Successful specialisation in complementary- 
activities (e. g. engineering work), product diversification, exploitation of 
valuable assets (land and buildings), relative success in the industry in the 
past, are all important for determining existing market (re)positioning 
strategies. They have in fact played a role in the changes that have 
occurred in the structure of the industry, if only as a backing for certain 
strategies aimed at gaining market dominance. Nonetheless, the most 
common strategies adopted by bus companies with regard to the supply of 
public services - still their dominant product - have consisted of achieving 
cost reductions and improved services. According to Porter (1985), there 
are two basic ways of achieving competitive advantage: cost leadership and 
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differentiation. The degree to which a firm can achieve a lower cumulative 
cost of performing value activities than its competitor, determines whether it 
has achieved a cost advantage. Similarly, differentiation can lead to 
competitive advantage if the firm can be unique at something that is valuable 
to buyers. For Porter, however, differentiation is a broader concept than 
quality: ... it is a strategy that attempts to create value for the buyer 
throughout the value chain. Differentiation is a costly strategy and demands 
a premium price that must exceed the added costs of being unique. 
On the other hand, competitive strategy relates to the ability to cope and 
ideally change competitive forces in the firm's favour. These forces 
encompass the entry of new competitors, the rivalry among existing ones 
and the threat of substitutes. These forces play a predominant role in 
determining profitability for they establish who keeps what proportion of the 
value a product creates for buyers (Porter, 1985). 
The threat of entry and the intensity of rivalry amongst existing competitors 
have implications for the extent to which the value created will be nullified by 
lower prices, or be dissipated by the costs of competing. The threat of 
substitutes on the other hand, places a ceiling on the industry's prices to the 
extent that other products can meet (better) the same buyer needs. 
The importance of substitutes differs according to market segments and has 
therefore different threatening effects depending on the segments that a 
company serves. The threat of substitutes in the professional/managerial 
type segment is significantly superior in comparison to the potential threat 
that exists in the younger segment (e. g. students and first time employees), 
to a lesser degree in the suburban/housewife segment and practically 
nonexistent in the'elderly part of the market. As a result of this difference in 
segment vulnerability, measures to improve/alter quality/costs of the 
product, its image and marketing efforts must vary accordingly. The 
success of these strategies depends to a great extent on the amount and 
direction of the resources that bus operators are prepared to invest in order 
to influence the substitution process. 
The fact that private transport has successfully penetrated the market for 
public transport requires the identification of the causes for such success in 
particular in the most important segments. In fact, it might be in the interests 
of bus companies to redirect their strategies toward those segments that are 
least vulnerable to substitution and focus investments on such segments. 
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There is some evidence that in effect some bus companies like Provincial 
have concentrated more intensely on those segments that are less exposed 
to substitution - for example, ... our market is the young and the elderly (Bus 
and Coach Management, 1988). 
In general though, investment initiatives aimed at attracting users out of 
private transport have been modest. Marketing expenditures still represent 
a negligible proportion of total operating expenses, and whatever has been 
achieved in the field must be attributed to learning experiences. Yet, it has 
been 'suggested that ... 
if 1 in 20 of journeys by car or taxi could have been 
attracted to buses, the last 25 years of decline would have been reversed, 
and local bus operations would have experienced a 50% boost in patronage 
(Fawcett, 1989). 
It can therefore be argued that the other competitive forces - new entrants 
and existing operators - have played a more predominant role in the 
competitive strategies pursued by most bus companies since 1986. One of 
the most important aims of the 1985 Legislation was to create conditions in 
the industry for competition to occur, and consequently to make every 
company vulnerable to attacks by competitors. These can come from two 
main sources - new entrants into the industry and other existing 
competitors. The actions taken by the former usually involve seeking new 
opportunities in an industry that represents a logical extension of their 
existing activities. The competitive challenges by the latter group reflect on 
the other hand attempts to reposition themselves due to their failure to meet 
or willingness to enhance certain targets of return from current positions. 
Although there have been suggestions that the process of privatisation 
followed by the Government might have led to the effective granting of 
market power to some bus operators, the ensuing analysis does not attempt 
to investigate this point. The important issue is one of identifying the 
general competitive strategies likely to have contributed to the market 
dominance by some (a few) bus companies in an industry facing a declining 
demand. 
It has been pointed out that one of the most important generic strategies that 
can be pursued in an industry with a shrinking demand is to increase 
investment and seek dominance. The specific strategies associated with 
this objective include the acquisition of competitors and the adoption of 
actions that exert pressures on others (e. g. predatory pricing) to "help" them 
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exit the industry sooner. The underlying expectation behind this kind of 
strategy is that higher returns are likely to accrue to the last remaining 
companies in the industry, and as a consequence less emphasis is placed 
on potential short-term losses. Evans (1988), for example, has argued that 
only a small number of buses can operate profitably on each urban route, 
thus reinforcing the idea that larger profits can be obtained by becoming the 
sole operator on a route rather than sharing it competitively with others. The 
possibility of charging higher than competitive fares and providing less 
frequent services than would otherwise be required by the presence of 
potential/actual competitors, enhances the attainment of larger profits. 
There is evidence that in the cases where market dominance has been 
asserted, fares have increased and frequencies decreased relative to their 
competitive levels. 
It is possible to identify some of the more general competitive strategies that 
have dominated the industry since 1986, although the full assessment of 
their role in the successes and/or failures that have occurred has still to be 
researched. The large incumbent operators have relied mostly on broadly 
targeted market strategies rather than focussing on narrow segments of the 
market. In doing so, they have become potentially vulnerable to other 
operators that might enter the market through the adoption of a focussed 
strategy. This threat can become particularly significant if there are strong 
interrelationships with other segments. There is evidence that contract 
services constitute a segment in which interrelationships can be built as for 
example is the case of commercial networks(1). The response to this strategy 
has involved intentionally worsening the conditions in the focussed 
operator's segments, through the registration of part/whole of contract 
services as commercial operations if actual entry has occurred, or by 
submitting lower subsidy requirements as a deterrent to potential entrants. 
The extent to which operators are prepared to follow this strategy depends 
on whether they have sufficient flexibility to serve the focussed operator's 
segment as well as others and on whether serving both undermines their 
ability to serve either. So far, incumbent operators appear to have been 
ready to meet these requirements even at the cost of compromising other 
strategies, i. e. foregoing more efficient utilization or alternative uses for the 
resources allocated to this end. 
(1) 75% of some 200 recorded cases of former territorial operators commencing operations 
outside their territorial area were based on local authority contracts and many operators later 
diversified into full commercial operations (Huntley 1989). 
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These actions constitute in effect a major strategic measure aimed at 
erecting entry barriers and illustrate the importance of considering a specific 
move - actual or potential - in its entire context. At the same time, it 
underlines the risks involved in entering an industry or expanding into new 
areas without a clear competitive advantage (cost or differentiation). 
However, it is in the more competitive parts of the market that the major 
battles for supremacy have taken place, and where the most successful 
competitive strategies can be identified. The visible signs of competitive 
behaviour can be said to have encompassed substantial increases in the 
level of service frequencies and reductions in the prices of fares. The aim of 
a high frequency and low prices strategy is clearly to raise the competitor's 
costs and lower its revenues in an attempt to erode its profitability. 
Reinforcing service frequencies represents an attempt to fill all the possible 
gaps that a competitor occupies or might intend occupying, e. g. to reduce 
the potential amount of casual demand that a competitor is/might be able to 
capture by deciding/continuing to compete in those periods of the day when 
operating costs are lower and demand levels, although high, are not at their 
highest. Forcing a competitor to match lower fare prices, on the other hand, 
aims at nullifying the potentially higher returns that might accrue by 
operating at lower costs. The notable point in all the competitive actions 
pursued in the industry since 1986 is the relatively fast pace at which they 
have taken place. The opportunities presented by some of the provisions of 
the 1985 Act (and subsequent alterations) - namely the facility to change 
the characteristics of service provision without being subjected to 
registration procedures and implementation timetables - has allowed 
quicker actions to occur faster. 
Nonetheless, the pace of change in the industry does illustrate above all a 
crucial element for enhancing the probability of success of a competitive 
strategy: the advantages of acting quickly. Early response to a challenger's 
move constitutes an effective strategy, for it is the period immediately after a 
move that companies tend to value most, with the early results obtained 
often used for longer-term projections. The fact is that if early targets are 
met, exit barriers are likely to arise as incremental investments are made 
and the challenger's commitment is increased as a result. There is 
evidence that the large incumbent operators can deploy relatively large 
amounts of resources in short periods of time and therefore be able to avoid 
prolonged battles with new entrants and/or (smaller) established operators. 
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In the cases where this has not been accomplished, incumbents have also 
shown their superior capabilities in coping with relatively more costly 
competitive actions. For example, interrelationships between operating 
units have been exploited to demonstrate an overall corporate commitment 
to succeeding in the industry. Furthermore, they have been able to 
overcome successfully attacks on those parts of their network that have 
proved vulnerable to competitors, or in fact where existing companies were 
operating, by limiting the extent of the costs of competing to those specific 
areas - e. g. reducing prices only in the services adjacent to those where a 
competitor has decided to operate or in fact where it was already operating. 
For the small operator this strategy creates severe mobility barriers. 
However, the 'cost' of cross-subsidizing services to deter entry and/or 
expansion may prove too high and provide scope for other operators to 
enter the subsidised market or parts of the most profitable one - especially 
those which are priced at levels higher than necessary. Nonetheless, the 
current trends in the structure of the industry tend to confirm the growing 
success of an increasingly smaller number of the large incumbent operators. 
In June 1989,25 of the 59 ex-NBC subsidiaries were in seven holding 
company groups with an average of 1200 vehicles each. Furthermore, the 
biggest groups had between 2,000 and 3,000 vehicles (Local Transport 
Today, 1989). This trend has obvious implications for the proclaimed 
applicability of the theory of contestability to those industries controlled and 
run by the public sector through strict entry regulations. 
The concern that has been most widely expressed refers to the "unexpected" 
behaviour of firms in the post-deregulation period. In the case of the US 
aviation industry, the proponents of the theory of contestability have argued 
that the post-deregulation events - namely the increasing number of 
collapses of smaller airlines - do not refute the basic tenets of the theory but 
should, on the contrary, be attributed to the appearance of structural 
deficiencies on the supply side of the markets (e. g. airport congestion and 
long delivery periods for aircraft). 
In the UK bus industry, there are some who do not consider the increase in 
the number of large holding companies as playing a dominant role in the 
industry - at least not yet - and point out that they are sufficiently dispersed 
in terms of geographic locations and that intense competition is occurring 
`between subsidiaries. In any case, as the Federal Trade Commission 
(1985) has asserted in one of its rulings ... in the absence of barriers to entry, 
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incumbent firms cannot exercise market power, regardless of the 
concentration in the nominal market and indeed if the market has been 
'monopolised' by a single firm ... for all that suffices is the presence of 
potential entrants on the fringe of the market to prevent the exercise of 
market power. 
It is difficult to assess the role that the threat of potential entry is having in the 
U. K. bus industry. But there is evidence for instance that a smaller number 
of bids has been occurring in the tendering of subsidised contracts - after 
all the most favourite entry strategy - and that some operators have felt 
sufficiently confident to de-register less profitable services only to submit 
bids to have them restored under subsidised contracts. Although the 
authorities appear adamant not to accept these widespread practices, they 
may become increasingly powerless to contend with other indications of 
market dominance - which in itself is an important strategy for firms that 
operate in a declining industry. 
In effect, one of the most powerful arguments that the Government used to 
introduce the changes in the bus industry was that the pre-1985 regulatory 
arrangements resulted in the establishment of a structure which led to the 
kind of market conduct and performance responsible for the decline in the 
industry. The main question appears now to be how to induce market 
conducts that are consistent with contestability and still remain within a 
general non-institutionalised framework. 
However, the aim of this chapter was not to investigate the potential 
relationship between competitive strategies and the structure of an industry. 
Rather it represents an attempt to begin to understand the strategies being 
pursued in an industry during the period following its deregulation. It looked 
specifically at the compatibility of these strategies with those that might be 
expected from a declining industry in general. It stressed the role of a 
number of bus industry related factors in achieving some sort of competitive 
advantage and, most importantly, it showed the rationale behind bus 
companies' attempts to turn competitive forces to their own advantage. It is 
however important to stress the potential limitations of this work, for it is 
based only on the most externally visible expressions of these strategies, 
and is therefore unable to account for the full implications of these strategies 
on the individual organizations and ultimately on the future developments in 
the industry. 
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3.2 The role of organizational variables 
Organizations are instruments of human agency - individual and social - 
constructed for the pursuit of specific goals. They can be regarded as social 
units engaged in transforming perceived environmental needs into products 
and services. The ways in which social arrangements are coordinated and 
interrelated within these units greatly determines the extent to which outputs 
are accepted and valued by the different environments. 
Organization structures are said to constitute one of the most important 
organizational variables for they encompass several crucial organizational 
functions. These functions in turn influence others which are no less 
important - for example, attitudes and processes. They therefore contain 
two fundamental aspects of organizational life: (a) the formal structure which 
is a planned framework created for the accomplishment of an organization's 
activities; (b) the informal relationships amongst organizational members, 
which evolve within the formal structure. 
Amongst those functions defined by the formal dimensions of an 
organization's structure are the distribution of functions and authority, 
coordination and integration, and communication and information flows. 
The formal division of work can be categorized in two ways. The first is the 
traditional way. This can be functional or divisional depending on whether 
the grouping of activities is built around functions [e. g., sales, manufacturing, 
administration], or around divisions, in which case the functional units are 
established for each product, customer or location. Secondly, there is the 
more contemporary design which includes the holding organization - one in 
which the allocation of functions is extensive to the point where the 
corporate office performs limited activities [e. g. capital allocation] - and the 
matrix organization - where a divisionalized, departmentalism is 
super-imposed on the functional organization. 
Delegation of authority is seen as an important characteristic of 
organizational life. There are two basic ways of structuring authority within 
an organization: by centralisation or by decentralization. The 
distinguishing factor lies in the degree to which the devolution of 
decision-making is distributed amongst organization members and units. 
Concomitant to the type of structure and degree of delegation that an 
organization chooses to adopt, there must be mechanisms to co-ordinate 
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and integrate its various activities. Organizations are not anarchic units. 
Production targets and sales expectations must be coordinated. Likewise, 
the needs of specific customer groups and geographic divisions must be 
combined into corporate goals. The mechanisms that can be used vary 
from hierarchical referral - i. e., the authority of the hierarchy -to setting goals 
on results (e. g. budgeting) to the addition of liaison elements or integrating 
departments. 
As the division of work is delineated, the degree of delegation is allocated, 
and the integrating mechanisms are set up, there remains the need to 
establish the way in which information is generated and channelled through 
the structure. The number of organization members that are involved in this 
process, their relative positioning in the structure and the degree to which 
information is encouraged and open to modification, constitute the main 
distinguishing features of communication systems. Organizational 
communication can thus flow vertically (up and down the organizational 
hierarchy) and horizontally (across the hierarchy) and to a certain extent 
they both have implications for the quantity and quality of information on 
which decisions are to be based. 
But however efficient communication systems may be in assisting corporate 
decisions, it is understood that these can be further enriched if there is an 
adequate synchronization between an organization's goals and those of its 
members. Motivation and participation are structural mechanisms designed 
to enhance commitment. 
Generally, the primary objective of the formal structure of an organization is 
to ensure that its activities are carried out in the best possible way. The 
effects of this on the conduct of individuals and groups should not be 
underestimated. In fact, the norms of behaviour that are created and 
superimposed on the formal structure greatly influence the actual operation 
of an organization. Informal structures provide notýonly valuable additional 
channels of communication, but they can also serve to highlight deficiencies 
or weaknesses in the formal organization [e. g. duties and responsibilities not 
covered in job descriptions or outdated systems and procedures]. 
Furthermore, they can help overcome unplanned and unforeseen situations 
more rapidly than would have been possible if formal methods alone were 
used. 
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Thus far, some of the main structural variables of an organization have been 
outlined. It is the interaction of these variables that provides the basic 
framework for organization life. Organizations, however, are not static, 
self-contained units. They are an integral part of more general social, 
economic and cultural environments. Organization theories aim at 
explaining the ways in which organizational variables interact in this context 
in order to understand organizational decisions and are important to the 
extent that they provide rich conceptual frameworks for the study of 
organizations in general. 
The first major contribution that has had a lasting impact on the development 
of organization theory can be traced to the first half of this century. It 
became known as the Classical Theory of organization and management. 
The fundamental characteristic of the early works by Taylor, Fayol and 
Weber was the mechanization of organizational life. 
Taylor in his book 'The Principles of Scientific Management' defined 
elaborate systems of work design and performance evaluation. Fayol 
focussed his work on the design of the total organization rather than the 
individual job, and Weber emphasised the need for the routinization of the 
administrative process. The basic principle was, however, similar: 
organizations should function as if they were machines. The fact is that for 
the classical theorists the main strategic issue relied on production 
efficiency. To this effect, the structural dimension prescribed entailed a 
specialised functional division of work and a centralised decision-making 
process coordinated by standard procedures and codified rules. 
Communications were to flow vertically downward through precise lines of 
command, and commitment was to be accomplished by legal compliance 
and rewards. 
The limitations of this approach were soon to be challenged on the grounds 
of the model's neglect of the human aspects of an organization, and on the 
fact that the tasks facing organizations are much more complex and 
uncertain than those that can be performed by machines. it must, however, 
be said that the mechanistic approach has had a major impact on the ways 
in which some organizations have chosen to work, for it has been shown to 
have led to significant increases in productivity, although at recognizable 
human costs. At the same time it must be pointed out that the prescriptions 
advocated were probably in keeping with the kind of environment and tasks 
facing organization managers during the period of study. Dessler (1980) for 
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example, relates the comparatively slow pace of life of that time and the kind 
of work tasks - routine effort and not creativity - with the 'rigid' mechanistic 
approach. 
The first major challenge to this model was provided by the Hawthorne 
Studies (1933). The importance of the human side of the organization was 
acknowledged for the first time. The main concern was nevertheless limited 
to finding a balance between technical and human requirements to achieve 
a higher quality operational mode. However, the emergence of an 
increasingly complex, diversified and uncertain environment in the post 
1945 period marked a shift in emphasis in the development of organization 
theory. This period was characterized by a wealth of research work which 
emerged as a reflection of a growing interest in the study of an increasingly 
important phenomena - organizations. This interest arose as a result of the 
shortcomings of the classical model -a new set of organizational demands 
could no longer be met by a closed mechanistic system - and also as an 
alternative to the normative microeconomics whose main concern resided in 
the ways in which economic units ought to behave rather than how they 
really behaved. Simon (1957) asserted that the model which describes the 
economic man ... choosing among fixed and known alternatives to each of 
which is attached known consequences no longer proves adequate when 
perception and cognition intervene between the decision maker and his 
environment. Furthermore Cyert and March (1963) held the view that firms, 
rather than trying to maximize/minimize economic variables, tried instead to 
'satisfice' certain goals [e. g. holding a certain share of the market]. 
The study of organizational life came to be regarded as the most appropriate 
methodological approach to counter both the classical formula of 'accepted 
assumptions-expected results' and to examine those factors which entailed 
greater influence on decision-making. 
The contingency theory provided one of the first major contributions to this 
effect. According to this theory there is in fact no best way to organize - as 
presented by the classicists - but at the same time not all ways of organizing 
are equally effective. As a contingency represents a possible event, this 
approach aimed at establishing forms of organizations that were most 
appropriate under certain circumstances. Burns and Stalker (1961) and 
Lawrence and Lorsh (1967) are amongst those theorists who argued that 
organization structures are contingent upon environments. 
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Burns and Stalker (1961) asserted that firms tended to organize more 
around products and projects and less around functions as the rate of 
change in the environment increased. Thus in those industries 
characterised by high rates of change of markets and technology, firms 
adopted an organic structure - one that is decentralised, informal and with 
lateral communication systems based on information and advice rather than 
instructions and decisions. In industries with stable markets and production 
lines, firms adopted a mechanistic structure - one that is centralised, highly 
formalised and with downward communication processes. The type of 
structure was therefore seen as being contingent upon the rate of change in 
the environment. 
Lawrence and Lorsh (1967) redefined the contingent assumption by arguing 
that since organizations are composed of different subunits, these may also 
need to take different forms according to the characteristics of the 
subenvironments that they face. They concluded that the greater the degree 
of certainty of the relevant subenvironment, the more formalised the structure 
of the subsystem. Subsystems would, however, not only differ in terms of 
their structures but also on their member's orientations toward time and 
goals - production employees tended to have short-term orientations 
because the feedback concerning their decisions was short intervalled 
whereas research members tended to have long-run perspectives because 
their feedback comprised longer periods. Their study also pointed out the 
fact that the more an organization diversified its operations to meet 
environmental conditions, the more relevant integration mechanisms 
became. The success of an organization was thus as much dependent on 
effective differentiation as on effective integration. 
The ideas expressed by Lawrence and Lorsh (1967) can be associated with 
the General System Theory which was developed from the 'organic' views of 
Von Bertalanffy and other biologists. Here organizations are seen as 
systems composed of sets of flows and processes but where the separate 
units or departments of a business are subordinated to the decision-making 
information and communication networks. Katz and Kahn (1966) embraced 
many of the general system theory concepts in so far as they emphasized 
the role of information on management's decisions and envisaged 
decentralisation as a deliberate restructuring of an organization to handle 
information overload. 
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Chandler (1962) on the other hand suggested that organization structures 
are contingent upon their strategies for growth. The awareness of 
environmental opportunities and needs stimulated strategies that led to 
expansion of volume and geographic dispersion, vertical integration and 
product diversification. Each of these strategies created different types of 
administrative problems which were eventually met - Chandler suggested 
that there was a time lag between administrative needs and their 
satisfactions - by the adoption of different forms of organizational structure. 
Thus the functional structure was adopted to run an organization that had a 
single or dominant product market strategy and the multiple-divisional 
structure was created for product diversification, for it was seen to permit 
quicker responses to individual market demands. Scott's (1971) three 
stage model is also essentially a sequence of new sources of diversity 
causing complexity and the concomitant changes in structure. Beckhard 
and Harris (1977) added that as organizations, grow further and each 
division required the technologies represented in each of the other 
organization's basic function (e. g. accounting, personnel or engineering), 
the headquarters will eventually become a holding company for a group of 
separate entities, each possessing all the functions. 
The idea that structures follow strategy can be further exploited to justify the 
emergence of matrix organizations. The strategy can be associated with 
growing environmental problems that create the need for increased 
interdependence across products, areas and functions. Matrix organizations 
thus result from strategies that introduce new sources of diversity and make 
product area divisions and markets of equal strategic importance. 
The strategy-structure model cannot, however, be considered as a universal 
one-way sequence. Normann (1985) for instance pointed out cases where 
structural changes have increased the learning capacities of organizations 
and generated new strategies. Furthermore, certain structural features [e. g., 
a decentralisation process whereby general management's 'operational' 
functions are lessened] may provide the necessary requisites for the 
formulation of new strategies [e. g., provide management with the objectivity 
necessary to look for opportunity beyond the current scope of their 
business]. Similarly, certain fundamental organizational characteristics can 
be associated with different strategic orientations. Pitts (1977) has pointed 
out that an organization where the corporate dimension is extensive 
(functions and staff), the interdivisional transfers are high, resources are 
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shared on a wide scale and which values subjective performance appraisal, 
can be associated with a diversification strategy based on internal 
development. An 'acquisitive diversifier' on the other hand is seen as 
... deliberately foregoing these aspects and relying instead on the ability to 
attract and retain acquired managers who themselves possess the required 
expertise in newly extended fields. However, Barnes et al (1970) 
expressed the view that organization structures should not restrict the 
definition of strategies to the extent that these do not conform with their 
current characteristics, for it may mean foregoing greater development 
opportunities. 
Another school of thought - e. g. Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) - 
associates organization structures with the degree of competitiveness that 
prevails in specific business environments. According to Galbraith and 
Nathanson, organizations adopt structures in order to remain competitive in 
a process that is quite independent of size (Aston Studies), product diversity 
or technology (Woodward, 1976). They concluded that ... the more the firm 
is decentralised and formalised in a competitive environment, the stronger 
the relation with economic performance. They used the example of Boeing 
to illustrate how a functional organization 'managed' a monopoly situation 
but became inadequate as a competitive market emerged and performance 
decreased. The studies by Negandhi and Reimann (1972) and Khandwalla 
(1973) appear to confirm these findings. They both established that 
organization structures become of primary importance under more 
competitive conditions. The degree of market competitiveness is seen as 
affecting organization structures in two ways: the greater the competition the 
more likely it is that decentralisation will increase to allow speedier 
responses to counter competitive action; the greater the competition the 
more likely that formal management and control will increase to enable 
closer monitoring of the competitive responses. The ways in which 
organizations tend to respond to competitive market conditions and the 
associated structural characteristics were further developed by Galbraith 
and Nathanson (1978). Organizations start by attempting to control what 
they regard as their territory. The search for new opportunities - 
geographical or product - however, requires the adoption of organic 
structures to assist in the learning process. To achieve this objective, 
organizations use "feelers" (the systematic investigation of new markets and 
technologies [Rhenman, 1973]) to collect new knowledge and. devise 
possible solutions to environmental problems. If, however, the outcome of 
this process leads to market penetration, in an effort to establish a dominant 
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position, organizations may instead require a more traditional military or 
mechanistic structure to be successful (Rhenman, 1973). 
There are, however, others who have suggested that it is not really 
important whether structure caused strategy or vice versa, but whether the 
organization's internal processes and structures are consistent with the 
strategy adopted. Child (1977) developed this point when he considered 
the case of two profitable airlines which faced a similar environment and 
were of equivalent size. Despite the fact that they worked with contrasting 
structures - centralised versus decentralised, non divisionalised versus 
divisionalised, personal control versus impersonal control systems, short 
term versus long term horizons - they both achieved a level of congruence 
amongst all the organizational variables which enabled them to handle the 
environment satisfactorily. On the other hand, the low performing airlines 
were found to have inconsistent structures, e. g., decentralisation but severe 
restrictions on decision-making capacity and lack of performance 
monitoring. 
This difference between organizations can also be attributed to different 
management styles which reflect the ideologies that prevail in the 
organization. According to Miles and Snow (1978) it is the dominant 
ideology rather than the environment stimuli that determines both strategies 
and structures. Thus in a declining market demand situation, an organization 
in which the prevailing ideology is conservative and low risk taking, would 
concentrate on the market niche in which it specialises and on high control 
mechanisms. An organization dominated by those who favour innovation 
would be characterized by higher risk strategies, greater individual initiative 
and less emphasis on efficiency and controls. 
Another important organizational dimension associated with management 
style of leadership concerns the ways in which an organization's member's 
commitment is sought. Authoritarian leadership and democratic supervision 
usually describes management preferences with regard to participation in 
decision making processes. Research findings suggest that although 
participation may result in increased- employee commitment, self-control 
and intrinsic motivation, its results on the employee's ultimate performance 
are less clear. Furthermore, whereas the quantity of work seemed to be 
slightly higher in autocratic groups, the quality was usually better in the 
democratic ones. Lawler (1971), however, points out that ... whether 
(increased commitment) will result in higher productivity or greater 
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organizational effectiveness is a function of the nature of the decision that is 
made. Job enrichment, according to Herzberg (1968), constitutes another 
structural mechanism to enhance motivation. The aim should be to increase 
an individual's sense of achievement by building into the job more 
challenge and opportunities. Research findings suggest that job enrichment 
is more successful in improving the quality of work than its quantity, but they 
also show its impracticality for dealing with problems associated with the 
reward systems. Reward systems play, of course, an important role in 
motivating higher performance. Lawler (1971) and Slater (1973) suggest 
that they should be designed according to the organization's task and 
strategy and Lorsh and Allen (1973) found that in diversified companies, 
rewards were directly related to the accomplishment of end results, whereas 
in integrated firms that was not the explicit factor. 
The organization theories that have been outlined in the preceding analysis 
have raised a number of important issues which will now be considered in 
the specific context of the bus industry. Although the analysis will focus on 
the period which followed the implementation of the 1985 Transport Act, it is 
important to consider first the main characteristics of the industry prior to that 
date and of the process of change itself. 
The bus industry was, up to 1986, subject to tight regulatory controls and the 
public sector operators dominated the market. Although there were some 
differences in the degree to which public control was exercised, it can be 
said that the underlying organization features consisted of a highly 
centralised decision-making structure and high formalisation and 
standardization of procedures. Bus companies were predominantly 
production-oriented but there were significant differences in operating 
environments e. g. product substitutes and demand patterns. The general 
trend of public transport demand was, however, one of decline, and public 
funding for bus operations on the increase. 
The decision to delicense the bus industry was taken in 1985 and fully 
implemented in late 1986 in a process that involved the liberalisation of the 
market and simultaneous privatisation of the main publicly-owned bus 
companies. These changes were both radical (considering the nature of 
the industry), quickly accomplished (considering that the industry had been 
regulated for nearly 30 years), and, it appears, permanent in nature 
(considering the inflexibility of the present Conservative Government and 
also the Labour Party's intention not to reverse the privatisation process). 
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Most of the bus companies which formed the'largest public bus group - the 
NBC - and a great proportion of the municipal companies have now been 
sold - mostly in the form of management and/or management-employee 
buy-outs. The process of privatisation of those companies that operate in 
the major conurbations (PTC's) has been slower. Nevertheless, the public 
institutions that still own those companies have a statutory duty not to 
subsidize their operations (except in those cases provided for by the 1985 
Transport Act which apply to all bus companies). 
Two important points must be singled out at this stage: firstly, the industry 
endured a major environmental change which, although it was legislative in 
nature, had two underlying components: firstly, (a) the end of direct public 
financial support, and (b) the introduction of a competitive element; and 
secondly, the industry is largely 'managed' by those who previously 
occupied executive posts in the industry and who have now become 
owners or major shareholders of the new bus companies. Both these 
aspects have played a role in the organization changes since 1986.: The 
former suggests that bus operators have been forced to rethink their product 
and market behaviour. The latter suggests that this process has been 
mainly management led. In fact it is hardly conceivable that the major 
corporate changes have resulted from wide internal involvement. The 
traditional functionally specialised structure, with its high degree of 
centralisation and compartmentalisation cannot be seen to have provided 
the primary impetus for the change to a more market-orientated type of 
organization. This fact does not, however, imply that the structural 
adjustments introduced to accommodate the adoption of new strategies do 
not (or indeed have not already) become themselves an important force in 
strategic initiation. Furthermore, the argument that the process of strategic 
formulation has been predominantly management led must be qualified to 
the extent that it reflects the ideologies that were predominant in the different 
organizations at specific points in time. Nevertheless, there was an 
underlying awareness that, in the new environment, the success of 
commercial services involved as many changes in the production processes 
as in the organization's ability to relate to external forces. Although these 
changes were basically concerned with the dismantling of bureaucratic 
information and control systems and with introducing radical changes in 
labour practices, their form and ambit varied significantly. -- They ranged 
from a conservative decentralisation of decision making, limited 
participation and scattered initiatives to change attitudes, to the formation of 
highly decentralized profit centres, formal structural changes to 
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accommodate increased involvement and to educational activities to shape 
values and behaviours. These changes were of critical importance to the 
success of the market strategies adopted, in the early stages by the bus 
companies. The primary objective was to gain a sufficient share of the 
market - by defending those territories regarded as their own and/or 
complemented by geographical expansion - in order to secure short-term 
stability and profitability to generate enough internal funds to meet financial 
commitments and/or financial expansion. 
Although it is important to recognise that capital funding availability is a 
significant factor in determining long term strategy, management 
expectations regarding socio-economic variables together with their 
learning process in the industry - namely their attitude towards its trends and 
product characteristics - and entrepreneurial skills, appear to have played a 
similar and concomitant role in establishing the corporate orientations of the 
bus companies. The cyclical nature of the product, increasing difficulties in 
countering a declining demand or the willingness to earn higher returns on 
their business, was the basis for some of the decisions towards 
specialisation and product diversification. Other strategic decisions 
however [e. g., consolidation, expansion in the same product line] can be 
seen as the result of successful penetration and dominance of the most 
profitable market segments and/or successful generation of traffic. 
It must, however, be pointed out that if the structural adjustments 
introduced to cope with the initial environmental impact were to a certain 
extent familiar to most management teams, the same cannot be said of the 
changes needed to adapt to strategies that involved expansion into new 
geographical areas and products. Although there might have been a time 
lag between the emergence of new organizational needs and their 
satisfaction, it must be realised that there were a number of basic issues that 
had to be addressed in advance. 
The recent developments in the bus industry show a significant trend 
towards geographical expansion by the incumbent bus companies. These 
companies have tended, as a result, to become increasingly divisionalised 
and decentralised, probably to the extent that communication channels 
have been improved and corporate aims successfully assimilated. Major 
strategic issues, namely those concerning investment decisions have, 
however, remained relatively centralised. 
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Notwithstanding this, more-complex organizational problems arise when the 
expansion programmes involve the acquisition of other companies in the 
same or in different product areas. The fact is that in both cases, major 
redeployment of resources and redirection of human activity is involved. 
The latter case clearly introduces a different dimension to those problems 
[e. g. assimilation of different production techniques, marketing concepts and 
methods, planning and control], and above all to investment decisions. 
Nevertheless, the ambit of organizational changes requires consideration of 
(a) the degree of integration - whether the two or more companies should 
remain separate centres with their own management or whether parts or the 
whole of the organizations should become physically integrated, (b) the 
method of integration - whether a project team should be appointed to 
ensure collaboration for technical and product integration, and (c) the ways 
for transmitting the goals and objectives of the acquiring companies. It is 
clear, however, that whatever the solutions adopted, they lead to 
significant differences in the internal mechanisms of organizations. 
Williamson (1970) argues that the multidivisional structure is more effective 
than the holding company, for the latter ... lacks the information and 
management necessary for strategic planning and internal control and 
according to Rumelt (1986) ... the multidivisional structure is the high 
performer in almost all financial areas. 
The holding company type of organization is usually associated with a 
corporate group restricted to specialist personnel in the tax, , legal and 
financial areas because the existence of sufficiently large units that operate 
in very distinct and dispersed areas require their own (essentially) functional 
activities. In the traditional multidivisional company, the corporate office 
entails a larger number of experts who, through corporate policies and 
participation, coordinate the activities of divisions which in turn play a 
greater role in major decisions, namely those concerning the allocation of 
resources. The matrix type of organization has probably not been 
institutionalised amongst bus operators, although it is conceivable for 
restricted teams to have been appointed temporarily to deal with specific 
strategic objectives [e. g product-market projects] either during initiation or 
implementation phases. 
Finally, the effects of organizational changes on internal relationships 
cannot be underestimated. It can be argued that they have caused 
inevitable disturbances in the established status quo. Certain activities, for 
example, marketing, which were latent during the previous regulatory 
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period, can now be seen as an important dynamic force in the new 
organization establishment. On the other hand, the comprehensive 
planning and monitoring of operations could have been replaced by more 
direct and simpler controls of market and competitor movements. 
Furthermore, the radical changes introduced in labour practices, which 
basically reduced benefits and rewards and increased flexibility, were 
implemented when bus organizations strove to enhance their member's 
commitment. 
These shifts in emphasis bring inevitable changes in the power structure of 
any organization, and in the case of the bus industry they come at a time 
when cooperation and stability are of the utmost importance. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the arguments presented in this 
chapter. Firstly, organization theories provide an important contribution to 
the understanding of the ways in which structural variables are related, how 
they are moulded and how they can assist organizations to attain their major 
goals. Secondly, although it is possible to draw important conclusions on 
the changes in organizational practices in the bus industry since 1986, 
there has been insufficient research work on individual operators to allow a 
precise understanding of these changes nor to draw conclusions about the 
extent of the impact of these changes on future organizational capabilities. 
3.3 An approach to researching organizations in the bus industry 
The aim of this research is to provide an in-depth analysis of strategic 
change at the level of one bus company after the deregulation of the bus 
industry. To a certain extent it aims at filling the research gaps by 
contributing to our knowledge of the bus industry's organization for, as Hibbs 
(1990) remarked, few textbooks in the area of strategic decision taking have 
used case studies from the bus industry. 
The focus of this research revolves around two main questions 
1 How have corporate strategies altered as a result of the industry's 
deregulation? 
2 How, why and with what results have strategic policies been developed 
with respect to organizational, operational and competitive practice? 
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The research design adopted is the 'embedded case study type' as defined 
by Yin (1989), for it incorporates more than one unit of analysis. The ideas 
expounded by Yin for the use of case studies as a research strategy are 
relevant to the choice of this research design. In fact this study involves 
researching the impact of a contemporary phenomenon (deregulation of 
the bus industry), within a real life context (an organization setting) from an 
inquisitive perspective (of how and why), which according to Yin favours the 
use of case studies. Furthermore, as Bryman (1989) states, a case study 
can be used to ... provide an understanding of areas of organizational 
functioning that are not well documented or can be employed ... to achieve 
insights into a previously uncharted area. To this extent, the decision to 
undertake research into one single case can be said to reflect the 
exploratory nature of this research's aims and questions. 
However, as Johnson (1989) acknowledged, ... it is not suggested that this 
one organization, or the managers in it, are representative of all 
organizations. According to Yin (1989), one of the traditional prejudices 
against case study research is that ... it provides very little basis for scientific 
generalization. But as he also notes, the use of a case study approach is 
appropriate when ... the intervention being evaluated has no clear or 
simple set of outcomes. It is clear that the deregulation of the bus industry 
has introduced an additional variable that makes this proposition particularly 
relevant: marked differences in local market competitiveness. 
The essence of case study research, according to Yin (1989), is thus that it 
aims to illuminate a set of decisions and not to represent a sample for 
statistical generalization. He suggests that instead, an analyst should try to 
generalise findings to the theory. This case study has been orientated on 
the basis of an interpretive analysis of strategic change with reference to a 
number of theoretical propositions. That is, it resorts to existing theories as 
well as general empirical findings in order to examine and understand the 
evidence of those affected in the 1985 UK public transport policy. To a great 
extent, the analytical approach followed in this . research accords with 
Allison's (1971) suggestion that ... what we need is a new kind of case study 
- done with theoretical alertness on the basis of which to begin refining and 
testing propositions and models. 
The single case of this research (Midland Fox) was selected because the 
company fulfilled a number of basic research pre-requisites. 
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Firstly, the basic criteria for selecting a company as the case study of this 
research was that it should be an ex-publicly owned bus company. It would 
provide the ideal framework to study strategic change, for according to the 
proponents of deregulation, privatisation and private entrepreneurship in 
particular is fundamental for changing the trends in the industry. MF - the 
company selected - was part of a major public group - the NBC -- was 
privatised in 1987. 
Secondly, MF was acquired by its management team. This is the most 
representative outcome of the privatisation process, after 1985. However, 
and more importantly, there was evidence to suggest that MF's new owners 
were strongly committed to the bus industry and were actively involved in the 
process of change. 
Thirdly, MF's areas of operation included Loughborough which was the town 
where this research was undertaken. This fact enabled an a priori 
acquaintance with local environmental factors and the possibility of 
observing 'in loco' crucial events in the market that are the object of analysis 
in this case study (eg. competitive activity in Loughborough). 
Finally, access was relatively easy to gain largely due to the receptiveness 
shown by management to the aims and topics covered by this research. 
The first contact with MF was established through the company's 
Commercial Director. From the preliminary discussion held with him and the 
general outline he made of the company's organizational structure and 
functioning (a subject developed at length in section 5.2) it became clear 
that only a small number of key figures were engaged in the company's 
management. They comprised the three Executive Directors and the Depot 
General Managers. These organizational members were therefore selected 
for interview. This choice was reinforced by the postulate that .:. changes 
about the definition of goals and priorities, organizational restructuring, 
modifying organization-environment relationships, all require significant and 
sustained involvement of top management (Beckhard and Harris 1985). 
That is, ... if we are to understand why organization strategies are the way 
they are, we must understand it from a management's perspective 
(Johnson, 1987). As a matter of fact it was clear from the first interview with 
MF's Commercial Director that he played a key role in the company's 
assessment of a) the overall changes in the industry and b) the specific 
strategic positioning of MF vis-a-vis the changes and the issues raised by 
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deregulation. The other two Executive Directors were interviewed with the 
aim not only of corroborating the Commercial Director's ideas but also as a 
means of broadening the scope of this research by exploring in greater 
detail areas which although of corporate concern were the particular 
responsibility of these Executives (eg. product strategy and fleet 
replacement). As far as the Depot General Managers are concerned two 
major criteria were used for the selection of the interviewees. Firstly, there 
was an underlying interest in selecting Depot General Manager's who were 
responsible to different Executive Directors. Secondly there was an interest 
in analysing types of operational and competitive responses to different 
environmental conditions (urban-minibuses versus large vehicles/small 
towns). The Depot General Managers selected were representatives of the 
aforementioned criteria. 
It is also clear from the Appendices that the data required covers both 
corporate and operational topics. This does not mean however that 
Executive members were not asked about operational matters or that the 
Senior Managers (Depot General Managers) were not invited to express 
their ideas on corporate decisions. More importantly though is the fact that 
interviewing organization members from two levels of the hierarchy and of 
different expertise enriches one's appraisal of the organization's 
management of change. 
The research method used for data collection is comprised of a detailed 
semi-structured interview guide, documentation (re: industry related 
publications on the case selected) and archival records (re: organizational 
records). A research plan (Appendix 1) was built as a reference for the 
research topics included in this case study and exhibits the main areas for 
data collection. The interview guide (Appendix 2) is however the most 
important source of the case's data. It was designed primarily as a guide for 
gathering general attitudes although specific stories were encouraged to 
develop in the course of the interviews to substantiate particular views held 
in relation to the topics covered in the interview. An identical list of questions 
., was used for the interviews which allowed individual opinions to emerge on 
the same issues. 
The interviews were held in a space of three months and were all tape 
recorded, permission for which was readily given. The interviews were of 
different durations - the longest one was held with the Commercial Director 
(two sessions of two hours each) and the shortest ones were with the Depot 
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General Managers (one session of an hour each). The sequence of the 
interviews was as follows: 
1 Commercial Director 
2 Depot General Manager 1 
3 Depot General Manager 2 
4 Financial Director 
5 Depot General Manager 3 
6 Managing Director 
This sequence provided a framework for studying managerial 
interrelationships and also for analysing the way in which strategic 
postulates established at the top of the structure were perceived at the lower 
levels of the organization. The interviewees showed no signs of having had 
prior knowledge of the questions asked and so there was spontaneity in 
their replies both on the issues under consideration and also when they 
were confronted with conflicting ideas expressed by others. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that all the interviews were transcribed by 
the researcher himself an exercise that was to play an important role 
during the analytical stage of this project. It contributed to a prompter 
identification and a clearer understanding of the relevancy and the 
implications of the data collected (re: theory and empirical evidence). 
The questions that comprise the interview guide have been arranged in a 
way that reflects the logical sequence of steps in which this research's data 
was to be collected. The first group of subject areas (questions 1-5) 
considers the environmental dimension of this case by addressing the 
political, legal, socioeconomic and local competitive and complementary 
transport environments. From an organization's standpoint these external 
factors can function both as constraints and as sources of opportunities. The 
second group of questions (6-10) aims at identifying the main trends in the 
company's market strategies that have contributed to its current market 
positioning. The third set of questions (11-14) considers the attitudes of the 
company's management in relation to alternative corporate directions. 
Together, the last two groups of questions contributes to the identification 
and understanding of the company's strategies that were formed since the 
deregulation of the industry. The fourth category of questions deals with the 
changes in the organization's structure and associated variables in the 
production and selling of services, and the company's strategies with regard 
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to competition. The approach to organizational issues reflects to a great 
extent Johnson's (1987) views that ... to consider the problems of managing 
strategy in organizations, and particularly the problems of managing 
strategic change ... we have to conceive of management not only 
in terms of 
the activities of individual managers but essentially as the activities of 
collectivities of managers and their interaction among themselves. The 
changes in the production and selling of services assume, in the context of 
the 1985 Transport Act, critical importance. The questions that were 
designed thus concentrate on the effects of deregulation on the use of 
human and material resources and on the strategies of pricing and design of 
the products supplied. The latter two issues cannot, in turn, be 
disassociated from the role played by the presence of competitors in the 
market where the company operates. The subject of competition is further 
broadened with questions, on the general competitive behaviour of the 
company. 
In brief, the main aim of the data collection techniques used in this case 
study is to induce the generation of facts as well as of attitudes, in a 
systematic way, which could then be translated into a framework suitable for 
subsequent judgment and analysis. 
The data pertaining to this case covers two main areas: corporate strategy 
and competitive behaviour. 
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PART III - The Case of Midland Fox Limited 
Chapter 4: The structure of the market for local bus services 
The aim of this part is to undertake an in-depth case study of one bus 
company - Midland Fox Ltd. The analysis begins by focussing on those 
aspects of the organization's external environment which are relevant to the 
company's operations emphasizing the structure of the market (the 
demographic characteristics of its area of operations - predominantly in the 
County of Leicestershire are outlined in Appendix 3). 
4.1 Main network characteristics of the bus companies based 
In Leicestershire 
In June 1990, there were 23 bus companies with Headquarters in 
Leicestershire, actively running local bus services in the County. Of these, 
21 were small independent companies. A sample of 8 of these operators 
indicates an average fleet of approximately 10 vehicles, 85% of which are 
coaches. By contrast, the combined fleet of the two major operators - 
Midland Fox Ltd (hereafter referred to as MF) and Leicester City Bus, 
(hereafter referred to as LCB) - totalled over 600 vehicles. 
4.1.1 The small independent operators 
Only four of the small independent companies are based in Greater 
Leicester. In June 1990, the total number of routes run by these companies 
was 59, giving an average number of routes per operator of just under 3. 
From the distribution of the 59 routes by days of operation, it is noticeable 
that nearly 40% of them are run on a weekly basis and that only 7% are 
operated hourly from Monday to Saturday (daytime). A second major 
characteristic of the services provided by these operators is the fact that 75% 
of the routes are run from or near the company's base. Thirdly, it is important 
to point out that only 31% of the routes are destined for Leicester. The 
remaining destinations are shared by towns and localities in Leicestershire 
(40%) and by towns and localities in the outer Counties (29%) which by no 
coincidence are situated near the centre of their operations. 
It is reasonable to assume that some of the 59 routes that are currently 
operated by the small independents are run on a commercial basis and 
others as a result of the tendering process. Two major conclusions may be 
drawn in respect of this assumption. As far as the commercial sector of the 
market is concerned, it appears that the independent operators have 
decided to concentrate on local niches - their small size and the low 
frequency of the services provided suggest that their markets consist of 
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transporting local people from small localities into nearby towns in 
Leicestershire and/or into the outer Counties - on those days where major 
events take place (eg market days). 
As for those services that are run on a tender basis, it could be argued that 
the small independents enjoy a cost advantage for providing services that 
are near their bases using surplus capacity that arises from other types of 
operation. This idea is reinforced by the fact that the only major operator 
running services between localities and major towns is MF and they only run 
4 routes. In fact MF's strategy appears to reside in exploiting services inside 
major towns on a very intensive basis. 
As a final conclusion, it could be said that the small independents do not 
appear to constitute a major threat to the bigger incumbent companies. 
Their market position seems relatively safe, at least as long as the returns on 
their services do not become sufficiently attractive for the more resourceful 
incumbents. 
4.1.2 The two big companies 
There are two main bus companies based in Leicester that operate a major 
network of services - Midland Fox Limited and Leicester City Bus. 
Table 4-1 shows the distribution of the routes operated by MF and LCB per 
areas of operation and the specific characteristics of the routes inside 
Greater Leicester. From the information provided, it is possible to conclude 
the following: 
a Routes in major towns: the market is completely dominated by MF that 
operates intensive, mainly minibus services in the major towns of 
Leicestershire. 
b Routes between towns and between towns and localities: although the 
number of routes in these categories is small, it is apparent that only MF 
operates these kinds of links. They can be seen as providing a 
complement, although in a limited scale, to the services that are run 
inside the towns themselves. 
c Routes between towns and Leicester City Centre: MF operates routes 
between Leicester City Centre and all the major towns in Leicestershire 
on a regular basis. Additionally, MF operates services classified as 
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express services to reflect shorter trip duration (they have a limited 
number of stops) which are by nature, targeted at a specific segment of 
the market. By contrast, LCB's links are limited to three major towns: 
Coalville, Hinckley and Uppingham. 
d Routes in Greater Leicester: although the difference in the number of 
routes that both companies operate in this area is not as wide as the total 
of their operations, two major points clearly arise: 
1 More than three-quarters of the routes run by LCB are in Greater 
Leicester. Of this total 65% of the routes are operated across the city 
centre. 
2 By contrast, the number of routes operated by MF in this area only 
represent 25% of the company's total number of routes. However, 92% 
of these routes are radial. 
Table 4-2 (see page 76) provides a general picture of the frequency of 
the routes that MF and LCB run to Greater Leicester from Monday to 
Saturday (daytime only). Four major points arise from this information 
1 Nearly two-thirds of MF radial routes have been classified as frequent 
services (every 15 minutes or better during the main part of day) 
2 Nearly 40% of Leicester City Bus across routes are run on an hourly 
service (at least) 
3 MF's only two routes that run across the city centre are frequent services 
4 Only two of the seven radial routes operated by LCB are run on a 
frequent basis. 
Two major conclusions can be drawn in relation to the characteristics of the 
networks provided by the two major Leicestershire operators 
a MF is predominately a County operator whereas LCB is a Greater 
Leicester operator 
b There is a marked difference in the operations of the two bus 
companies in and around the city of Leicester: MF's operational 
strategy focuses on providing radial links between the city centre 
and more varied parts, in Greater Leicester, whereas LB's services 
are mainly across the centre of the city. As a result, MF's network 
has' a higher percentage of routes that are frequent - reflecting the idea 
that a radial network requires high frequency services to ensure, 
amongst other things, that the time required for transfer is kept to 
., a minimum. Nevertheless, it appears that above all there is a 
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strong commitment on the part of MF to provide frequent 
services in the more densely m, populated areas of the County, 
irrespective of their characteristics. 
4.2 Main network characteristics of the bus companies based 
outside Leicestershire 
There are 16 bus companies operating in Leicestershire (or parts of 
Leicestershire) whose bases are situated in surrounding Counties. Of these, 
11 operators are small bus companies and the other five are relatively big 
operators running major networks in their own Counties. 
Their distribution by County and by number of routes in Leicestershire is as 
follows 
Table 4-3: 
Distribution of routes of 
bus companies based outside Leicestershire 
COUNTY NO. OF SMALL 
COMPANIES 
Nottinghamshire 5 
Lincolnshire 1 
Warwickshire 2 
Staffordshire 1 
Northants 1 
Derbyshire 
TOTAL NO. OF 
ROUTES 
9 
1 
2 
I 
4 
NAME OF LARGER 
COMPANIES 
Barton 
Lincolnshire Red Car 
Midland Red North 
Stevensons of Uttoxeter 
United Counties 
Trent Bus 
TOTAL NO. OF 
ROUTES 
17 
6 
4 
13 
9 
1 
Source : Guide to Public Transport in Leicestershire - June 1991 (Leicestershire County Council) 
4.2.1 The small companies 
From the characteristics of the routes provided by the small companies, a 
major conclusion arises: the pattern of the routes is similar to that identified 
for the Leicestershire based small independents except that the towns and 
localities that are linked are by enlarge situated across the borders between 
Leicestershire and the outer Counties and/or the localities served in 
Leicestershire are just mid-points of routes that link major towns or localities 
in the outer Counties themselves. 
4.2.2 The big companies 
Barton, amongst all those whose bases are situated outside Leicestershire, 
is the bus company that runs more and most frequent services into the 
County. Five of its 17 routes run from the city of Nottingham, near where the 
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company is based, into three major towns in Leicestershire - Loughborough 
in the North West, and Melton Mowbray and Oakham in the Eastern part of 
the County. In the latter, Barton operates local town services, mainly on an 
hourly basis. It is from these two towns that Barton operates three more 
routes into Leicester City. Barton's routes also include a link between the 
two major cities in both Counties - Leicester and Nottingham. It is apparent 
that Barton's operations involve longer distance routes complemented by 
one local town service. 
From the remaining five bus companies in this category, Midland Red North 
runs three of its routes from Leicester into two major towns in Warwickshire 
(Nuneaton and Rugby) and one in conjunction with MF's route into a town in 
the South of Leicestershire (Lutterworth). Stevensons of Uttoxeter, on the 
other hand, concentrates its operations on the corridors between the 
company's home town and nearby towns, and major towns and localities 
nearest to the Leicestershire border with Staffordshire. 
United Counties' operations follow a similar pattern to Stevensons's on the 
Eastern part of Leicestershire's border with Northamptonshire with most of 
its routes serving the town of Market Harborough. 
Trent Buses only operates one route between Derby and a town just inside 
the new border with Leicestershire. 
4.3 An overall view of the market 
The underlying feature of Leicestershire's bus industry is that the market for 
public transport is dominated by two major companies - MF and LCB. MF's 
share of the market is, however, larger than that of LCB. 
This chapter has provided a broad characterization of the local markets 
within which MF operates. It is now important to concentrate on the main 
features of the company Midland Fox. 
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CHAPTER 5: Midland Fox Limited - The Company 
5.1 Brief history of the company 
Midland Fox was part of the former state-owned group of bus companies - 
the National Bus Company (NBC) - until mid-August 1987. 
Following the legislative changes in the bus industry, which required the 
sale of the individual companies that comprised the NBC to the private 
sector, MF was privatised by means of a management buyout. On the 19th 
of August 1987, the company started to trade under the leadership of its 
'new' owners. 
According to the company's first published accounts (31.12.87), the principal 
activity of the company is described as the provision of local bus services 
and coaches operations in Leicestershire. By 31.12.88, these activities were 
extended to include the recovery and repair of all classes of vehicles in 
Northamptonshire. By the same date, the three main shareholders who 
always held executive posts in the company increased their shareholding. 
During 1988, the company extended its services to include major towns in 
Leicestershire (mainly in the North West of the County), and acquired two 
small independent operators - Fairtax Foxhound and Wreake Valley Travel. 
1989 was a milestone in the history of MF. In the spring of 1989, MF became 
involved in a competitive battle with a local operator - G. K. Kinch - in the 
town of Loughborough. In May it acquired the Loughborough Coach and 
Bus Company. But in early summer 1989, the company became the subject 
of a takeover bid by a major holding group - Drawlane Transport Group - 
which controlled several other ex-NBC companies. By September, MF 
became, once again, a subsidiary of a major group of bus companies (this 
time a private group). Three of the original executive members of MF 
retained the balance of the shares in the company. The remainder of the 
shares, which were held by the two major shareholders of Stevensons of 
Uttoxeter were acquired by Drawlane Transport Group. 
By December 1989, G. K. Kinch was absorbed into Drawlane, and it is 
relevant to note the remarks made on the occasion by Mr Kinch: ... Drawlane 
could call on backing that I was unable to match.. Also important are the 
comments made by one of the main shareholders of MF about the takeover 
by Drawlane of MF: ... although the company had been pleased with its 
progress since privatisation, larger groupings seemed to be beneficial in the 
longer term. 
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The important aspect is nonetheless that MF belongs to a holding company 
that claims to be the largest group in the bus industry with 1600 vehicles and 
a staff of 4000 and a turnover in excess of £70m. 
5.2 The organisation structure 
Prior to the analysis of MF's organisation structure, it is important to illustrate 
the changes that have occurred at the executive level of the company since 
its privatisation. Figure 5-1 has been prepared to this end and shows that 
two executives have remained in the organisation since privatisation, and 
that the executive posts have been occupied by the same directors since the 
end of 1988. Apart from the resignations and new appointments in late 1989 
- which were the result of the acquisition by Drawlane of the shares held by 
Stevensons of Uttoxeter's main shareholders - there is an underlying 
stability and continuity concerning the main Directorships of the company. In 
June 1990 there were three Executive Directors at MF and the Board of the 
company included three additional members who are main shareholders of 
Drawlane Transport Group. ` 
The structure of MF's Headquarters organisation (Figure 5-2) can be 
characterised as follows: At the executive level there is the usual division: 
Operational-Commercial; Engineering; and Administrative. However, there 
is a very noticeable departure from the typical organisation structures that 
have characterised most bus companies in the past. In fact, it is apparent 
that: 
1 Each executive retains control over his own main specialised area 
with the support of additional experts - Managing Director with Fleet 
Engineer; Commercial Director with Commercial Manager; Company 
Secretary with Financial and Computer Managers. 
2 Each executive is now responsible for the supervision of a number 
of depots which involves them in tasks that lie beyond their 
specialised expertise. 
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It is in fact this latter aspect in the organisation structure of MF that marks a 
significant shift in the way in which the work at the depots is regarded. Most 
of all it constitutes a recognition of the importance of the depots where, after 
all, the company's products are produced and sold. It should also be 
pointed out that although the Managing Director and the Company 
Secretary are new to the industry, this kind of organisational structure 
provides a direct link between these two executives and the management of 
all the depot activities. 
It appears also that each executive has been allocated to depots with very 
specific characteristics (Table 5-1 has been drawn to illustrate this point). 
The Commercial Executive Director together with his Planning/Commercial 
Headquarters staff supervises the biggest depots where only 13% of the 212 
vehicles are mini or maxi buses. However, the number of vehicles that 
comprise these depots account for 50% of the total fleet. The Managing 
Director, together with his senior Engineering staff supervises the smallest 
depots - total vehicles represent 17% of the fleet - but whose vehicles have 
the highest average age in relation to those allocated to the other two 
Executive Directors. The operational supervision by MF's Managing 
Director is extended to comprise the overall engineering work on all the 
depots and he is further responsible for the company's second major activity 
- repair and recovery of all types of vehicles in Northamptonshire. It is also 
important to note that the depots under the supervision of the Managing 
Director comprise almost two-thirds of all the coaches in the fleet if the 
National Express coaches are excluded from the total. This indicates that 
the activities of the depots under the Managing Director are mainly tours and 
excursions. 
Finally, the General Manager of the depots which consist exclusively of mini 
or maxi buses, reports to the Company Secretary. 
Two major conclusions can be drawn from this distribution of depots and 
functions amongst the Executives of the company 
a The Managing Director's specific task in the organisation is 
concentrated on an area of the business which is becoming 
immensely sensitive to all bus companies at present: the reliability of 
an ageing fleet. 
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b The fact that the running of the depots has been split between the 
executives inevitably leaves room for different (and competing? ) 
managerial approaches to their operations - if only because of their 
different fleet compositions. Moreover, this difference in the 
characteristics of the depots raises the issue of comparability of 
performances between the business units, which will ultimately have 
repercussions in the allocation of the company's overall resources. 
The main organisational feature of the structure of the individual depots 
(Figure 5-3) is the allocation of the overall responsibility of their activities - 
planning/operational/engineering - to a single member of the company, the 
Depot General Manager. This fact can be interpreted as an indication of 
both decentralisation and accountability of the business units to the 
organisation's main centre of decision making. 
5.3 The network 
The main characteristics of MF's network (previously identified in this case 
study), can be summarised as follows 
a MF operates major radial networks in Greater Leicester and in the 
most important towns in the County, which are run at high frequencies. 
b MF operates longer distance routes, on a less frequent basis, linking 
a) some of the major towns in the County b) some of these towns 
with the centre of Leicester and c) some of these towns with others in 
outer Counties. 
The remaining part of this section provides a more detailed analysis of the 
local bus services provided by MF. This analysis comprises the following 
major areas : 
5.3.1 The commercial and the tendered services of MF's network 
Table 5-2 is a summary of the number of journeys (one way only) operated 
by the company during Monday to Friday (M-F), Saturday (Sat) and Sunday 
(Sun). They have been split between the journeys that are operated in 
Greater Leicester and those operated on the rest of the network, as well as 
grouped into two major categories - those that are run on a commercial 
basis and those that are run under contract to Leicestershire County Council 
(tendered services). 
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Figure 5-3 
Family Tree - Depot 
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Two major facts emerge from this information 
a The number of journeys operated under tender represent about 9% of 
the total number of journeys that comprise the company's network., 
b The percentage of tendered journeys is much higher in the areas of the 
network outside Greater Leicester (on Sundays the number of 
tendered services actually outweighs the commercial ones). 
These findings can be interpreted as follows 
1 The commercial part of the company's network - over 90% of all 
journeys - is larger than could be expected. There have been 
suggestions that the national average could be between 70% to 
80%. 
2 From the analysis of the main network characteristics operated by 
other bus companies in Leicestershire, it is clear that MF faces the 
fiercest competition in Greater Leicester. It is in this area that MF 
runs the lowest number of tendered journeys. This fact accords 
with the empirical evidence from other areas in England in that the 
percentage of commercial services tends to be higher when the level 
of competition is higher. 
5.3.2 The period of operation of MF's network 
A sample of routes with 20 or more journeys operated between Monday to 
Friday was considered for the Greater Leicester area and for the rest of the 
network. In Greater Leicester, the sample numbered 20 routes and in the 
rest of the network 30. These routes accounted for 84% and 76% of the total 
number of journeys run in these two areas respectively. The information that 
was gathered from this sample related to the times of the first and of the last 
journeys. 
The data collected reveals that 
a In both areas more than 90% of the first journeys started between 
5am and 8am. 
b In Greater Leicester, 45% of the routes run their last journeys 
between 17.00hrs and 18.30hrs, whereas in the remaining areas 
more than three-quarters terminate their last services between 17.00hrs 
and 18.45hrs. 
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c In the total of the sample considered, only a third of all of the routes 
run services after 18.45hrs. 
If the number of tendered journeys that are run in the evening is taken into 
account - they represent only 20% of the total - this sample suggests that the 
amount of the services provided by the company in the evenings is very 
limited. This characteristic has also been identified in the networks of other 
major operators since the deregulation of the bus industry. 
5.3.3 Changes in weekly service provision 
Table 5-3 (see page 88) shows the variation in the number of commercial 
journeys between Mondays and Fridays and Saturdays, and between 
Monday to Friday and Sundays. 
The main trends are 
a There is a relatively low reduction, throughout the network, in the 
number of commercial journeys between Monday-Friday and 
Saturday. 
b There is a significant reduction in the level of Sunday services 
(78% in Greater Leicester and 95% in the rest of the network) 
These findings appear to confirm the general trends that have been 
identified in the industry as a whole, since deregulation: Saturday services 
remain commercially attractive whereas Sunday services are mostly 
loss-making services. 
5.3.4 Characteristics of tendered services operated by MF 
Table 5-4 provides a detailed analysis of MF's tendered services. Two 
major trends emerge from the information contained in this table 
a The number of tendered journeys run on Sunday account for 
45% of the total (Table 5-4a). 
b The highest percentage of the tendered journeys occur during the pm 
period ie. between 12.00 and 20.00 hours (Table 5-4b). 
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The important aspect of these findings is the predominance of tendered 
services during the pm. periods on all days of the week. This can be 
attributed to the fact that this period of the day coincides with the existence of 
high levels of unused capacity which encourages bus companies to submit 
tenders at prices that both reflect and cover the lower operating costs 
associated with this period of their operations. 
5.4 The Fleet 
The study of MF's fleet is made up of the following major areas 
5.4.1 Fleet Composition by type of vehicles 
Table 5-5 shows the distribution of MF's fleet by type of vehicles, at the date 
of privatisation and at the beginning of 1980. The existence of a large 
number of mini and maxi buses is a feature which dates back to the period 
prior to privatisation. The fact that a great majority of this type of bus was first 
registered in 1985 -a date that marks the beginning of the deregulation of 
the bus industry - confirms the fact that some companies were resorting to 
this type of vehicle in preparation for privatisation and for facing a 
deregulated market. 
Table 5-5 also reveals that in the 21/2 years since privatisation, the company 
acquired 50 new vehicles, 90% of which were mini-maxi buses. At the same 
time, the bigger capacity vehicles that have been acquired, either for 
replacing others that have been disposed of, or for increasing the size of the 
fleet, are by and large 2nd-hand buses. 
Finally, it should be noted that the type of vehicle that has increased most 
since privatisation is the double decker bus. There are two reasons for this. 
Firstly, there was the more pressing need to start replacing very old vehicles 
- which until recently meant mostly double decker buses. Secondly, there 
are favourable opportunities in the 2nd-hand market for double decker 
buses - for example, they are more readily available, and above all under 
financially attractive conditions. What remains to be seen is the way in 
which the company intends to replace its already ageing mini-maxi fleet of 
buses, given that it will possibly be too late to wait until the 2nd-hand market 
for these vehicles develops. 
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5.4.2 Fleet composition - vehicle make 
Any bus company's degree of standardisation in vehicle make has important 
implications in at least three major areas of the business 
1 the variety in the stock of parts and accessories that the company is 
required to hold 
2 the standardisation of maintainance practices and the need to 
employ engineering staff with different skills 
3 the resources that are needed for training drivers to handle the 
specific characteristics of the different makes of vehicle. 
Tables 5-6 (page 95) and 5-7 (overleaf) have been prepared to analyse the 
case of MF's fleet. Table 5-6 shows the distribution by make of vehicle at 
September 1990. Although the fleet comprised of 13 makes, it is clear that 
a Almost three-quarters of the double decker buses are Leyland (50%) 
or Daimler (23%). 
b 95% of all single decker/dual purpose are Leyland. 
c Almost two-thirds of the fleet of coaches are also Leyland. 
d 92% of the mini and maxi buses are Ford and Iveco respectively. 
Table 5-7 depicts the distribution of the vehicles that comprise each of MF's 
depots according to their make. Although 50% of the depots have more than 
four different makes of vehicle involved in their operations, there is an 
underlying feature in the overwhelming majority of the depots: in 9 of the 10 
depots, two different makes account for three-quarters or more of their 
individual fleet. 
Tables 5-6 and 5-7 thus suggest that there exists a considerable 
standardisation in both the makes of the vehicles that comprise MF's fleet 
and in their distribution amongst the depots. 
5.4.3 Distribution of the fleet per depot 
Figure 5-4 shows the distribution of the fleet according to its seating capacity 
, 
by the 10 operating units. There is a clear indication that the bigger sized 
buses (with a capacity greater than 45 seats) are concentrated in two major 
depots - Southgates and Wigston; together they account for three-quarters 
of the total number of these kinds of buses. A further two depots - Hinckley 
and Sandacre - have exclusively mini and maxi buses. 
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Figure 5-4 
Types of Vehicles Per Depot - At 12.07.90 
SD-C 
DD 
M+M 
WV SH 
\ý, \. 
M- 
I 
HK NH 
Abbreviations : 
LB FX cv ws ss SA 
1 SD (single decker buses); C (coaches); DD (double decker buses) 
M+M (mini and maxi buses) 
2 WV (Wreake Valley); SH (Shelton Osborne); HK (Hinckley); 
MH (Market Harborough); LB (Loughborough); FX (Fairtax); 
CV (Coalville); WS (Wigston); SS (Southgates); SA (Sandacre) 
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The reasoning behind this kind of distribution appears to be mainly market 
determined, but it is a feature that reflects a significant degree of 
specialisation in operational terms. 
5.4.4 The age of the fleet 
In July 1990, the average age of MF's fleet was 8 years and 9 months. 
However, when the lives of different types of vehicles are considered 
separately, the following reality emerges 
Table 5-8: 
The useful life of the fleet by type of bus 
% of the useful life that has 
TYPE OF BUS elapsed (at June 1990) 
Double Deck 77% 
Single Deck & Dual Purpose 76% 
Coaches & Dual Purpose 94% 
Mini Buses 83% 
Maxi Buses 28% 
The scale of the replacement programme that is required as a result of these 
findings is illustrated in Table 5-9. This table shows the dates at which the 
useful lives of the vehicles held at June 1990 (except the 8 double decker 
buses not yet allocated to depots), by seating capacity, are expected to 
terminate according to the company's depreciation policy. It can be seen for 
example that in five years time (1995), 83% of all the vehicles will have 
attained the limit of their useful lives. By the year 2000 (10 years time) this 
figure will reach 98%. It is also clear that the timing on which vehicles were 
acquired in the past can bring increased difficulties for the company. For 
example, in the space of three years (1991-93) more than half of the fleet will 
theoretically need to be replaced. 
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The major conclusion is, therefore, that MF's fleet is rapidly ageing. This fact 
has important implications for both revenue generating activities (eg. 
reliability of service) and for a major cost absorbing activity - engineering 
related work (eg. capital tied up in stocks of parts and materials). The effects 
of operating with an ageing fleet are already evident in some depots, where 
high levels of spare capacity can be found - for example, in the second 
biggest depot, the percentage of spare vehicles in relation to the depots 
Peak Vehicle Requirement is 23%. 
5.5 Human resources 
5.5.1 MF's work force 
Table 5-10 shows the distribution of the total staff employed by MF per depot 
and at Headquarters by job category. The different job categories have in 
turn been grouped into two main areas: Production (Traffic and Engineering) 
and Administration. This Table also shows the number of staff that is 
employed by the company's other complementary activity - recovering and 
repair of all types of vehicles, and by two additional centres which are 
exclusively engaged in coaching operations. Although this analysis will 
focus on the data relating to the 10 operating units and to Headquarters, the 
following conclusions can be drawn from the overall totals 
- The company employed a total of 986 people, of which 4.5% were 
based at Headquarters. 
Almost 70% of all employees are drivers, 13% are engineering staff 
and 15% are administrative staff. Two depots account for 45% of all 
drivers and one single depot comprises nearly 40% of all the 
engineering staff. 
- The number of supervisory staff and inspectors is considerably low, 
about 1.5% of the work force for each. 
Table 5-11 illustrates the relationship between the staff employed in the 10 
depots and the number of vehicles allocated to each of the operating 
centres. Table 5-11 a shows that on average the number of minibus drivers 
per minibus is higher than the corresponding ratio for bigger buses (1.71: 1 
drivers compared with 1.27: 1). One reason for this finding is the fact that a 
minibus service usually requires more continuous periods of operation. 
Table 5-11 b shows the number of vehicles per engineering staff. The results 
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show that there are wide variations among the 10 depots. In Southgates 
depot for example, there are 1.8 engineering staff per vehicle whereas in 
Sandacre and Hinckley together(1) there are 7.8 per vehicle. This difference 
can be further illustrated when the total number of engineering staff 
employed in these two depots is considered in the following separate 
categories: 
CLEANING WORK ENGINEERING WORK 
SOUTHGATES 4 Vehicles per Cleaner 3 Vehicles per engineering worker 
SANDACRE & HINCKLEY 12 Vehicles per cleaner 23 Vehicles per engineering worker 
These results can be attributed to the different type of vehicles that comprise 
the fleets at these depots - Sandacre has mini or maxi buses only and 
Southgates fleet is exclusively composed of bigger buses. These differences 
relate not only to the size and age of the vehicles but also to variations in the 
mechanical and electrical complexity that exists between mini/maxi buses 
and the more conventional type of buses. 
This chapter has reviewed the salient aspects of the company MF. The 
company's organization structure, its network, its fleet and its human 
resources have been presented and the most outstanding characteristics 
analysed. This chapter was designed to provide a framework through which 
the major trends in MF's corporate behaviour on the one hand, and MF's 
management of change of critical strategic issues on the other could be 
understood. 
(1) Sandacre supports Hinckley depot as far as engineering work is concerned. 
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Chapter 6: Corporate Strategy and Strategy Formation 
6.1 Corporate strategy 
This chapter examines the relationship between corporate strategy and 
strategy formation in MF by reviewing the relevant literature associated with 
these important topics. The study of corporate strategy and of management 
of change covers a vast field of theoretical and empirical work. It is therefore 
important to establish the main area of analysis for this study, to clarify the' 
meaning of a number of concepts and to outline the framework in which the 
study will evolve. In this context, the present analysis is more concerned 
with the outcome of strategic decisions than with the process by which these 
decisions are taken. As a result, this study is predominantly an analysis of 
strategic change. However, it becomes apparent from the literature on 
organisation theory, that there are many, and sometimes contradictory ideas 
regarding the concept of strategy (eg. definition and scope) and a number of 
issues associated with it (ie. strategy formation). The definition of these 
topics has, in turn, an inevitable influence on the research framework 
adopted. 
It is not the purpose of this project to undertake a review of these theories 
and models. It is nonetheless important to draw on the riches of some of 
these contributions. They provide valuable instruments to enhance the 
understanding of the findings in this case study in particular, and to further 
the understanding of strategic issues in organisational settings in general. 
Two major areas in the organisational strategy debate are considered 
important to merit further consideration: the definition and scope of strategy 
and strategy formation. 
The term strategy is defined in military theory as ... the art of preparing, 
moving and using armed forces in a war so as to secure the initiative and 
ultimately to win the war (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). In management 
theory, strategy revolves around two major concepts: it concerns ... the 
determination of long term goals and objectives of an enterprise (Chandler, 
1962) and it involves a response of an organisation to its environment. 
These definitions raise a number of contentious issues. Firstly, it is not clear 
whether strategy should be viewed as a preconceived plan leading to ... the 
adoption of courses of actions and the allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out goals (Chandler, 1962). Secondly, there is the question of 
attempting to establish a universally accepted definition of what constitutes a 
strategy. Finally, it is questionable whether the environment is the sole 
determinant of strategy. 
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Strategies as preconceived plans 
It has been claimed that if strategies are to be envisaged as major plans that 
are made explicitly in advance, there is a limit to the scope for understanding 
major changes that occur in the strategic positioning of organisations. 
Mintzberg (1978) defined these a priori guidelines as intended strategies 
and a strategy as a ... pattern in a stream of decisions. In Mintzberg's 
model, strategies are formed when a ... sequence of decisions in some area 
exhibits a consistency over time. In this way, strategies are not solely the 
result of deliberate plans conceived in one particular point in time, to be 
executed in the future. Even those that are, may not be realised in their 
original form. For Mintzberg, the crucial aspect is to observe sets of 
behaviour that crystallise to the extent that they position the organisation in 
its environment. 
Strategies: a definition 
Von de Ven and Hudson (1985) have taken the view that strategies are 
choices that represent major departures from existing practices for an 
organisation, thus underlying the view that there is no exact and accepted 
definition for what is and is not strategic. In the 150 Bradford case studies 
(Hickson et al, 1985), the following were considered as typical strategic 
decisions 
a technology topics (investment in equipment or premises) 15% 
b output categories (new, expanded or reduced services) 19% 
c reorganisation topics (internal restructuring, takeovers, mergers) 22% 
As Hickson et al concluded, ... strategic decisions are most often about the 
form of an organisation itself or the goals inherent in its outputs and 
investment in technology, topics that among them make up more than half 
the 150 Bradford cases. It is reasonable to say that organisation strategy is 
concerned with the scope of an organisation's overall activities, and with its 
resource capabilities within an internal and external environmental context. 
Strategies - determinants 
It has been said that the widespread interest in corporate strategy is a 
product of the debate between the classical management theorists and 
those who support the open-system approach. The former are preoccupied 
with mechanical principles of internal design, whilst the latter are more 
concerned with the ideal of an organic organisation whose survival depends 
on the development of appropriate strategic responses to a changing 
environment. However, other organisational theorists (eg. Johnson and 
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Scholes, 1988) have qualified this by arguing that it is ... too simplistic to 
think of strategy as a response to the environment for ... it is evident that 
faced with similar environments, organisations will respond differently. 
Furthermore, an organisation that faces an identical environmental change 
at different times in its history may not develop the same type of consistent 
behaviour patterns. It is in this context that a significant amount of research 
has been undertaken with the aim of identifying concomitant forces 
susceptible of intervening as stimuli for strategy formation and change. The 
common theme to most studies is that an organisation per se does not 
decide goals, and that these are determined in the first place by its 
members. This proposition adds an inevitable variable to the debate: 
strategies form and change depending on the values, expectations and 
interests held by individuals in the organisation vis-a-vis the internal and 
external environments. Together, they build sets of behaviour that position 
the organisation in the environment. For Drucker (1988a), the future of an 
organisation is determined by the vision of a powerful leader. For Miles and 
Snow (1978), the overall strategic posture reflects the dominant ideologies 
in an organisation, and for Pettigrew (1979) it is politics and culture that can 
hinder or encourage change. Mintzberg (1978), on the other hand, suggests 
that strategy formation and change depend on three forces: the environment, 
the bureaucracy and leadership. Whilst the latter accelerates or dampens 
the organisation's response to the environment, strategic change is 
constrained by the momentum of the bureaucracy. A major element in this 
momentum is the availability of resources. For Rumelt (1986), existing 
resources can both limit and influence directions. In the latter, Rumelt states 
that ... the general direction of a firm 
is closely related to the nature of 
existing resources and to the type and range of productive services they can 
render... and that the general type of productive services already existing 
within the firm provided a basis for the development and expansion of the 
production of existing products. Bennett (1988) points out that ... capital 
funding availability to meet on-going capital replacement and new 
investment needs is a significant factor in long term strategy and that ... as 
discretionary funds decrease, strategies begin to focus on survival. There 
are however limits to which the availability of resources can restrict or shape 
organisation strategies, for as Norman (1985) points out, decision makers 
can both influence and be influenced by circumstances. Nonetheless, 
resource gaps invariably arise when organisations envisage moving from 
one position to another, and this accounts for the modification or 
abandonment of intended strategies and the emergence of others. At the 
same time, the presence of excess capacity at particular points in time, can 
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lead to intended strategies being altered or act as a stimulus for the 
formation of different behaviours. 
From the ensuing analysis it is apparent that the outcome of organisational 
strategy and change is predominantly determined by the interplay of three 
major forces: people, resources and the environment. 
This research is concerned with changes in strategic behaviour of a 
company operating in a specific industry - the bus industry. Some 
theoretical issues associated with the choice of unit of analysis have been 
introduced thus far. The more practical issues related to this choice are 
twofold. Firstly, the industry concerned was the subject of a major 
environmental change - it experienced deregulation and simultaneous 
(partial) privatisation. At company level in general, this change marked the 
end of restrictions with regard to product - market scope. For the privatised 
companies in particular, it meant, in addition, corporate freedom. Secondly, 
strategic change is a concept that is universally associated with changes in 
the environment, and as Caplow (1983) states ... even the most passive 
organisation is compelled to modify itself from time to time in response to 
irresistible changes in the environment. 
The findings of this case study will be analysed and interpreted as follows 
1 it considers the three major periods of strategy formation and change that 
were identified between 1984 and 1990 
2 an appreciation of the company's management of critical strategic issues 
during the same period 
6.2 Patterns of strategy formation and change - the case of MF 
Figure 6-1 shows the major pattern of strategies adopted by the company 
between 1984 and 1990 and the legislative context in which they occurred. 
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Figure 6-1 
Pattern of Strategies - the case of MF 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Company Expansion by internal Expansion by acquisition Consolidation 
Strategies development 
" reinforcing the core " extending the core business " rationalisation and 
business defence of an 
" unrelated diversification enlarged core 
" related diversification "growth by acquisition 
" internal reorganisation " revitalisation of 
related diversification 
" specification 
Legislative Publication Transition Full deregulation and 
Context of intentions period partial privatisation 
There are three features in this configuration of change that are noteworthy. 
Firstly, the relationship between the type of-strategies and the changes in the 
political dimension (ie. legislation) is not as clear cut as the diagram implies: 
that is, it cannot be assumed that once the restrictions on product and market 
choices are eliminated, ' legislation and politics in general cease to influence 
the development in the industry and company decisions. 
Secondly, the pace and radicality of change in the strategic behaviour of the 
company is outstanding especially as the industry concerned had been 
under regulatory control for over 30 years. However, according to the 150 
Bradford studies (Hickson et al, 1985), the mean value between the time in 
which a stimulus for an action was perceived and the commitment to the 
action was made (Mintzberg and Teovet, 1976) was just over 12 months. 
Thirdly, it should be stressed that there are distinct origins for the changes. 
Some are the realisation of judgments (and thus of intentions made about 
the environment by members of the organisation who had a detailed 
knowledge of the industry and were able to anticipate and fulfil the needs of 
the new environment (eg. the utilisation of minibuses).. Other strategies 
emerged as consistent patterns which were not intended (eg. acquisition of 
other companies) or that were intended but not realised (eg. major internal 
reorganisation in mid 1988). 
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The three major periods shown in Figure 6-1 will now be considered in more 
detail. 
Period 1. Expansion by internal development :A period 
intended strategies 
This period starts in 1984 with the publication of the Transport Bill and ends 
in October 1986 - the date that marks the start of the industry's full 
deregulation process (so-called 'D-day'). 
The main aim of the company was clearly identified - to assert an early (and 
strong) market presence before D-day. To achieve this goal, the company 
introduced major changes in areas of the business which historically had 
been blamed for the industry's lack of success: the quality of the product 
and the costs of producing it. The company was quick to identify the market 
niche where the greatest impact could be made - minibuses - and was able 
to force through changes in employment conditions and improve 
productivity. These changes made an enormous impact on the performance 
of the company during this period, as is testified in the following statements: 
- Our presence in the market was established between the 
publication of the 1984 Transport Bill and the 1985 Transport 
Act's implementation, so it was through the later half of 1984, 
through 1985 and up to deregulation. Most of the generation of 
new business came with minibus services [which are said to 
have resulted in an 85% increase in patronage (Jones 1988)] 
which we really introduced during 1985, early 1986, before 
deregulation (Commercial Director, hereafter referred to as 
CD). 
- We really approached the whole package of wages and 
conditions and renegotiated them in 1986 - which was in effect 
prior to deregulation ... approaching deregulation, we quickly 
broke away from the central negotiating machinery and had the 
ability of negotiating significant changes to the traditional 
national conditions (CD). 
However, these strategies have to be understood bearing in mind three 
factors. Firstly, the period of transition to a deregulated environment can be 
characterised more as a period of confusion rather than one of instability. 
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The Company's direction was clearly focussing beyond D-day and at the 
same time was capitalising on an undefined environment. 
... it was the 1985 Transport Act that in many ways was part of the 
spur. It took off the controls but we still achieved under the old 
regulations. These were not applied as rigorously as they had 
been, because everybody was looking towards the 1986 
Deregulation (CD). 
Secondly, MF's leadership was not acting as simple caretakers of an 
organisation that was soon to face the twin challenges of deregulation and 
privatisation. The content of the strategies adopted during this period are 
clearly associated with a proactive type of leadership and not with the type of 
behaviour that could be expected from a leadership approaching the end of 
its management intervention in the company's activities. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the leadership was quick to draw upon its 
repertoire of experiences. Economies of experience are said to reflect the 
link between costs (and also often price) and the length of time a producer 
has been active in the market (Button, 1988a). Economies of experience 
can be expressed in many ways. Superior information about the needs of 
users can avoid for example, the costs of extensive experimentation; the 
experience in the workings of the network and knowledge of the costs of 
production can, in addition, lead to a more accurate assessment of the 
profitable market segments. Although the company recognised that the 
supply of bus services involves a bit of trial and error (CD), it is clear that the 
emphasis is on experience expressed as good feeling (CD). This idea is 
evident in the following statements: 
- Experience has shown elsewhere (that people appreciate a 
better quality of service that goes round the estate). There is not a 
lot of science at all. It is more a question of good feeling (CD). 
-A lot of decisions ... are taken as a result of good feeling and 
probably no more than that. / dare say that we are lucky that in the 
past the good feeling has been correct (Loughborough and 
Coalville Depot General Manager, hereafter referred to as DGM2). 
This period can thus be characterised as the-realisation of an intended 
strategy - an early and strong market presence - whose content was closely 
associated with the leadership's past experience and future interests in the 
industry. It was undoubtedly a period of intense management activity and 
leadership. It is also important to note that, the type of behaviours observed 
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did not lead to the frame breaking type of change in Newman's model 
(1985). The introduction of minibuses and the changes in employment 
conditions, the main contributing means in the company's growth, were not 
traumatic experiences and were absorbed without a major internal upset 
(Norman, 1985). The fact is that even if there were mismatches between the 
strategy and internal arrangements, the absence of market competitiveness 
during this period did not bring them to the fore. 
In conclusion, this was a period in which management was able to capitalise 
on the company's weakness and on an undefined environment, but it would 
certainly take longer for it to know its strengths for these are ultimately 
determined in an open market. 
Period 2. Expansion by acquisition: A period of emerge 
strategies 
The second period started in late 1986 with the full deregulation of the 
industry and lasted until the end of 1989. 
Evidence that the company had embarked on a different type of strategic 
emphasis is clear in the following statement: 
- On the 26th of October 1986, we really had achieved our 
optimum ... really the optimal was over the 12 months (of 1985 
(CD). 
Rationalisation of services and consolidation of the existing core business 
was the underlying objective during a great part of 1987: 
- It was a period of modification and fine-tuning, not of expansion 
... in terms of the core business, ie. the long standing MFs depots 
within (the main urban centre) or within (the smaller town 
networks) (CD). 
Concomitant to this fundamental norm, another emerged as a (natural) 
product of deregulation and of the privatisation of the company - that of 
profitability: 
- All we seek is to make a profit (CD) 
- Obviously, my major responsibility is to ensure the continuing 
profitable operations of the two garages (DGM2) 
Together, rationalisation and profitability have determined behaviours 
throughout, and were particularly active at times of market dominance. 
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But, although these fundamental directions remained unaltered, resources 
were being diverted into a new and unrelated product area - that of recovery 
of all classes of vehicles in a specified area (Report of Annual Accounts, 
1988). 
This trend would be repeated during the early part of 1990, although this 
time it involved the (further) development of a related product (coaching). It 
is also important to point out that unrelated diversification was not developed 
further for 
-(Recovery of Vehicles) has demonstrated to us the fact that many 
people have quoted in the past, ie. stick to something you know, 
because ... when you move into a new field you become the 
newcomer who is likely to make serious errors (CD). 
Related diversification prevailed as a significant strategy. It had its first 
impetus during 1988, progressed cautiously during 1989 and was 
reactivated in 1990. The more cautious approach in terms of resource 
commitment during 1987 can be seen to be related to the management 
buyout of the company in mid 1987, to the extent that the owners' stake in 
the company represented an important portion of their wealth. 
However, the years of 1988 and 1989 witnessed the most radical events in 
the company's history. A series of acquisitions in the product related area 
(coaching) in the beginning of 1988 was followed by a major internal 
reorganisation of the company in the latter part of that year. 1989, on the 
other hand, saw the combination of minor and major competitive battles with 
small operators resulting in further acquisitions. In late 1989 the company 
was itself integrated into a major Transport Group. 
The changes can be classified into two main groups according to their 
origins: 
1, the major internal reorganisation. This was an intentionally 
designed strategy that was put on hold and reemerged within a 
different specific context 
2 the wave of acquisitions and the integration of the company into a 
holding, were not intended strategies but emerged also, as a 
result of specific events. 
The change from a functionalised type of structure to a divisionalised used 
one was a typical example of an intended strategy 
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- For a number of years we have been trying to get General 
Managership within the depots ... it was not something that 
happened overnight ... it was something that was on the table 
(CD) 
that was not realised in previous periods, 
- We tried on a number of occasions ... but failed by and large 
(CD), 
but that eventually (re)emerged, 
it was really a change in personnel that triggered the whole 
thing off to its ultimate (CD). 
The expansion strategy of MF beyond its main core, involved the acquisition 
of a number of concerns in the company's main product area (stage 
carriage) and to a lesser extent in a related product area (coaching). 
According to the company's executive, this strategy emerged as a result of: 
- Failures within the industry by others and not because of a 
success (of the company) in the industry ... many of them were 
struggling financially ... and would have ultimately gone to the wall 
without any interference from the company (CD). 
But in other cases, acquisitions were not the result of what could be 
described as this proactive behaviour aimed at exploiting business 
opportunities. They became the outcome of a fundamental competitive 
strategy that emerged as the core business was being extended - the 
intransigent defence of the acquired territories. 
However, the cumulative effect of the success enjoyed by MF in the more 
peripheral markets was causing concern to a major incumbent who began to 
signal an increasing unease about these developments in surrounding 
areas of its own core business. This concern was naturally augmented by 
the integration of MF into a major Transport Group. This strategy was seen 
by the company's competitors as providing the means for MF to assert 
market dominance: 
- It (MF) could call on backing that I (a competitor) was unable to 
match. (Kinch) 
For the management of the company, the decision rested on the fact that 
larger groupings seemed to be beneficial in the long -term 
(Managing Director, hereafter referred to as MD) 
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However, it is likely that these two ideas have a strong connection. The 
financial demands of the buy-out, together with the strain imposed on 
resources from fairly prolonged competitive battles with relatively small 
operators must have played a key role in this (long term) decision. 
Furthermore, it became clear that, in the opinion of the Commercial Director, 
the value of the market was low and that it could not stand too many 
operators sharing a declining demand. There can be little doubt as to the 
formation of this strategy - it was not intended - after all the company kept its 
independent status for only a period of 21/2 years - and emerged as a result 
of facing the reality of a deregulated market. A reality that has nonetheless 
enabled the company to express a market superiority in marginal areas, but 
not within the boundaries of its main urban core. 
Period 3. Consolidation: A period of strategy conceptualisat 
and growth by acquisition 
This period marks the resurgence of the rationalising and consolidating type 
of strategy, although in a distinct form from the one pursued before. - By mid 
1990, the company had successfully gained market dominance in those 
areas where smaller operators had been active earlier. In the view of the 
Commercial Director, the small operators by and large have gone now. 
The first half of 1990 was characterised by trimming resources, ie. 
deactivating over-provision in those areas where competition had been 
more intense on the one hand, and integrating the resources of the 
companies that were acquired on the other. The message given by the 
leadership to the increasing autonomous divisions continued to be that of 
streamline operations and defend individual market shares. However, by 
the end of 1990, the company faced a major attack by the main incumbent. 
The fact that the competitor is still a public company and is regarded as 
being non-commercial in its approach to the market, has led to a rethinking 
of competitive strategies. Some divisions began to form behaviours that 
were outside the umbrella of strategies (Mintzberg, 1989) defined by the 
leadership. They have not yet, however, developed as a consistent pattern 
and are better understood as being part of the company's learning process. 
It has also become apparent that the company, although dominant in some 
market areas, was not generating sufficient returns to finance the 
replacement of its fleet, and in particular the smaller vehicles. Whilst the 
main core business was still considered to be local bus services, some 
members of the organisation were conceptualising strategies for alternative 
and complementary uses of the company's resources. At the corporate 
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level, coaching was seen as a business able to return higher earnings, and 
thus merited an increasing share of the company's resources. At the 
divisional level, the aim was to exploit additional sources of income within 
existing resources (eg. maintenance related work). 
The role of the leadership in influencing the company's direction was once 
again in evidence: 
- Our MD has a particular soft spot for coaching and his opinion is 
that it can be made to work ... he has a theory that if we 
considerably increase the quality of the coaching product, we will 
achieve a good level of profit ... now in the past his opinions have 
come true, so I am more than willing to wait and see if this one 
does (DGM2). 
The impetus given to the development of the related product must also be 
seen in the context of the major internal reorganisation that took place in 
1988. In fact, the MD who knew nothing about coaches (CD) was the 
executive who assumed the managerial role in the integration of the 
coaching companies acquired, in close liaison with their ex-leaders who 
were all coachmen rather than busmen who knew all about coaches (CD). It 
is this relationship between specialised know how - the access to which 
was gained at a relatively low cost - and the management skills of the 
leadership, that can be seen as having contributed to the evaluation of 
investment opportunities in this related product. 
The year of 1990 marks the start of a period of uncertainty both in the 
internal and external environments. The main core of the business 
demands great investment effort and the value of the market remains low. 
The political scene has not significantly changed. The competitive 
environment is entering a turbulent phase to a degree not experienced 
before - competing with new (commercial ) entrants is significantly different 
from competing with (non-commercial ) incumbents. Related diversification 
and in particular the growing acquisition strategy may create conflicting 
claims on the company's resources for ... what we want at the moment is for 
cash to be available to take advantage of the opportunities which will come 
up (MD). The holding group has not established itself as an influential force 
although at present its role of deterring ... anyone from having too much of a 
go at us (MD) is clearly acknowledged. These are factors that will affect 
future business. 
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6.3 Studying strategy in organizations -a final note 
The findings of this chapter have raised important issues as far as 
methodologies for studying strategy in organizations are concerned. 
The methodology chosen - the one suggested by Mintzberg (1978) - was 
thought to provide the framework for examining "what patterns of strategy 
could be seen to exist historically and to assess what could be learned from 
the changes occurred" (Johnson 1987). From the data collected there was 
strong evidence of clearly identifiable patterns of change. 
This approach to studying changes in organizations behaviour differs from 
the one developed by Miles and Snow (1978). Miles and Snow classified 
organizations into Defenders, Prospectors, Analysers and Reactors 
depending on the characteristics of the patterns of adaptation shown in 
relation to three broad problems (entrepreneurial, engineering and 
administrative) of an adaptive cycle. This categorization of organizations 
has since been amended by others to accommodate other types. Nicholson 
(1988) introduced the Hybrid type to combine features of the Defender and 
of the Prospector kind of organizations and Bryman (1982) saw the need to 
add the Transformer to represent a transitional state from one type to 
another. The research undertaken on MF has shown that this company 
shared some features of an Analyser as defined by Miles and Snow (eg. 
seeking out new ventures tried elsewhere but valuing its core business 
highly). However, there were instances where its behaviour deviated from 
Miles and Snow's ideal model of an Analyser (eg. adjustments in product 
characteristics were developed only when it was forced to do so, or, as in the 
period before full deregulation, it was able to anticipate future trends by 
having changed its fleet configuration in advance). It could therefore be 
argued that these findings appear to confirm Bryman's view that "companies 
incorporate inconsistent elements because they are in a state of change 
from one strategic orientation to another": It is in this context that the 
methodology chosen in this research and presented in this chapter has 
placed less emphasis on categorizing strategic responses and has 
concentrated instead on identifying major trends in MF's corporate 
behaviour since its privatization and the deregulation of the bus industry. It 
has covered areas of corporate concern, namely the form of its organization 
and of its output, and it has identified the forces (leadership, resources and 
the environment) that have influenced the set of (consistent) decisions in 
relation to these topics. 
117 
The next chapter will consider in more detail the role that these forces have 
played in the configuration of the patterns of strategic change presented 
herein. That is, it will establish the major links between corporate behaviour 
and the various functional area policies and operating plans that MF used in 
order to manage change. 
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Chapter 7: - The Management of Change 
After identifying the major strategic patterns of behaviour of MF, it is now 
crucial to concentrate on key issues in the management of strategic change 
within the framework outlined in the preceding section. 
7.1 Organisational Issues 
For an enterprise to function it needs an organisational framework. The 
formal and informal types of relationship that evolve within this framework 
characterise the form of the organisation. The ultimate aim of an 
organisation is to adopt a structure that combines its human resources in a 
way that is compatible with its mission. It is nonetheless debatable whether 
gaps between structure and goals can be held solely accountable for an 
organisation's lack of success. It is also questionable whether the structure 
of an organisation determines its goals and strategies or vice versa. The 
undisputable fact however, is that as Mintzberg (1989) points out, 
organisations do favour one type of structure over the others at certain 
stages of their lives. 
There are a number of factors that can induce change as much as they can 
contribute to the maintenance of the status quo. The environment plays a 
key role, namely at times of major discontinuities. The power system 
influences the type and pace of organisational change. The size of an 
organisation is a factor that can stimulate and reinforce the need for change. 
These and other factors have been extensively researched. Most of this 
research aims at providing a contextual understanding for the developments 
observed in specific cases. 
MFs organisation structure was, until mid 1987, basically of a functional type. 
This is a characteristic still common to most companies in the bus industry. 
Production was divided into two main areas: Traffic and Engineering, and 
the non-productive function was comprised of the Operational and Financial 
accounting. 
There are some striking features about this type of structure that are 
noteworthy. Communications throughout the organisation were usually very 
formal and the administrative structure was extensive. The power for 
decision making was largely centralised and the size of the operating unit 
tended to be great. Finally, there was a disproportionate importance 
attached to the operations function. 
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In the case of MF, this type of framework was soon identified as being 
incompatible with the longer term needs of the company. However, despite 
the fact that the basic structure and its main parameters remained unaltered 
during the transition period (1984/86), the company is said to have achieved 
considerable success. This suggests that certain strategies can be pursued 
successfully at times of dissonance with company structures. Other 
circumstantial factors - namely a) the experience, expertise and the 
pro-active behaviour of the company's leadership b) environmental 
indefinition and c) the lack of market competitiveness together with the 
impact on demand of a new type of product (minibus services), have, in this 
case reduced the potential disadvantages of such disequilibrium. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that in spite of the success attained, the intention to 
change the form of the organisation persisted. 
The changes in the company's structure were substantiated by the training 
given to the future divisional managers. Furthermore, the ultimate shape of 
the company's divisional structure was preceded by a configuration based 
on leadership expertise rather than on apportioning overall responsibility for 
the divisional managers to each individual director. This temporary 
arrangement caused mixed feelings among divisional managers 
- The situation before - when we consulted different Directors - 
was probably not right ... 1 could not really identify who was my 
overall superior (Wigston Depot General Manager, hereafter 
referred to as DGM1) 
- ... it didn't cause me any difficulty or problem to talk to four 
separate people (the then four directors) (DGM2) 
The differences in these two positions can be accounted for by the fact that 
DGM 1 had been recently recruited from outside the bus industry, whereas 
DGM 2 had worked in the industry for 11 years -5 with the company. It is 
evident that the experience gained in the bus industry by the latter meant 
that he did not require the same degree of contact with the expertise of top 
management, than in the case of DGM 2. This appears to confirm Bentley's 
(1980) suggestion that the more experience a manager has in a particular 
job the more he relies on his accumulated knowledge. 
The implementation of the definitive form of organisational structure in 
mid-1988 occurred amidst the acquisitions made by the company. It is clear, 
however, that the basic principle of Depot Managership associated with that 
structure was formalised before the acquisitions took place, and was not a 
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consequence of this strategy. There is no indication that the type of structure 
adopted was intended to meet the needs of the company growth which was 
a result of its strategy of expansion by acquisition. This does not, however, 
belittle the role played by the growth which occurred during the transition 
period (though mostly in the company's historical core) if only in 
strengthening the dominant feeling towards change. The following statement 
summarises the prevailing motives : 
... the major changes were made so that each depot was 
managed by someone who had the authority to make the 
day-to-day decisions and had the financial responsibility to 
ensure that the depot operated profitably ... unless you can 
trust your local manager you are not sufficiently attuned to local 
circumstances to make the right decisions at the right time 
(CD). 
The changes were thus to be achieved by reformulating and reinforcing the 
role of the company's operating units: the Depots. 
This depot based approach can be seen as part of a wider market driven 
approach to the extent that it positioned the company nearer to its 
customers. As Moyes (1990) has pointed out, market research has 
demonstrated a clear customer preference for small providers with whom 
they can identify. The creation of self-contained depots around smaller 
towns or in specific urban areas, has enhanced closer community ties and 
market competitiveness. The philosophy of profit accountability must also be 
understood in this context. Profitability is a goal that is ultimately defined by 
local market forces and it is greatly dependent on the understanding of the 
characteristics of local demand of the real and potential impact of 
competition and of the costs of operating in particular territories. 
The preceding quotation embraces a number of universal issues associated 
with various aspects of organisational life. The following sections provide a 
discussion of the most important issues in the context of this case study. 
7.1.1 The depot approach 
The bus depot is the essence of an urban bus operation. It is where all 
productive resources are located and where the operative decisions have to 
be made. The traditional depot structure was essentially fragmented into 
two major areas - Traffic and Engineering, each working under different 
hierarchal lines. The reporting procedures between the depots and 
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Headquarters were both extensive and limiting, and lateral communications 
were restricted. Despite the fact that the bulk of production takes place at the 
depots, responsibilities and authority were characteristically centralised at 
Headquarters. 
These facts suggest that any internal strategy aimed at vitalising the role of 
these operating units is necessarily an organisation-wide exercise. In fact, 
the depot based type of organisation adopted by MF caused an inevitable 
reformulation of important organisational parameters. The following merit 
further analysis for they have had a significant disruptive effect on 
established patterns. 
7.1.2 Delegation of authority - decentralisation and autonomy 
Centralisation/decentralisation is a concept intimately associated with 
delegation of authority and responsibility, and thus of power. In the bus 
industry, a clearly definable nucleus of power was discernible in most 
companies. The distance between this nucleus and the operating units was 
considerable, and yet the latter were very dependent on the former. 
The decision to dilute power over a wider structural base involved, in the first 
instance, the creation of a new post - that of depot-General Manager. This 
meant that the functionalised type of dependence between the depots and 
Headquarters was greatly reduced. It also contributed to the formation of a 
sense of unit autonomy and identity that was not present in the traditional 
structure. This is a feature that would have been impossible to accomplish 
without a concomitant devolution of authority and responsibility to the 
management of the company's operating units. 
The degree of structural decentralisation is highlighted in Table 7-1. The 
weakening of the company's authority (decentralisation) is expressed in this 
table by the depot's management accountability for meeting agreed targets 
(responsibility), as a result of being empowered to command crucial aspects 
of the depot's business (authority) and of being able to influence matters that 
remain under the authority of Headquarters (inputs). 
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Table 7-1: 
The Degree of Decentralisation 
Depot General Manager 
Responsibility submit and meet annual budget 
targets 
submit regular reports on 
performance variables 
Authority discipline & organise production 
produce services 
set level of fares (except within 
urban area) 
Input wage negotiations 
vehicle replacement 
competitive strategies 
registration and tendering of 
services 
Headquarters 
Authority corporate business direction 
set final budget targets for 
depots 
control performance 
negotiate wage levels 
decide on vehicle 
replacement 
direct major competitive 
strategies 
liaise with outside institutions 
eg. (Traffic Commissioners, 
County Counciq 
One major issue emerges from this decentralised configuration - the degree 
and the implications of depot autonomy. 
Table 7-1 suggests that whilst the involvement of corporate management in 
the daily operations of the depots is limited, its influential role is 
considerable. In fact, despite the contributions of the depots, it is the 
company's corporate management that sets wage levels - The only cost that 
is dictated to the General Manager centrally is Wage Rates (CD) - and 
decides on the vehicle replacement programme - the decision on vehicle 
replacement ... is primarily the Director's (CD). 
Furthermore, despite\the fact that the depot General Managers prepare their 
own budgets, there are minimum targets that ought to be achieved and 
these are closely monitored: 
- It is up to the DGM in the first place to say what his depot can 
achieve. But if he is making a loss he has to do something 
about it. If he is only making 1% profit, that is not enough. We 
always have to be aiming at getting towards 10% profit. (CD) 
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However important these constraints may appear after all wages account for 
nearly 70% of operating costs they represent only a fraction of what is 
involved in the concept of autonomy. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
autonomy as the right of making its own laws' and administering its own 
affairs. 
It is clear from Table 7-1 that the depot managers decide independently: 
1 the internal structure and administrative arrangements of their 
depots 
2 the methods of labour and vehicle utilisation 
3 the level of fares to a great extent 
Together, these factors complete an important part of the profit equation and 
represent the control of a vast field of the depot's managerial affairs. 
However, there is evidence to confirm that the company's divisions enjoy 
different degrees of autonomy. This is particularly the case in Depot 3 where 
the presence of a major incumbent competitor with an important impact on 
corporate interests, has led to a reduction in the depot's autonomy to the 
extent that corporate management dictates the level of prices to be charged 
for the unit's products. 
-I have no direct control over fares. It is a Director's decision 
(Sandacre Depot General Manger, hereafter referred to as 
DGM 3) 
This is an organisational characteristic identified in Galbraith's and 
Nathanson's (1978) work when they suggested that under competitive 
pressures, organisations would favour more formal management and control 
over decentralised structures. 
Nonetheless, depot autonomy has had important implications for corporate 
management. It has reduced the time consumed with regard to operational 
matters and provided a closer, and yet wider perspective of the overall 
business. Centralisation is now mostly consigned to areas of financing 
(major capital expenditures, overall budgeting and control) and general 
product direction. It is also important to point out that in some depots a 
similar situation, although of a different nature, has arisen: 
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As a result of the changes that have been introduced, I can say 
that much of the time I am redundant. ... the present set up 
gives me more time for forward thinking as opposed to 
reactionary management or to management by crisis (DGM 1). 
The scale and importance of the structural changes observed in this case 
study are clearly exposed by the comments made by a MD about the 
prevailing situation in a bus company when it was part of the same 
nationalised bus group: 
Being a General Manager (the then title fora MD) was to be 
responsible for the running of the company on a day-to-day 
basis, working with laid down guidelines ... standardisation 
was costly and unnecessary and acted as a disincentive to 
maintaining morale in the company ... board meetings were 
also principally reporting occasions : they were not decision 
making occasions. (Birks, 1990) 
7.1.3 Coordination and control 
Coordination and control are two organisational variables that play a 
particularly important role in a decentralised structure based on 
geographically dispersed units. The delegation of authority requires 
mechanisms to -agglutinate organisations towards common purposes 
(coordination) and to assure that targets are continuously achieved (control). 
According to Lessen (1989) the principle of coordination serves to 
counterbalance the factors of differentiation which tend to pull people and 
things apart. The fact is that managers see the business in which they work 
differently, hold divergent views about their role and have different 
expectations. To coordinate is to unite organisational efforts based on a set 
of core beliefs. This function was particularly active in MFs management of 
change. 
The new managerial posts - the Depot General Managers - were filled both 
through promotions within the organisation and by recruiting experienced 
managers from outside the bus industry. The coordination mechanism used 
for both groups relied on training. The emphasis was, nonetheless, different. 
The training given to in-service promotions focussed essentially on technical 
areas (eg. financial and managerial). The training of outside recruits 
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involved transmitting basic company beliefs and assumptions with regard to 
the general functioning of the industry 
there was a need for people to accept the change in 
approach. But we were conscious that it should not be too 
dramatic, too quickly. We therefore counciled the new 
managers to ensure that they were not going to rock the boat 
too heavily (CD) 
2 decision-making: Depot General Manager 1 did not value dialogue 
highly 
We convinced him that that was not how MF traditionally had 
worked (CD) 
whereas Depot Manager 4 was 
very much a people's person ... one of his problems is getting 
the decisions implemented because he wants to consult too 
much (CD) 
The method used to match individual and organisational agendas thus 
described can be identified with Kelman's (1958) notion of identification and 
internalisation and to Pettigrew's (1973b) regularisation process through 
the control of recruitment and training. They both aim at ensuring that 
organisation members adopt an organisation perspective. 
However, the delegation of authority to divisions invariably causes internal 
losses of control. To attenuate this effect, organisations introduce more 
formal mechanisms that establish the contributions of individual units 
towards corporate goals (budgets) and ensure that these are consistently 
met (reporting procedures). In this particular case the target was defined as: 
10% profit on turnover. That is what we will have in our mind as being the 
ideal (CD) 
Although this is a specific and immediate objective it must be seen as part of 
longer term interests. It reflects the amount required for safety and survival 
as well as for meeting capital needs. However, according to Drucker 
(1988b) there are organisations that have shunned profits as goals and 
instead see them as a requirement of the business; that is, as a need. 
Nonetheless, the definition and monitoring of objective functions raises a 
number of organisational issues. As Porter (1985) pointed out, there are 
126 
limits to which all business units should be asked to meet the same goals, 
even though this may seem to be the fairest solution. In fact, depots face 
different operational circumstances - both environmental and in terms of the 
characteristics of their production factors, and have different scales of 
operations. Furthermore, depots are not totally independent units as far as 
their markets are concerned. These are mainly defined according to broad 
geographical areas but there are cases of inter-territorial routes where each 
depot must abide by existing rules (eg., fares etc) over which they have little 
control. Finally, depots have been drawn into competitive battles on routes 
that they do not operate directly and have had to face unexpected strain on 
their resources. Although some of these factors are acknowledged: 
- In the process of examining budgets, the Directors will 
take account of the individual circumstances (CD) 
they are very difficult to quantify, especially when comparisons are 
warranted for the purposes of evaluation of divisional performance and 
allocation of corporate resources. Whereas performance is rewarded by a 
system of bonuses, the allocation of resources is to a certain extent related 
to the financial appraisals that are submitted by the depots for approval by 
the Company's Board. It is clear, nonetheless, that every organisation must 
operate within its financial capability and that choices must be made that 
reflect, among other factors, the projected profitability and market share of 
the individual depots. 
The essence of the monitoring function mostly concerns financial matters: 
- Where there is control over General Managers it is of a 
financial nature ... we believe very strongly in strict financial 
controls (Financial Director, hereafter referred to as FD) 
and is almost nonexistent so far as operational controls are concerned: 
- They are obviously expected to achieve the budget. 
How they do it is up to them. If there are adverse 
variables within the budget they are expected to know... 
what they are, and how they have arisen (FD) 
This fact indicates that individual General Managers are not compelled to 
follow sets of operational guidelines: 
I have a free hand within this Depot (DGM 3) 
-I am the General Manager of this Depot and I take 
responsibility for all aspects of the operation ... basically ! 
run the business more or less how I want to (DGM 1) 
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The degree of freedom and autonomy described thus far, has important 
implications for the attainment of corporate uniformity and for organisational 
communication purposes. 
It is obvious that it is difficult, if not undesirable, to have all company 
procedures clearly specified and enforced throughout the organisation. 
However, the absence of universal company policies with regard to certain 
areas of the business can have opposing effects. On the one hand it frees 
depots from enforcing policies that do not necessarily constitute priorities - or 
can in fact become obstacles to the competitive strategy (that of low cost 
provider) that those depots have decided to pursue (eg. great emphasis on 
staff appearance can increase staff turnover). On the other hand, it can 
undermine the promotion of policies and adversely affect the internal 
equilibrium in some depots [eg. deteriorating staff morale] that are 
attempting to qualitatively differentiate themselves (Porter, 1985). 
This is an issue particularly in evidence in the case where the geographical 
markets of the divisions are close, and thus likely to serve common portions 
of demand. Depot General Manager 1, whose market overlaps with that of 
minibus services, clearly expresses some of these ideas: 
- Depots are allowed to implement their own approaches as far 
as staff is concerned ... these differences cause dissatisfaction 
... we at (this depot) value image highly ... we are very firm on 
staff appearance. However, other depots may not see this 
issue in the same way. You can often see minibus drivers 
smoking and wearing Tee Shirts. (DGM1) 
The changes introduced in the organisation structure of this company and in 
particular the increased autonomy invested in the depots have inevitably 
created a different framework of communications and interrelationships 
between its most senior members. However, the function of communication 
cannot be disassociated from other organisational trends eg. size, 
complexity and environmental pressures - both internal and external. 
7.1.4 Communications and interrelationships 
As Johnson and Scholes (1988) suggested, the study of the problems of 
managing strategic change involves also the interaction of individual 
managers amongst themselves and with other stake holders in the 
organisation. 
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The concept of communication entails the exchange of ideas, knowledge 
and information between members of an organisation. Interrelationships 
consist of mutual relationships that are established in the conveying of such 
facts. This section is concerned with the degree and nature of interpersonal 
behaviours in both the vertical and horizontal directions of the company's 
hierarchy. 
Figure 7-1 is a graphical representation of the type of interrelationships 
considered in this study. Table 7-2 is a summary of the views expressed by 
two Directors (CD, FD) and three Depot General Managers (DGM1,2,3) and 
cover the areas of the communication function described by Weishall (1981): 
What people are communicating about, which tools they are using and 
when they are communicating. The following sections provide an analysis 
of the underlying patterns that have emerged and other organisational 
issues associated with them. 
1 Vertical Interrelationships 
Directors and Depot General Managers 
Two main characteristics emerge 
a Directors and Depot General Managers interrelate 
infrequently 
Two major factors have contributed to the consolidation of this type of 
interrelationship. Firstly, the size of the depots have justified the creation of 
a management environment whereby the presence of expertise on all major 
aspects of the unit's business has greatly reduced the need for consultation, 
and advice on decisions to be sought in the higher levels of the hierarchy. 
This has been expressly encouraged by the Directorship 
- As for decisions within the depots, we expect the General 
Managers to take these with their own teams (CD) 
Secondly, the major formal communication requisites which the depots are 
compelled to follow have been clearly specified. They comprise mainly 
financial data and are seen by the General Managers to fulfil the main 
corporate information needs: 
- There is enough financial information given to the Directors 
for them to know how we are performing (DGM1) 
However, it is clear that communications between these two levels of the 
hierarchy go beyond formal quantitative reporting procedures. 
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b Directors and -Depot 
General Managers Interrelate on 
different issues 
From Table 7-2 (column 4) it is clear that divisional managers interrelate with 
different (eg. FD and DGM3) as well as with the same Director (eg CD and 
DGM1 and 2) on different issues. These differences are mostly related to the 
fact that Directors and Depot Managers alike have distinct professional 
expertise. As a result, depot managers are encouraged to consult on areas 
that constitute important complements to their individual expertise vis-a-vis 
the attainment of unit goals. General Manager 1, who has a managerial 
background, consults with the Commercial Director on industry-related 
issues; General Manager 2, who was involved with bus demand forecasting 
exercises, is clearly identified by the Commercial Director as being capable 
of dealing with environmental uncertainty; General Manager 3, who has a 
clear operational background, interrelates with the Financial Director on cost 
control since the major revenue generator - fares - is decided, in his case by 
the Directorship. 
The roots for this complementarity of professional skills must originate in the 
period of counselling given to the Depot Managers in the stage that 
preceded the implementation of the new structure and to the proclaimed 
special rapports that evolved. This is clearly expressed in the following 
statements: 
Taking my own people, I have two General Managers who 
didn't know anything about the bus industry... i needed to 
give them a grasp of the nuts and bolts about the bus 
industry. The Finance Director had two people who had a 
wealth of experience in the bus industry... so he supported 
them with the Financial and Managerial skills. Many of the 
people that the MD supports benefited from his pure 
managerial skills. They were all coachmen (CD) 
In brief, it is apparent that management contacts between depot and 
corporate leadership are conducted on the basis of the exception principle 
(Barber, 1968) even though its substance varies from one unit to another. 
Depot General Managers and Depot Structures 
In spite of slight variations in titles and job descriptions, depot structures are 
all functional systems. Production creates a chain of interdependencies that 
does not permit granting autonomy to its main task groups (engineering and 
traffic). All functional groups contribute to the final market product. However, 
it is invariably difficult for people in such structures to relate to and 
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comprehend the value that they add to that product. The role of 
communications and interrelationships must therefore be regarded as an 
important means for disseminating the significance of that work, and at the 
same time for creating unity towards common goals. This role has assumed 
different forms (Table 7-2, column 6). To a certain extent they reflect different 
management styles and have helped create distinctive depot identities. 
Depot 1 was probably the depot where the most comprehensive changes 
took place. General Manager 1's first priority was to overcome 
unprofessionalism and excessive departmental demarcation by making: 
- the departments work closely together and to consider the 
implications of any decision upon profitability (DGM 1) 
The means were based on personnel training and development and the 
results were defined as follows: 
We have already reduced the staff by 25% and I still retain 
full maximum efficiency and in effect improved it in general 
terms ... I have managed to improve their professionalism 
over the past 20 months. Not that we are totally there, but 
we have confidence in our ability (DGM1) 
The process involved transmitting basic business ideals (re: previous 
professional activity - trouble shooter) rather than providing for wide-scale 
involvement in decision making. It has served, however, for identifying the 
sources of industry-related expertise and information: The management 
team has been changed in total (DGM1), upon which this newcomer to the 
industry could rely for decision-making purposes. This is also the depot 
whose General Manager has expressed more inward-looking and 
self-centred feelings: 
-I am responsible for this Depot and / don't really get 
involved in what is going on outside this Depot's service 
area. lam purely judged on the performance of this garage. 
Fortunately, there is little that we require from the 
(Headquarters) support departments. This is what we work 
towards (DGM1) 
and who has also indicated strong reservations with regard to corporate 
strategic decisions (eg. coaching) 
- Coach work is too competitive. -I personally would like to see 
them stop acquiring too many coach companies and go more 
into stage carriage. (DGM1) 
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By contrast, Depot General Managers 2 and 3 show a more open - driving 
staff come up and see me and I discuss various problems with them (DGM2) 
- team based - we have team meetings every week (DGM3), and humanistic 
- we are very forthcoming, the door is never closed. We are a caring 
company (DGM3), perspective about the role of interrelationships. 
There is also evidence to suggest that although the performance of the 
depots constitute a major priority, company goals and views are closely 
related to that priority: 
-I go and look at the two garages ... but take on board the 
broader company view as well which is not necessarily 
something that the other General Managers fulfilled (DGM2) 
- As far as I am concerned, I work for MF and I will do whatever 
I can for the whole company (DGM3) 
Furthermore, these positions reflect the way in which corporate decisions 
are envisaged: Depot General Manager 2 is ... more than willing to wait and 
see if this one (coaching) works, although it is a decision not fully accepted - 
I am not convinced that the level of profit is there presently. Depot Manager 3 
is more openly supportive: I agree with the way that (current corporate 
product direction) is going at the present moment ... it is a lucrative market. 
There is a terrific potential out there for coaching. 
Whilst vertical interrelationships can be seen by organisation members as 
being purposeful, the interchange of knowledge and information across the 
hierarchy constitutes a more complex issue. 
2 Horizontal Interrelationships 
The Interrelationships among divisional managers are distant 
This is a characteristic mostly associated with geographically divisionalised 
structures where there is little product overlapping and where units are 
loosely coupled - (Aldrich, 1979). Under these circumstances, well integrated 
divisions operating within fairly fixed market boundaries, rarely interrelate. 
In spite of the few opportunities for unit confrontation that may arise as a 
result of this, the fact remains that they must all compete for scarce corporate 
resources. - Furthermore, voluntary cooperation, even when it is expected in 
its simplest form of closer and more fluid exchange of ideas between units, 
may become harder to achieve when performance rewards are perceived as 
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the principal means for individual self-assertion and for career assessment 
purposes. It is visible from Table 7-2 (column 5) that corporate management 
is only prepared to intervene when the need for pooling resources arises. 
However, this raises the question of quantifying the future benefits that ought 
to accrue to the depot that has committed its own resources for the success 
of others, but whose market position and performance has not substantially 
improved as a result. 
It is clear however, that there are significant differences in the way in which 
divisional managers interpret their corporate role. Depot General Manager 
1 takes a rather self-centred orientation towards the other parts of the 
company's business; DGM 2 expresses the views of those who wish to be 
associated with a successful and growing company, and, DGM 3's position 
is one of devotion and loyalty towards prevailing corporate interests. These 
differing beliefs are related to the way in which these three organisational 
characters have been allocated areas of control. DGM1 and DGM2 occupy 
peripheral markets whereas DGM3's central positioning demands greater 
personal disposition to interrelate 
- Whatever happens out there ... we will assist. It has got to be 
done to keep the company going (DGM3) 
even if this represents an additional burden to the functioning of the depot 
- where we lose out is where it takes my fitters away from their 
own jobs. (DGM3) 
In conclusion, it could be said that the issues raised herein with regard to the 
pattern of communications and interrelationships are in consonance with the 
type of coordination and control mechanisms used to group together (rather 
than altogether) autonomous units. 
7.2 Operating Issues 
The origin of the bus transport industry's delicate situation can be traced 
back to many of its operating methodologies. Orski (1982) has enumerated 
a number of contributing factors: 
... generous wage settlements, inflexible labour practices, 
deferred maintenance and unreliable equipment ... cities went on 
running buses on fixed routes seemingly oblivious to the fact that 
demand for such services was dwindling.. -. little effort was made to 
design and market bus services with the customers in mind... 
artificially low fares... . 
The 1985 Transport Act aimed at reversing the trends cited above, through 
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the deregulation and privatisation of the industry. Competition amongst bus 
operators and between the industry's product and its main substitutes on the 
one hand, and the profit motive that would result from private ownership on 
the other, were seen as the means to revitalise the bus industry., The state 
monopoly - assured by the control of route licensing - was considered to be 
a major impediment to experimentation and innovation. At the same time, it 
was claimed that the effect of competition ... on costs and prices 
is so widely 
seen that few would question its validity or its importance (Morlock. and 
Krouk, 1983). 
The new legislation was thus regarded as a framework that would induce 
changes in practically all areas of the industry's business, ie. production, 
design and sale of bus services. This chapter considers the major strategies 
pursued by Midland Fox within this context. 
7.2.1 Production 
The major production factors utilised in the supply of bus services are labour 
and vehicles and constitute the major items of operating expenses. 
Labour 
As in any other industry a bus operator may own its buses but it can only hire 
its labour force. However, bus companies face a dual problem of being 
labour intensive but unable to use both its production factors evenly 
throughout a normal production period (ie. during one day or throughout the 
year). In fact, because of peaks in demand and other adverse time-related 
environmental factors (eg. congestion, population dispersion), bus operators 
invariably carry additional drivers and vehicles to supply a product 
consumed only during a fraction of the total time that they are employed 
(drivers) or that could be utilised (buses) as productive factors. 
The issue of labour costs played an outstanding role in the argument in 
favour of the deregulation of the bus industry. Operating costs were 
regarded as having soared during the 1970s and early 1980s, not only as a 
result of high wage rates and fringe benefits that were awarded, but also 
because productivity levels led to more drivers being recruited in order to 
produce decreasing amounts of services. It. was claimed that as a result of 
deregulation, operating costs could fall by as much as 30%. This would not 
only ensure the financial viability of bus companies but it would also reduce 
the need for public subsidies. - 
Bus users would benefit from lower cost 
provision of services via lower fares and public authorities would enjoy low 
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cost bids being submitted for tender services. 
There is wide recognition that in fact operating costs have fallen 
substantially since the full implementation of the Transport legislation in 
1986, although it is less certain whether they have been translated into a 
welfare gain (Savage 1986). 
Nonetheless, it is apparent that three major factors provided opportunities for 
the prosecution of significant savings in labour costs : 
1 the removal of the restrictive labour practices imposed on 
state-owned companies by a national negotiation machinery 
2 the pressures associated with a more open market 
3 the privatisation of the major nationalised bus group. 
The important role of these factors is intrinsically acknowledged in the case 
of the MF bus company: 
- Many aspects of payment that had been formerly agreed 
nationally were totally disbanded (CD) 
- The staff now realise the importance of the profitability of the 
garage. They are fully aware that MF stands or falls according to 
their performance. There is no longer (the major nationalised) 
group to bail us out (DGM 2) 
- When we became private, our Directors originally took a gamble 
by putting a lot of money into the company. The company was not 
very successful and obviously a lot of new negotiations had to be 
agreed upon with the unions (DGM 3) 
Main savings were expected to be achieved in two major labour related 
areas 
1 employment conditions 
2 productivity 
Table 7-3 contains extracts of the Wages and Conditions agreement in effect 
at MF during 1990. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the type of labour contract 
adopted by MF is that it confirms the views expressed by many (eg. Savage 
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Table 7-3 
Extracts of MFs Labour Agreement -1990(1) 
Wages & Conditions 
1 One basic hourly rate applies irrespective of 
a the amount of hours worked in excess of the minimum hours guaranteed/day 
b of the period of the day (early or evening) 
c of the day of the week (Saturday or Sunday) 
2 Guaranteed hours/day : 7.00 
3 Rates of pay Time of Service Vehicle Capacity 
16 seater 25 seater 75 seater 
up to 6 months £3.00 £3.00 
6- 12 months £3.10 £3.30 £5.00 
plus 12 months £3.40 £3.60 
4 The company does not pay meal breaks but there is a 10 minute/day allowance at the 
start or at the end of a duty 
5 Split shifts are accepted practice: in a 12 hour spread, 2 hours will be unpaid 
6 Spare drivers can be detailed to do garage maintenance or other labouring types of job, 
if not driving 
7 There are no specific scheduling guidelines to be applied uniformly by all depots 
8 Holiday entitlements: Accrue according to the length of service with the company 
Time of Service Entitlement 
up to 2 years 20 days 
2 to 4 years 22 days 
4 to 6 years 23 days 
over 6 years 25 days 
9 Sick pay entitlement: depends on the length of service as in the following table 
Time of Service 
up to 2 years 
2 to 3 years 
3 to 4 years 
4 to 5 years 
5 to 10 years 
over 10 years 
Entitlement 
Nil 
4 weeks 
6 weeks 
8 weeks 
13 weeks 
26 weeks 
The company does not make any 
payments for the first 3 days of 
sickness: Payments are awarded 
at the basic hourly rate, multiplied 
by average weekly hours, less 
statutory sick pay. 
(1) Part of a three year package agreed in March 1986 
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op. cit, Dodgson and Katsoulacos 1991), that the deregulation of the bus 
industry has led to a tightening of the conditions of employment in relation to 
their pre-deregulation standards. 
A major factor in this process of change is the relationship that evolved 
between management and labour. The basic challenge facing management 
in the post-1986 era was implementing changes to labour practices without 
alienating the company's employees in general, particularly those whose 
proximity to market forces (to both users and other competitors) made them 
more likely to affect the company's performance and image. Fielding (1987) 
pointed out that bus operators have relied more on employee involvement 
and less on confrontational tactics in their efforts to revise work rules and 
reduce upward wage demands. Besides, this methodology conforms with 
Trade Union's claims prior to deregulation: 
- ... so let no-one say that we are opposed to changes. What we 
are opposed to are any sort of unilateral decisions which bring 
these changes without us having any say or input before the final 
decisions are made (Morris, National Secretary of the 
Transport and Workers Union, 1982) 
MFs approach to labour relations does not differ essentially from the above: 
- we have got to consult the Trade Union ... it is far better to advise 
them in the first instance of what you intend to do and let them 
have an input to the extent of slightly moulding it (CD) 
Whilst at the same time explicitly stating that 
- Ultimately, the decision is the company's. (CD) 
Nonetheless, this type of relationship is acknowledged by management to 
have contributed to the desired changes in attitudes: 
- We have a very committed Trade Union to the company: they 
don't say that the men get better opportunities if they 'rip off the 
company. The company has got to be successful in order for the 
men to benefit from that success (CD) 
- In brief, I think that one of the most important changes has been 
the good working relationship that we have with the Trade 
Unions (DGM 2) 3 
- ... everybody's aim now is to work in one direction for the good 
of the company to safeguard everybody's jobs (DGM 3) 
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More importantly, it is an approach that has proved valuable to those who 
are sceptical about the role of Trade Unions: 
- They (Trade Unions) only agree when it suits them. If it doesn't, 
they put all sorts of obstacles in the way. I found that to be very 
much so, even in this organisation, although we have a fairly 
unique system here, where there is a reasonable cooperation 
between the two parties and it proves, in the main, to be effective 
(DGM1) 
The changes indicated in Table 7-3 have therefore to be envisaged within 
this framework of relationships between labour and management, a type of 
relationship whose ultimate goal goes beyond the single implementation of 
new wages and conditions. It generated a sense of trust between the parties 
and a redefinition of patterns of behaviour and beliefs. 
However, as was noted by Turner and White (1987), regional factors have 
also had an important impact on these labour changes. In MFs case, two 
factors have played a significant role. 
Firstly, the competitiveness of the local labour market - the geographical 
area where MF is situated, ... being a heavy (mainly engineering) industry 
type of area, was characterised by high competition for labour (CD). This 
meant that traditionally the previously nationalised company had been a 
good wage payer in order to compete in the labour market, and 
- We have been unable to break that situation in terms of long 
serving drivers ... in terms of rates, we did, I fear pay rather 
heavily. (CD) 
Secondly, local private employers do not award as generous fringe benefits 
as the bus industry was known to practice (eg. Heseltine and Silcock 1990, 
reports that prior to deregulation, 8% more staff was required to cover for 
holiday entitlements alone). 
-There are not many employers around this area who give more 
than 20 days holiday leave (CD) 
which provided an important incentive to 
bring the holiday entitlement more, into line with other 
employers because 28 days plus bank holidays (the then existing 
practice) was out of all proportion (CD) 
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Finally, it is important to note the role that a new input factor - mini/midi 
buses has played in the configuration of the labour agreements (re. wage 
rates). 
- Where there was a significant break was with minibus drivers 
(CD) 
As Mohrin (1983) suggested, the survival of minibus operations depends on 
a wage differential between conventional and mini/midi bus drivers. This 
view was echoed by DGM3, whose depot comprises exclusively mini/midi 
buses: 
- You have to take it into perspective. The big bus will go out and 
carry 85 people. The most we can carry is 31 (with midibuses) 
, and 21 (with minibuses). ` So basically, we couldn't afford to pay 
the minibus driver the same as the big bus driver ... it would just 
cripple us altogether (DGM 3) 
In spite of wide regional variations, and of the differences in rates of pay 
according to length of service, Banister and Mackett (1990) concluded that 
overall labour costs are some 15 to 25%, less in the minibus sector. Table 
7-3 indicates that this differential in MFs case is 32% and 28% after 12 
months of service in relation to mini and midi bus drivers respectively. 
Table 7-3 shows in addition that premium rates were abolished and that the 
number of hours/day for which there is guaranteed remuneration was 
reduced from 7hours 48minutes to 7hours. These facts, together with the 
acceptance of split shifts - something that ... the Trade Unions were resisting 
very heavily 5 or 6 years ago (CD) - form an important basis for improving 
productivity. Under the current terms, a driver who effectively works 10 
hours will earn £50 gross per day. If the 7hr 48min clause and overtime 
rates (first hour at time and half, remaining hours at double time) based on 
£5 basic rate applied, it is estimated that that driver would have needed to 
work for 9hours 09minutes to earn the same £50 per day. From a depot total 
of 85 duties, nearly 15% involved more than 9hr 30min work and just over 
9% less than 7hours. The average length of duties was 8hr 15min. This 
confirms that: 
- Drivers are putting more of their own time in, to get the same 
sort of wage at the end ... but this has been more readily- 
acceptable than actually saying, right we are taking x% off the 
wages ... one thing that really demoralises people is if they 
were to feel that they are working one hour and are getting 
paid less for it than before. (CD) 
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The relatively low number of duties under 7 hours, together with the reduced 
time allowed to sign on and off, and unpaid meal breaks, signals substantial 
improvements in the ratio of paid hours to worked hours. According to 
Heseltine and Silcock (1990) the latter two factors accounted for much of the 
almost 30% paid time that was not spent behind the wheel driving prior to 
deregulation. It was also reported by MFs Commercial Director that in a 750 
hours rota ... there are 10 non-working times on these schedules, for ... the 
only time we pay anybody for not working is if we can't give him 7 hours 
work. This raises the question of determining the optimal number of 
guaranteed daily hours. It is recognised that it must be long enough to 
attract quality staff, but it must not be too long to avoid underutilisation. It 
must be stressed nonetheless that this issue does not by itself overcome the 
need to carry excessive resources during the peak periods. Scheduling 
techniques must be incorporated to take full advantage of the rules imposed 
by labour contracts, together with product initiatives aimed at utilising 
capacity as fully and as continuously as possible. The former must aim at 
providing a certain quality of service utilising the least amount of resources 
whilst the latter ensures that buses and drivers are used to produce what 
they were primarily employed for - as factors of revenue generators. 
Depot 1 relies on the fit between network requisites and contract work, 
together with a three-way rota system, so that drivers are staggered over the 
day in three shifts. This shows a ratio of peak/off peak vehicle requirement of 
1.46. Depot 2 stresses the scheduling flexibility afforded by the labour 
agreement and more importantly enjoys a peak/off peak ratio of 1.4 for 
conventional buses and 1.0 for the minibus operations. Depot 3's minibus 
network also has a unity ratio between peak and off peak requirement (from 
early morning until 19.00hrs) and places increasing importance on Private 
Hire as a revenue complement to its stage carriage operations, and on very 
tight schedules. It is in this context that the major concern expressed by the 
Depot General Managers with regard to efficiency was associated with the 
potentially non-productive role of spare drivers, ie. drivers who are 
scheduled every day to cover for absenteeism. As Fielding (1987) pointed 
out, ... unscheduled absenteeism is not only costly (re: additional staff have 
to be employed andlor existing ones paid extra), but it also degrades the 
quality of service (re: missed journeys). On average, the number of spare 
drivers represent 5% to 6% of the scheduling requirements (Heseltine and 
Silcock [1990] suggested that prior to deregulation this figure could have 
been as high as 18%). 1 1- 1 
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MFs labour agreement permits the utilisation of these drivers on other duties 
(eg. vehicle cleaning, traffic related jobs in the garage, eg. cash collection) 
when they are not requested to drive. In general though, spare drivers are 
required to perform driving duties, a trend which is particularly strong in the 
minibus depot - 
-I am in a happy situation - if you can say happy - where I can say 
that they are always used (DGM3) 
Unlike the suggestions made by some (cf. Hall, 1986; Glaister, 1986), both 
absenteeism and staff turnover are acknowledged to be greater amongst the 
mini/midi bus drivers than the drivers of conventional buses. Mini/midi bus 
drivers were said to 
- have all the domestic problems of a young person and couldn't 
get used to shift work (DGM3) 
In the depot that employs solely conventional bus drivers, a different 
situation arises: 
- we have only had one person leaving in 20 months and that was 
19 months ago (DGM1) 
There are evident savings associated with low staff turnover rates 
- this saves us considerably over the years in uniforms, recruiting, 
training, lost mileage (DGM1) 
As Stanley (1988) pointed out, drivers with Public Service Vehicle (PSV) 
qualifications are in short supply, and more importantly there are areas in 
England where the waiting time for tests is 8 weeks plus two more before the 
licence arrives. Stanley concludes that a company has to forego 10 weeks 
pay before a new recruit can be used in production. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that the consolidation of wage rates has had 
an important impact for the general managership of the depots in so far as: 
- it is easy to identify the 'specific costs of a particular journey and 
the cost of operation of MF is similar throughout the day, 
throughout the year (DGM2) 
This change must be seen as an important factor for the cost awareness 
type of behaviour that the Company's Directors have sought to transmit 
since its privatisation. 
Labour issues constitute a major item in the study of the management of 
change in the context of the privatisation and deregulation of an industry, but 
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those associated with the capital that is used in the production process (ie. 
buses) assume, in the case of the bus industry, a particularly important 
strategic role. 
Capital 
This section concentrates on maintenance and replacement strategies 
associated with the industry's biggest capital item of production (buses). 
They account not only for a considerable % of total costs - eg. maintenance 
costs are said to represent up to 30% but also for the quality of the product 
supplied (eg. reliability). 
Maintenance practices 
Driver productivity is difficult to measure (eg. Transportation Research 
Board, 1987) and control, but maintenance practices are visibly more 
accountable because they impact directly on performance. 
The changes in MF were reported to reflect the overall organisational culture 
that has emerged since deregulation/privatisation. The depot approach and 
its underlying characteristics are high exponents of this new culture. The 
effects on the maintenance function in particular, were said to 
- ... have made people much more cost-aware, preparing their own 
budgets and expenditures ... gave us greater efficiency on direct 
labour and greater control and commitment from that direct labour 
to do the right job on the vehicle (MD) 
and in general 
- ... before it was a 'them and us' syndrome. The traffic people 
played with buses over there. We played with our engineering bits 
here and the two didn't really relate. Now they do ... what they 
spend on engineering has a massive impact on what buses are 
actually running on the road (MD) 
There are two areas related to this capital input which are capable of 
exerting significant pressure on a company's resources: 
a investment in parts and accessories 
b the cost of labour repairs 
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In the past, it was acknowledged that: 
- employees were used to a situation where there was a massive 
store filled with new parts and if they wanted something they could 
go and get one and excessive over engineering... and the 
supervision left something to be desired (MD) 
By transmitting responsibility and accountability to individuals: this is what 
we expect of you, this is what you job is,. this is how you will be monitored, 
this is how you will be rewarded a different conceptual thought evolved in 
terms of the realisation of the cost of what they were actually doing (re: 
whether that part needed to be exchanged, whether that job needed to be 
done (MD) 
It is in this context that the major economies have been : not necessarily in 
terms of labour but in terms of parts usage we ourselves replaced parts 
that broke down rather than saying that engine is no good, we will exchange 
it for another (CD). 
Another source of cost savings is the policy of standardisation in types of 
vehicles, which enhances the interchangeability of spare parts. However, it 
must not be inferred that the cultural difference induced by the 
organisational mechanisms previously described results in a totally effective 
maintenance system: 
-I am not saying that we are super efficient now, far from it. There 
is scope to do things engineering wise (MD). 
Nonetheless, the urge to achieve or maintain certain overall levels of 
performance is further reinforced by the fact that the monitoring function of 
maintenance activities is not limited to internal controls to the extent that: 
- ... every year we religiously go out and get quotas- (for 
sub-contracting maintenance work) just to make sure 'that we are 
not becoming too complacent ourselves (MD) 
However tight the control of maintenance spending and -efficiency, 
maintenance costs are invariably related to the age of the vehicle fleet. 
Furthermore, old fleets are usually associated with higher ratios of 
base/peak vehicle requirements. MF has an old capital base and ratio of 
base/peak vehicles that varies between 13 : to 18% in the 3 depots 
considered in this study. This is nevertheless an industry-wide 
characteristic. The scale of deferred investment is, illustrated by Heseltine 
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and Silcock (1990). For each year between 1985/86 and 1988/89, about 
3,880 new conventional vehicles should have displaced 4,730 old ones. 
Instead only an average of 1,990 new buses a year were registered. 
It is therefore crucial to analyse the strategic posture of individual operators 
in relation to the issue of the replacement of their fleets. ' The case of MF is 
considered in the next section. 
Fleet replacement 
In order to understand MFs current strategies with regard to fleet 
replacement, it is important to identify beforehand the major factors that have 
led to the present fleet composition and requirements. 
It could be said that the format of MFs current fleet, which started to take 
shape back in 1985, was the result of the interplay of two main factors 
a the scarcity of funds 
b the workings of market forces 
Scarcity of funds demanded investment in vehicles with low life-cycle costs, 
ie. vehicles with low initial purchase prices and reduced operating and 
maintenance costs. It is generally accepted that minibuses fit this type of 
investment (eg. Gomez-Ibanez, 1987; Turner and White, 1987). The 
workings of market forces must be considered within the framework of the 
two main agents that are active in any market: other suppliers and users. 
MFs early strategy was one that sought a strong market presence. A little 
before deregulation there was a universal conviction that this strategy could 
only be turned to advantage - in terms of capturing patronage - if an operator 
could run more frequent services and thus more buses, than its competitors. 
Minibus operations clearly fitted these competitive requirements. It is in this 
context that MF acquired large numbers of 16 and 25 seater type of 
minibuses. Furthermore, they have proven their suitability to the type of 
network that was designed then and which has been developed ever since. 
In urban areas a conjunction of radial routes and suburban links boosted 
patronage to unexpected levels. In smaller towns an evenly distributed 
demand has led to ratios of one in peak/off peak vehicle requirements. 
However, the higher patronage demand flows, and more importantly the 
deterioration in traffic congestion has had a progressively adverse effect on 
a crucial item of bus operations - time. As a result, bus operators face wider 
discrepancies between wage costs, and the amount of fares collected - the 
former are time based whereas the latter are mileage based - and more 
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buses and drivers are needed to supply a given amount of bus miles. As 
Webster (1986) pointed out, bus operators that attain and are able to sustain 
market successes may be forced for reasons of profit, to change the 
composition of their fleets in favour of fewer larger buses. This is a view 
shared by MFs Managing Director: 
- The 16 seater is dead long ago. The replacement situation is 
going to be in the larger minibus - eg. 30/35 seater type of vehicle. 
They are more economic. They have better fuel consumption. 
(MD) 
However, the role of the more conventional buses is not disregarded: 
- Having said that, there is still scope for double deckers and 
single deckers. We want double deckers during the peaks and/or 
higher quality, aesthetic single decker vehicles, which can carry 
volumes of people at peaks and also be very comfortable for the 
off peak passenger (these are the views of the CD) (MD) 
In brief, it becomes apparent that whilst there exists a need to review (and 
probably to add) double deckers and single decker type buses - especially 
in high density population areas (eg. Depot 1), there is an underlying 
corporate shift towards increasing the capacity of the mini/midi bus fleet: 
- The 16 seater does come in for a lot of criticism now ... but ... we 
still want to be able to take the bus where the passenger is. 
(DGM3) 
However, there remains a considerable shortfall between the income and 
the costs of bus operations on the one hand, and the considerable, amount 
of capital investment requirements on the other. Furthermore, in the case of 
MF a large proportion of vehicles is reaching the end of their useful lives 
within a reduced time scale interval, and many have already had their lives 
extended. These facts are clearly acknowledged: 
- Given the age of the fleet that we have got, no way can we go out 
overnight and buy 100 new vehicles (MD) 
as is the aim of the replacement strategy 
- We have to smooth this pattern out (MD) 
In fact, MF has focussed its capital investment strategy on replacing older 
buses with slightly younger ones, and on acquiring a limited number of 
brand new vehicles. In doing this, 
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we moved the problem away a little bit, to spread it over a 
number of years (MD) 
This is a strategy that has to be understood within the context of the 
prevailing conditions in the second-hand bus markets, as well as of the 
returns generated in relation to the investment made on the capital 
employed. 
The excess supply of second hand (conventional) buses has been created 
mainly by bus companies that are still under the public sector control - PTEs 
and municipals. Many of these vehicles are 12 years old. Given that: 
1 their average price is £4,000 - £5,000 
2 they have a further 5-8 years productive life left 
3 the returns in the industry are generally low (MD), 
such investment seems very good especially when compared to one of 
£100,000 (the price of a brand new double decker) with a 20 year life (MD). 
Furthermore, the maintenance costs of buses that are 3 or 4 years newer 
than those that we have got are expected to be exactly the same (MD). The 
difference that may exist is between makes, for example, we can maintain 
new Metro buses for 60% of the cost of the Fleetlines (MD). 
However, the replacement strategy just described is not envisaged to be a- 
long term one: 
- There needs to be a balance. We can't go on doing that. It 
represents above all a response to market opportunities (re: 2nd 
hand vehicles) (MD). 
There is a final issue that ought to be addressed in the context of fleet 
renewal and/or additions : the methods used to finance such investments. 
Deregulation, it was claimed, would provide for the development of rental 
and leasing operations. As a result, bus companies would be able to 'try the 
market' before more permanent commitments had to be endorsed - thus 
augmenting the contestability of the markets - and opportunities for the 
industry's old capital stock to be gradually replaced, enhanced. 
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Until MF joined a major holding company, the position was one of buying 
everything for cash (MD) and leasing was said to represent a greater 
commitment to the market to the extent that: 
- only after 10 years can you get rid of the vehicles, and some 
companies can't continue in existence for that long. The value of 
the asset is very quickly less than the outstanding payments on the 
lease (CD). 
However, being part of the holding group has meant that 
- The decision is not made by me now. Whether to buy for cash or 
lease ... we put forward capital expenditure programmes to the 
group and they say either to buy out of cash or to lease. At the 
moment (the holding group) is following a policy of leasing its 
assets (FD). 
Much of this shift in policy has been attributed to the financial structure of the 
holding which makes the picture slightly different (MD). The endorsement of 
such policy buying vehicles now is to tie up cash (MD) must be seen within 
the present MFs business philosophy in so far as: 
- What we want at the moment is for cash to be available to take 
advantage of opportunities that will come up in other areas 
(MD). 
It can be argued that the 1985 Transport Legislation aimed at creating a 
business oriented industry to the extent that product management could be 
determined predominantly by commercial considerations, even in the cases 
of unfulfilled social demand (re: the tendering process). Having outlined the 
strategic orientation of MF with regard to the main production factors, it is 
important to analyse, within the context of the new legislation, the 
Company's strategy in relation to the design and pricing of its products. 
7.2.2 Supply 
The main policy elements of the 1985 Transport Act were defined by 
Beesley (1991) as encompassing deregulation, privatisation and 
subsidisation. Basically they were designed to foster a change in the 
predominantly social type of environment that characterised the industry in 
the proceeding 30 years. Deregulation aimed at relaxing entry requirements 
which together with privatisation and the new subsidy arrangements were 
meant to create an entrepreneurial approach in the industry capable of 
ending ... the inertia that currently exists (Department of Transport, 1984). 
149 
This section comprises an analysis of the changes that were claimed would 
occur at bus company level, for ... the managers of bus operations will have 
more freedom to manage (Department of Transport, 1984), and 
concentrates on the issues related to MFs supply of its dominant products. 
Product strategies 
The industry's product can be defined in terms of miles/seat miles. Either of 
these constitute what a bus company has for sale in the market. Vehicle 
miles/seat miles are organised into local bus services whose combination 
forms the network of operations exploited by bus companies. 
The subsidisation model currently in force in the industry has created the 
need to distinguish between the groups of services that are provided 
commercially, ie. those not eligible for direct public subsidy, and those that 
are supplied on tender, on behalf of the local authority - the tendered 
services. 
However, bus operators do invariably supply other types of products which 
may or may not be related to the provision of local bus services. Table 7-4 is 
a summary of the products supplied by the three depots under 
consideration. There is one outstanding feature in this information. As a 
result of depot autonomy the company's operating units, faced with different 
environmental constraints and opportunities clearly show distinct patterns of 
network services as well as business priorities (re: supply of other products 
eg. tender work, private hire, excursions). Most of the differences in the 
network characteristics are determined by broad demographic features. 
Depot 1 is located in the periphery of a major urban centre and is mainly 
concerned with transporting people to and from the city centre (DGM1); 
Depot 2 operates in two free standing towns whose individual network 
configurations were designed to fit different movement patterns of demand 
mainly associated with historical conditions. Finally, Depot 3's minibus 
network caters for movements inside the urban perimeter and complements 
the big bus network run by Depot 4. 
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Table 7-4: 
Types of Product 
Depot 1 Nearly 95% of our business is stage carriage 
We run direct express services to nearby towns 
Tender work represents only 5% of our business 
We also do private hire work and excursions (DGM 1) 
Depot 2 We do very little rural work 
We do a little of private hire 
During Summer we are involved in an express service 
Town 1 Radial pattern 
Local bus service is probably 75% 
Interurban services account for the rest 
Tender work is probably no more than 10% 
Town 2 Local bus services are mainly across town 
Tender work is probably 25% (DGM 2) 
Depot 3 Most of our routes are radial 
We do very little tender work : it represents about 2% 
We do private hire with our 16 and 25 seat buses (DGM 3) 
Table 7-5: 
Defining Demand Characteristics 
You are buying movement from A to B which you want to get away as quickly as you can. 
So you walk to the bus stop, you get on the first vehicle that comes in and it doesn't 
matter whose it is. 
(CD) 
Our theory is that in an urban area, you should be trying to provide at least a 15m 
frequency, although a 10m frequency is better, you don't necessarily need to provide 
better than at Om service. 
(CD) 
It is normally best policy to run aI Om frequency rather than a 30m frequency which may 
operate nearer to where people live. However, the 30m frequency doesn't give them 
sufficient confidence to use the network. 
(DGM 2) 
The public want reliability ... I certainly found that if you give passengers reliability, they 
will stay with you ... If a person comes out for a bus at 6.00am and he/she knows that the bus is going to be there, he/she will come out every morning 
(DGM 1) 
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However, the overall characteristics of a product are often related to the 
dominant corporate understanding of the product's ultimate aim. Bus 
services are generally regarded as a volume business supplied to provide a 
movement between two points, that is as a means to an end (Prowda and 
Draeger, 1982). This is the view held by MFs Commercial Director: 
- Providing a bus service is to provide a service for groups - large 
numbers of people ... you are not buying a bus journey, you are 
buying a movement from A to B. 
and this is a concept that has been adapted to the new commercial 
environment: 
- Buses are a tool to actually earn money. They are just to pick up 
people (DG M 1) 
It is in this context that, in an urban area, a radial type of network is seen as 
the most adequate configuration for it does reflect the bulk of transport needs 
(CD). 
The supply of a predominantly radial network that aims at providing regular 
services from A to B meeting capacity movements rather than individual 
needs (CD) requires highly frequent reliable services together with an 
adequate access to the network. These product features are in fact in 
accordance with the way in which demand is perceived to behave in the 
new market environment (Table 7-5, page 147). They are also essential for 
a strategy of service design whose priority is to agglutinate market segments 
that are difficult and recognizably costly to identify and quantify, for the value 
of the market is low anyway (CD). 
MFs product strategy can thus be said to rely on the supply of services with 
broad characteristics based on general travel patterns. For example,... There 
are insufficient people who want to travel at the same time to make (a 
peripheral) service commercial. But there are lots of people who will gather 
together to travel to the city centre and even to travel out again (CD). 
However, there were examples to suggest that the regular monitoring 
activities that take place are susceptible to induce adjustments by reinforcing 
certain service characteristics that meet the needs of specific market 
segments (eg. limited stop services, improved accessibility to the network). 
Nonetheless the lack of a comprehensive market research programme was 
evident throughout this case study. The role that such programmes can play 
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in monitoring the dynamics of a market has been widely exemplified and its 
value recognised ( Lovelock et al, 1987). 
Table 7-6 provides a summary of 
1 the main criteria used in MF for considering changes in existing 
services. 
2a brief description of the kind of market and costing analysis that 
is undertaken when the creation of new services is envisaged. 
3 the company's position with regard to product substitutes. 
The information gathered in this table unveils a number of aspects related to 
product strategies in the post-deregulation commercial environment at 
company level. 
Four major issues merit further discussion 
1 Statement 1 clearly indicates the practice of cross-subsidisation 
between services. 
Cross-subsidisation between services involves transferring above normal 
returns from one route in order to maintain the operations of another whose 
supply costs do not cover the receipts accrued. As a result, users of the first 
route pay higher prices or face a poorer quality of service, had the quantity 
supplied expanded to eliminate the abnormal profits needed to preserve 
the second route. This was a practice supported by the authorities prior to 
deregulation as a means of keeping levels of supply (re: the size of 
networks) increasingly in excess of the quantity demanded. The subsidy 
arrangements up to 1986 consisted mainly of blank payments and were 
seen to encourage cross-subsidisation. The 1985 Transport Act sought to 
change this situation by introducing a system that would finance directly the 
operations of unremunerative, but socially desirable, services by awarding 
them as contracts on competitive tenders. Under these circumstances it 
was claimed, there would be no need for internal cross-subsidisation. 
Competition and/or the threat of entry into excessively profitable routes 
would deter bus operators from cross-subsidising their services. 
Although cross-subsidy between routes must be seen in this case study to 
be part of a strategy to defend and prevent entry into a core of services, it 
also has some connection with the effects of the new method of 
subsidisation. 
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Table 7-6 
Aspects of Product Strategy 
A. Changes in Services 
1. Existing Services - Criteria for Changes 
CD If the revenue does not cover the costs relating specifically to 
one service, we start with the premise that the service is not 
worth running ... there may be situations where we may decide 
not to abandon a service even though it is losing money ... the County Council could put it up for tender and introduce 
competition into the profitable route. 
2 DGM 1 ... the only time that we make significant changes is when our 
network is directly affected by competition. 
3 DGM 2 The first thing you look at is profitability. If a service is performing 
inadequately you need to look at that particular service and 
decide what alterations to make to improve it, if any. 
4 DGM 3 Basically we only change routes if the number of passengers is 
falling. 
2. New Services 
2.1 Market Analysis 
5 CD The market analysis that is undertaken is limited to looking at the 
existing market, and at small opportunities which with house 
building as it is currently stands are very few. It is often looking at 
where there are new opportunities, eg. where there is the new 
estate ... is there a new opportunity for persuading people that the bus is the right idea? 
6 DGM 1 Prior (to developing new services) there is a lot of research to 
be done, eg. finding how many persons are actually working, the 
size of the housing establishment (it would have to have more 
than 500 people to get any sort of reasonable return), the type 
of road network, the various times to and from various points. 
Then you look at the financial implications. We look at what kind 
of people are living there - whether there are young families with 
working mothers who have two cars. 
7 DGM 2 MF do very, very little market research. In a new service situation 
you look at the estate, at the format of the housing, at the 
density of the housing and then compare that with a similar 
estate elsewhere in which you have had experience. From that 
you will determine the level of frequencies that you will put into 
the estate, if at all. 
8 DGM 3 We look at areas that have been built upon. We look to see if 
there is a need to put any extra buses or extend the routes. 
154 
2.2 Costing Analysis 
9 DGM 1 If you have a situation where we do not need to put additional 
resources then we would say - Right, we could do a bit of 
rerouting, rethinking of our services to actually just incur into 
marginal cost. If we would need to put total resources, then it 
would make us more or less hang about. 
10 DGM 2 The major factor is whether or not you increase the number of 
vehicles in the garage ... if I am going to start a service that 
operates once a day at 12 o'clock lunch time, we already have 
the majority of resources in the garage for that. So it will only 
cost me perhaps the additional driver's wages and a little bit of 
mileage. 
11 DGM 3 We sit down and work out how much it will cost to run these 
services and what we need to get out from that to make it cost 
effective. 
B. Product Substitutes 
12 CD It is impossible to capture the car market. The bus has no 
advantage over the car in the eyes of the motorist whatsoever. 
The car is very flexible in terms of time within the constraints of 
congestion ... it is far better to take the car to the works car park than it is to walk from the bus station which may be 1/2 mile away 
... the bus will come at a particular time rather than standing 
waiting at the drive of the individuals house. 
A greater frequency of services was possible with a minibus and 
this has encouraged more people to travel by public transport ... but the scope for that has ended. The things that would make a 
bus journey more attractive than a car journey are beyond the 
control of the bus companies (eg. travel faster to the city centre, 
get nearer to the city centre or to the work place or wherever 
people want to go). 
13 DGM 3I would say that we have taken more cars off the road than have 
been put on since the time that we have been operating our 
minibuses ... I put my minibuses where the cars were the only 
ones that were able to go at one point. 
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As Beesley (1991) acknowledged, the 1985 Transport Act aimed at not 
only changing subsidy payment methods but also at reducing the amount of 
these payments. As a result, Public Transport support fell in a two year 
period from £312m to £184m in real terms. Although the industry still 
remains heavily subsidised - costs per vehicle Km have also fallen sharply 
- the fact is that local authorities are looking at the very lowest possible bids 
in any work that they offer (CD) for Central Government is merely putting 
financial constraints on the County Council to limit the amount of money 
that is available (CD). As a result the cheapest possible provision (of 
tender services) depends upon cheap, second hand vehicles, low paid 
drivers and back street operations. (CD) 
Abandoning a loss-making service which is nonetheless important to the 
core of services in the sense that it makes a contribution to a profitable trunk 
route, may not constitute the most advantageous solution for a major 
incumbent given the lowest possible price policy of the County Council to 
tender services. The fact is that there is no guarantee that the County 
Council, following the abandonment of a service, will not impose operating 
conditions that may force the previous incumbent to incur even higher costs 
than previously if it wishes to regain that route by direct subsidy. A potential 
entrant that is prepared to accept returns from tender work which will not 
sustain the industry in the future (CD) but that ultimately may introduce 
competition in the profitable routes, is in this way forcing the incumbent to 
defend its core through some form of cross-subsidisation. 
However, according to Beesley et at (1984), a service is only genuinely 
loss-making if, by withdrawing it, the avoidable costs exceed the revenue 
lost in the context of the overall network. That is, there may be a reduction in 
through ticketing and season ticket receipts as a result of the linking 
(loss-making) service being abandoned. Otherwise, they conclude that 
none of this involves cross-subsidy in a strict economic sense. 
2 As far as changes to the existing network are concerned, it is apparent 
that the evaluation criteria greatly relies on the attainment of set standards 
of performance. Changes are triggered either by events (eg. new 
competition) likely to adversely affect targets that are currently attained, or 
after a conjunction of undetected factors have led to performance below 
existing levels. Fielding (1987) has suggested that bus operators ought 
instead to adopt an approach that emphasises the best alternative 
investment, that is, service returns should be compared and resources- 
allocated on an opportunity cost basis. This criterion would force bus 
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companies not to focus exclusively on problem routes and ignore 
satisfactory ones. At the same time, as he pointed out, the frequent user 
cannot be regarded as a captive patron and changes in existing services 
should also contemplate upgrading quality factors of supply on those routes 
that presently meet performance thresholds. 
3 Statements 5 to 8 confirm Fielding's (1987) findings that bus operator's 
methodology for launching new products is grounded on simple methods. 
The early stages in this process involve scanning basic environmental 
factors (eg. housing size and configuration, population characteristics). 
The next phase is one of comparing this data with analogous situations. As 
in the judgmental method described by Fielding, it is assumed that, over a 
certain period of time, similar demographic characteristics are expected to 
have similar travel patterns, require identical operational elements (eg. 
frequencies) and have similar consumption rates. The internal assessment 
of the most cost-effective way of supplying the new product - of which the 
peak factor is the most decisive element (statements 9 to 11) - complement 
the financial analysis required for the creation of new services. 
In brief, it is apparent that the overall potential success of a new product is 
more important than a precise definition of demand estimates, even if only 
because of a lack of available resources to undertake further market 
research. 
4 According to Onkivist (1989) the ultimate goal of a company's product 
strategy is to get people to have more frequent and more varied usage of 
the services provided. However, as in any other industry there are products 
in the market that perform identical functions from a buyer's point of view. 
The main product substitute for bus services is the private car, although in 
some areas other modes of public transport (eg. rail and metro) also 
compete strongly for a share of the overall market. 
Statements 12 and 13 reveal 
1 MFs standing with respect to private transport. 
2 the achievements made since 1986. 
3, the future prospectives for capturing or retaining part of this 
transport market. 
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There has been considerable research into the reasons why private 
transport has prevailed as a superior product to public transport(l)- 
Statement 12 emphasises the wider functions that the use of a car offers 
and its identical - or at least not inferior - performance in situations where 
competition for road space is at its highest. The underlying idea expressed 
in this statement is that users of private transport can only be persuaded to 
utilise public transport if the latter offers a number of quality attributes that 
enhances the user's propensity to switch. However, the propensity to 
switch modes of transport differs amongst market segments. To attract 
commuters into using bus services requires providing one important service 
quality - ensuring quicker travel time - which is beyond the control of bus 
companies (CD). 
Congestion is mainly a peak problem but it coincides with the period of 
operations when bus companies transport the highest quantities of 
demand. To increase demand in the peaks without further increasing peak 
vehicle requirements thus calls for measures that reduce traffic congestion. 
The fact is, however that the way things are going we may have to increase 
measures just to match our current usage (DGM 1) 
The issue of congestion has been widely debated and many solutions tried. 
They all appear to follow a distinct trend : reducing congestion by 
penalising the car user(2). Furthermore, in other European cities, these 
initiatives have had the strong backing of public resources not only in their 
conceptualisation phase, but also in their subsequent administration and 
control. It is doubtful whether under the current British public transport 
policy there is sufficient incentive for local authorities to lead similar 
initiatives for: 
- ... one serious effect of the 1985 Transport Act was that it took 
away from local authorities the belief that they had no powers in 
terms of regulating, controlling or providing infrastructure for public 
transport (CD) 
It is in the context that a new marketing approach has emerged in the 
sense that it is not the user that you have got to attack, it is the politician 
(CD). . 
I See for example Beirer (1971) and Stephenson (1973). 
2 eg. in Zurich, parking spaces have been designed with the aim of slowing down private transport traffic 
flows and underground car parking has been replaced by pedestrian areas (Tomorrows World, . BBC, 7 March 1991). 
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In this way, bus companies are spending their own resources in the 
preliminary phase, that is, in traffic studies oriented towards bus 
prioritisation, which are then submitted to the Council for consideration. 
The success of these initiatives from an operators point of view is clear: to 
increase the average speed of the operations means high quality services 
at lower costs(1). 
The introduction of minibus operations has generated a significant amount 
of demand that value frequency, accessibility and reliability which are 
characteristics that can only be fully exploited and sustained in situations of 
relatively low traffic congestion. They are features that appeal to most 
off-peak segments of demand (housewife, elderly) for they override the 
values attached to previously preferred modes of transport (eg. car, taxi, 
cycle or walk). As a result most of the generated minibus traffic has 
occurred during the off-peak period - up to 70% or 80% of the peak traffic 
(Fawcett, 1989) 
However successful minibus operations have proved to be in modifying the 
image of the industry's product (especially in relation to its substitutes), there 
are now signs that in certain areas the minibus has lost its attractiveness to 
the general public (DGM2). It is difficult to single out the reasons for this 
trend. The fact that the expectations raised in relation to quality factors have 
now increased in terms of comfort and travelling environment (DGM2) may 
have played a significant role as does the income factor in any product 
substitution process - we have gone through a phase where more wealth 
has been available to more people and as soon as people get more money, 
they want to spend it. One of the first areas where they want to spend it is in 
a car. But as Banister and Mackett (1990) remarked, the image issue is 
likely to change in the long term if the new label diminishes and quality 
factors such as perceived reliability and time keeping deteriorates thus 
suggesting that continuing success may depend on operators maintaining a 
high profile and continued marketing innovation. 
t The relationship between average speed and costs per mile and per vehicle/hour is illustrated by the 
following data 
Costs related to 
Operator Average Speed 
(mph) 
1 10.31 
2 10.71 
3 13.70 
4 16.80 
speed (1981) - the case 
Cost per mile 
1.384 
1.276 
1.033 
0.874 
of 4 Operators 
Cost per vehicle/hour 
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14.27 
13.65 
14.15 
14.68 
Source: Hayward, 1991 
Furthermore as Balcombe et al (1988) have acknowledged, the nature of 
the increases in patronage has not been clearly identified, which can 
constitute an obstacle to conceiving a marketing mix capable of making 
sure that today's niche does not become tomorrow's grave (Fawcett, 
1986). A crucial element of any marketing mix is pricing. The 
Government's expectations were that fare structures would become a 
potential area of innovation following the industry's full deregulation and 
that a deceleration of the upward trend in real fares could be achieved. 
Pricing strategies 
Pricing strategies are generally seen as part of the goals pursued by 
organisations. As Stubbs (1980) asserted, pricing is a means to an end. 
Classical economic theory assumes that firms maximise profits and pricing 
evolves from a marginal analysis of revenue and costs. In a situation of 
competitive equilibrium, the theory asserts that from the stand point of 
optimum allocation of resources prices should equal marginal costs. Some 
economists, however, have claimed that it is not realistic to make this 
assumption, for firms pursue different objectives. 
It is not so much that firms do not wish to maximise profits but that the lack of 
knowledge, the uncertainty of the business environment or indeed the 
internal complexity of organisations lead businessmen to seek different 
goals. In this way, specific theories have been developed based on 
evidence of alternative behaviours. Some, like Simon (1971) and Cyert and 
March (1963) dismiss the maximising behaviour and instead claim that a 
firm aspires to attain satisfactory levels of profits and/or market shares. 
According to Simon (1971), a firm that achieves these levels does not wish 
to pursue maximisation. Others though claim that the objective is to 
maximise sales subject to a maximum profit constraint (Baumol, 1962). 
Baumol lists a number of reasons why businesses may adopt this strategy. 
The reputation in the money market may be affected if a firm shows declining 
sales volume and/or its market power becomes vulnerable as a result. At 
the same time, an expansion in sales in one point in time can be seen as a 
good means to earn more money tomorrow (Baumol, 1962). 
In Baumol's model, price and output are set where total revenue is at its 
maximum but not at its highest profit point. The minimum profit constraint - 
which ensures investors the going rate of return - may in turn force a 
combination that does not correspond to the maximum value of sales. A 
reduction in output and an increase in price that emerges as a result may 
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ultimately lead to the profit maximising combination level. 
i 
Baumol's model has been associated with full cost pricing where prices are 
set at average cost plus the profit constraint that satisfies shareholders. Full 
cost pricing has been criticised on the grounds that it does not take account 
of demand and only by chance will the normal sales volume coincide with 
the demand at the calculated price (Bridge and Dodds, 1975). This method 
was nonetheless found to be used by 27 out of 38 UK firms in Hall and 
Hitch's study (1939) and in 6 of 13 others in a later study undertaken by 
Hague (1971). Furthermore, Skinner's (1970) work revealed that 70% of his 
questionnaire respondents claimed to use a cost-plus system but that 
demand, competition, costs and the desired profit margin all influenced 
prices. 
MFs stated objective is revenue maximisation: the optimal fare is the one 
that maximises your revenue (FD). Fare levels are set according to what the 
market will stand (FD), mainly in terms of the price responsiveness of 
demand and of competition. If the costs of production plus the rate of return 
imposed on the operating units do ... not fit with that sort of revenue level 
(FD) then, it is not worth you operating it or you will have to do something 
about your costs (FD). 
The bus industry experiences significant variations in demand over its 
production cycle which are associated with different degrees of sensitivity to 
price levels, and which cause wider differences in the costs of supply. 
These are amongst the issues discussed in the following sections which 
analyse the company's fare structure and the criteria for evaluating the 
effects of changes in fares on patronage and revenue. The role of 
competition in pricing strategies will, in turn, be analysed in the next chapter. 
The fare structure 
Table 7-7 is a brief summary of the type of fare structure used by MF. Three 
major issues merit further discussion 
1 MFs fare structure reflects the traditional 'tapered fare scale' used in the 
UK, whereby the proportion between the distance travelled and the fare 
charged is tapered so that a passenger who travels short distances pays 
more per mile than the longer distance traveller. According to Cervero 
(1981), those who live in the inner-city whose trip length is less than two 
miles pay 10 to 12 times as much per mile as does the average user, who in 
turn pays twice as much as the suburban commuter. However, DGM 1's 
statement: 
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Table 7-7 
Fare Structure 
A Summary 
On-the-bus ticketing There is a standardised fare throughout 
(DGMI) 
All the fares are within a similar band, that is, it is not £1 
for 3 miles in one direction and £4 for 3 miles in another 
direction. As for differences in fares between peak 
and off-peak services, the only one that we have is the 
availability of return tickets. The same fares apply in 
both minibuses and big bus services. (CD) 
City tickets: issued on board the bus allowing unlimited 
travel within the City area (Ticket Issuing procedures) 
Special Fares (County Council) 
Travel Aid Passes : available to all unemployed people: 
half the adult single ticket. 
Concessionary fares for pensioners: half fare providing 
at least one end of the journey starts or finishes within 
the county borders. 
For the Disabled: entitles the holder to a (fixed 
reduced) fare per single journey or to half fare 
depending on whether both ends of the journey are 
within the city boundary. 
For the blind : Unlimited fare travel 
(Ticket Issuing Office) 
Off-Bus Ticket Passes. For example: 
Type 1: the holder can make an unlimited number of 
journeys between the stages shown and intermediate 
points on the line of route. 
Type 2: allows the holder unlimited travel within 
specified areas of the network. 
Scholars Contract Tickets: passes are , valid 
for one 
journey in each direction at the appropriate school 
(Ticket Issuing Office) 
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- It could be said that most people who live in the suburbs pay less 
and they are better off, but we wouldn't be able to attract them to the 
buses otherwise. (DGM1) 
confirms the assertion by Nash (1988) that tapering price with distance is the 
result of most operator's convictions that longer trips have higher elasticities. 
It should be added that the company also operates a number of pass 
schemes that vary from allowing unlimited travel within different bounded 
areas to those that restrict the number of unlimited journeys within two 
predetermined points in one route. MF also operates day return tickets 
whose validity (all day, every day or only after 09.00am) varies according to 
areas of the network. It is difficult to judge whether these types of passes 
and tickets reflect any marketing concept aimed at targeting specific market 
segments or whether they are part of a competitive strategy to enhance 
customer loyalty. After all their availability means that there are different 
prices for the same product and as Oran (1983) pointed out, operators tend 
to loose revenue from unlimited-use passes. (Customer loyalty will be 
considered in the next chapter. ) 
2 There is nevertheless an underlying uniformity in the company's fare 
structure. For those who supported deregulation, it was hoped that a 
selective fare differential that reflects the costs of production could 
encourage more utilisation of services (Department of Transport, 1984). 
It is generally accepted that the production of a unit of supply during the 
peak periods costs more than during the off-peaks. It has also been noted 
that price sensitivity of peak demand is lower than the off peak one. In this 
way, Lago and Mayworm (1981) argued that a peak/off-peak price 
differential would result in a net increase in ridership and revenue. 
However, marginal cost pricing in the face of decreasing costs can lead to 
operating deficits. It is in this context that Baumol and Bradford (1970) 
developed an alternative method in which demand elasticities and marginal 
cost information could be used to determine how the fare in each market 
should differ from the marginal cost. Nonetheless, a fare differential 
between time of day operations - which in MFs case is mainly expressed by 
the availability of return tickets - can produce an important function: it can 
encourage trips of a discretionary nature to take place during the off-peak 
period and thus reduce peak vehicle requirements. { 
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It is important however to note that the concessionary fares policy operated 
by the County Council was said to have created off peak demand in 
quantities sufficiently near to peak levels (the case of Depot 2) thus making 
time-of-day pricing of little value. 
Nonetheless, there is scepticism about whether management possesses the 
analytical means capable of: 
1 providing strategic guidance on different pricing packages to 
sub-markets that have different price elasticities, identifying those 
that are changing in relative or absolute magnitude, and 
2 of implementing and marketing a more complex fare structure. 
However, the level of fares does vary from one depot's network to another. 
Other external forces (eg. competition) have contributed to these differences 
and they will be considered in the next chapter. 
3 Notwithstanding the differences in the depot's level of fares, there are no 
significant variations between fares charged in services operated by 
minibuses and those run by the more conventional type of buses (eg. double 
decker /single decker). 
For a given level of passenger seats it is clear that the operating costs of a 
minibus are higher than those of a larger vehicle, for the former can only 
carry a fraction of the latter's passengers but still uses the same amount of 
labour. 
In spite of the claims that as a result of this difference fares would have to be 
higher (Farrington, 1986; Walker, 1982; Turner and White, 1985), there is 
little empirical evidence to corroborate these claims (Turner and White, 
1987). As a matter of fact, as observed in section 7.2.1 , minibus drivers' 
costs are substantially lower so that, as Banister and Mackett (1990) point 
out, staff costs may not increase proportionally to the higher number of 
vehicles - and thus of drivers - necessary to produce the same number of 
passenger seats. Furthermore, the additional quality characteristics of 
supply, mainly accessibility and frequencies, associated with minibus 
services have generated levels of demand not experienced before. These 
two features have in fact been the outstanding factors in the success of 
minibus operations. 
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Nonetheless, MF did at one stage introduce a fare differential on services 
run by the two types of vehicles. The effects on patronage and thus on 
revenue were sufficiently discouraging, however, to maintain such a strategy 
for: 
... there was no financial 
benefit whatsoever. Fewer people travelled to 
off-set the increase in revenue that we expected. When we dropped the 
fares (relative to the bigger bus services) the passengers returned to the 
previous levels and the revenue went up (CD). 
It should be noted however, that the minibus services were run partly in 
competition with the larger bus network and with another incumbent's 
operations. 
There is, however, evidence that once a localised monopoly position has 
been asserted, and there is some product differentiation between bus 
modes, minibus services can sustain higher fares. The premium fares 
charged on common portions of service run by two different types of vehicle 
reflects a superior quality of service, - quicker travel time. At the same time 
they are susceptible of maintaining the value of those services (eg. avoid 
overcrowding) in areas that intermittently overlap with the larger bus routes 
mainly because of the strong passenger resistance (CD), to the fare 
differential and to the similarity of service frequencies of the two bus modes. 
The task of designing a price structure that addresses simultaneously the 
internal needs and goals of an organisation and the uncertainty of 
environmental factors is a complex one but it only represents part of the 
issues that encompass pricing strategies. The next section analyses the 
criteria for evaluating the effects of changes in the level of fares. 
Changing fares 
Table 7-8 provides information on the way in which various aspects 
associated with a price change in fares are perceived in MF. 
Firstly, it must be pointed out that the decentralisation of decision making 
with respect to setting and changing fare levels, outside the main urban 
area, constitutes an important break with the traditional practice of assigning 
fare policy to the financial department based at Headquarters. To a great 
degree the responsibility is now shared with those who can better judge the 
response of consumers. In addition, the different adjustments to the level of 
price between operating units reduces the overall impact on the revenues of 
the company from adverse and/or unexpected effects that may result from 
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these changes. It is also important to note that this risk is further minimised 
by pursuing a policy of frequent but very small increases on the levels of 
fares. 
Secondly, it is clear from Table 7-8 that most of the analytical exercises on 
the probable effects of a price change are mostly based on past 
price-quantity relationships. However, the volume of sales in one particular 
point in time is invariably affected by other factors (eg. changes in income, 
in service characteristics) which can occur simultaneously and lead to an 
imperfect assessment of the effect of a price change alone. Fare elastics 
have usually been considered according to the time of day travel demand, 
off peak elasticity has been assumed at -0.4 and peak elasticity at -0.2, 
(Glaister op. cit)with overall level of -0.3 (McKenzie and Goodwin, 1986; Bly, 
1976; Mullen, 1973). 
However, as reported from a study in Portland (Prowda and Draeger, 1982), 
30% of users were new to the system from one year to another. This means 
that the relative quantities of demand that lie behind the two types of price 
elasticity may change and thus lead to variations between expected effects 
and actual results of a price rise. 
Finally, it has been explicitly recognised by MFs executives that competition 
has an effect on fares. The role played by an existing competitor and/or by 
a potential entrant on the way in which fares change, will be analysed in the 
next chapter. 
7.3 An overview 
It is apparent throughout this chapter that organisational issues have played 
a significant and innovative role in the company's strategic management of 
change. The new organisational framework has fostered a management 
system that is conducive to a rapid adaptation to local market forces, thus 
contributing to the consolidation of the company's strategic positioning with 
regard to its dominant product. Concomitantly, the depots are increasingly 
involved in deciding corporate directions. In effect, those depots that face 
significant limitations on expansion are successfully attracting corporate 
commitment for products that are production-related, eg. MoTs. However, it 
is also clear that corporate decisions in favour of vaguely related products, 
for example, coaching, that have not entailed organisation wide 
involvement, and which are regarded as consuming discretionary funds that 
could otherwise be invested in production factors in the main product 
(buses), cannot be expected to receive universal adhesion. 
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Table 7-8 
Changing Fares 
CD The analysis on the effects of changes is largely 
based on past results. But you can never be sure that 
today's circumstances are going to mean that 
yesterday's evidence will hold ... I am not an expert 
and I don't think there is anybody who can say what 
return you will get from changing fares ... I know of 
companies that put fares up this year and the effect 
on the returns have been negligible ... the question 
is 
have passengers declined because the fares went up 
or have passengers declined for some other reason? 
There is always a difficulty in isolating the cause and 
effect. 
OGMI When costs increase, we can go up 1% or 2% here 
and there, which we tend to do. 
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Although the contribution made by the new organisational framework has 
been acknowledged - we are now a much stronger and better managed 
company (FD), it is only one part of a number of management areas that 
need to be addressed at times of major environmental changes. 
It is in this context that this chapter has analysed key operating issues and 
has covered a number of related areas, namely production (re: labour and 
capital), design (re: product strategies) and sale of bus services (re: pricing 
strategies). This analysis has shown the role played by each of these areas 
in the management of change of one bus operator in the post-deregulation 
era. It has reviewed the existence of new managerial approaches with 
regard to important issues of the industry's business (e. g. labour, fleet 
configuration) but it has, at the same time, exposed areas where 'old' 
concepts and practices still prevail (e. g. marketing, X-subsidization). 
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Chapter 8: Competition, Contestability and Leadership 
The main aim of this chapter is to assess the evolution of the strategic 
competitive behaviour of one major incumbent over a period of time in the 
context of the 1985 transport legislation and of the theoretical propositions of 
contestability on which it was based. In addition it seeks to demonstrate the 
critical role of organizational leadership and cultures in this process. 
There are three main areas under consideration: 
1 conditions of access to and exit from the industry 
2 competitive activity inside the industry 
3 importance of organizational leadership and culture within the bus 
industry. 
8.1 Access to the industry 
The extent of competition in any industry is determined by legal restrictions 
imposed on entry and exit and on rules that constrain the behaviour of firms 
aimed at purposefully erecting artificial barriers of entry into the industry. 
The key requirement for a market to be perfectly contestable is the 
non-existence of any entry and exit barriers. For incumbents to be subject to 
a permanent threat of incursion in their markets, potential entrants must not 
be forced to incur costs other than those incurred by the incumbents 
themselves. The absence of a'costly reversible entry' invariably implies the 
presence of conditions in the industry for a potential entrant to be able to 
recover its costs - either by disposing of the assets acquired for entry or by 
reallocating them in alternative markets - when profitable conditions have 
ceased to exist. That is, the absence of sunk costs is essential in 
determining the contestability of a market. 
The bus industry was judged to constitute an example of where contestable 
markets could develop providing that 
1 the major barrier to entry was dismantled (ie route licensing) and that 
equal entry and exit rules were introduced (ie registration and safety 
requirements) 
2 that unfulfilled needs could be protected on an equitable basis (ie 
direct subsidisation; tender services and concessionary fares) and 
3 that other conditions could reasonably be assumed to develop and 
prevent potential entrants from incurring sunk costs. 
169 
This section comprises two major areas: the first considers the evidence 
gathered in this case study in terms of the effects of existing institutional 
arrangements concerned with 'the free entry and exit' in the industry; the 
second concerns the role played by the prevailing conditions in the industry 
soon before deregulation and the ways in which they have evolved 
afterwards in terms of their effects on entry conditions. 
8.1.1 Access rules: Commercial sector and subsidisation 
Commercial Sector 
The system of route licensing was abolished and replaced in the 1985 
Transport Act by one of compulsory registration. For entry to occur, for 
service changes to be effected, and for exit to be sanctioned, the new 
legislation required that fixed periods of time had first to elapse. This ruling 
has subsequently been changed in some respects and the local Traffic 
Commissioners have been given more discretionary powers with regard to 
its application. Nonetheless there remains a system of legal restrictions to 
mobility. The extent to which they are likely to constitute artificial barriers to 
entry must be considered 
a under three separate circumstances and 
b in the way in which they may be perceived as barriers by incumbents 
and potential entrants. 
Firstly, entry is subject to a period of 42 days' notice. From an incumbent's 
point of view this requirement has not meant major re-adjustments -a similar 
system existed before... for major changes in the past you had to wait until 
publication and then 21 days for objection before you got approval (CD). 
For a company operating in a related industry eg coaching, a similar 
registration procedure was in force. For a completely new entrant these 
entry requirements are obviously novel and may lead to administration costs 
that may not be recovered in case of exit. But in so far as incumbents have 
incurred similar costs, they cannot be seen as an entry barrier as defined by 
Baumol (1983). 
It is nonetheless important to note that the statutory obligation to effectively 
enter a market once a registration for a service has been accepted and a 
starting date set, has forced incumbents to greater internal discipline - In the 
past there may have been a tendency ... to miss that deadline... the Traffic 
Commissioners under the old system would accept that there . was no interference with anybody else and therefore nobody would be objecting 
(CD). 
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Secondly, changes in existing services are subject to different timetable 
requirements. Frequent services, that is, those with at least one journey 
every 10 minutes can be changed without notice provided that frequency is 
maintained. The same applies to changes in services within 5 minutes of 
the registered timetable. For an adjustment between 5-10 minutes, Traffic 
Commissioners may only require seven days notice. These rulings are 
particularly important in a situation where retaliation can be expected. 
According to the theory of contestability the gap between entry and punitive 
strategic retaliation is such that an entrant should not fear entering for it will 
'hit' at the incumbent's excessive profits before having to 'run' as a result of a 
lack of continued profitable operations in that particular market. It has been 
widely reported that competition has occurred mostly in dense areas and 
has led to highly frequent services. If the entrant does not have resources 
that match those of an incumbent, the registration procedures appear in 
these cases to enhance the investment vulnerability of entrants to sustained 
retaliatory resources by an incumbent. The consequences for users, whilst 
competition lasts, may not be as detrimental - after all frequencies are very 
high - as in those routes that are intensely congested, but whose 
frequencies require 7 days notice before changes can be made: in week 
one we were running on the hour, week two our competitor moved, week 
three we moved, week four he moved, and the whole thing was moving 
around the clock. The public unfortunately suffered as a result (CD). 
However, the degree of mobility between markets inferred herein, enhances 
the industry's contestability in the sense that an entrant can easily and 
quickly recover its entry costs by operating in successive (and more 
profitable) markets. 
Thirdly, exit from a market requires that an operator gives 42 days notice 
before it can withdraw. The extent to which this ruling is likely to be seen by 
a potential entrant as a statutory pressure to stay in a market when it can no 
longer earn profits, will influence its decision to enter. In this context, the 
absence of widespread entry in the industry has provided an opportunity for 
considering the total disbanding of the existing registration procedures as a 
better solution, for it would enhance the contestability of markets (Preston, 
1991). At the same time, as Porter (1985) points out, one of the effects of 
forcibly extending unwarranted pressure of firms in an industry due to exit 
barriers, is to prolong periods of excess capacity. However, more flexible 
guidelines have subsequently been given to the local Traffic Commissioners 
with regard to the applicability of the statutory rules on exit. As a result, bus 
operators have been able to deregister services and replace them at shorter, 
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notice - providing that they are 'substantially similar' - or indeed to withdraw 
completely from the market. In the latter case Huntley (1989) reported an 
example where an operator exited with 7 days notice due to another firm 
having competed successfully for its passengers. 
More importantly, however, from an entrant's point of view is whether the 
costs that it has incurred to enter can be recovered when it may be forced to 
exit. That is, a low barrier to exit also means that an entrant finds either a 
profitable alternative use or an adequate resale value for the resources 
acquired to enter. As previously observed, existing legislation does not 
appear to greatly affect mobility within the industry - at least in the most 
contested markets. At the same time, a buoyant 2nd hand market for buses 
has been noted, thus suggesting a relatively easy way of disposing the main 
capital requirement for entry. It should also be pointed out that if entry is 
effected by using low cost 2nd hand buses - their average price is 
£4,000-£5,000 (MD) - and assuming that moving those assets around 
different markets, does not constitute a major obstacle, the entrant may only 
require limited profits until its presence can no longer be justified. 
Finally, it is important to note that the role of the Traffic Commissioners has 
been judged by MF's Managing Director as fair despite the fact that - 
whereas prior to 1986, the Traffic Commissioners took account of the public 
interest, in terms of how they interpret the legislation today, if it does not 
actually fit the guidelines or the rule of law, whether it is in the public interest 
or not, it does not happen (CD). 
The interests of those users that, for commercial and strategic reasons, were 
not fulfilled by the market, were nonetheless to be safeguarded by County 
Council resources via payments for services tendered and through 
concessionary fares. 
Forms of subsidisation 
There are two main areas for operators to obtain public subsidy 
1 Winning tenders 
Regardless of the system adopted by County Councils - cost or revenue 
based - they both require the gathering of a certain amount of 
information. For some operators, this information might already have 
been part of the previous management information structure - under the 
old system (network support based) they (the local authority) required 
very detailed financial information of the company - operational costing 
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which was a route revenue and cost allocation (CD). For others though, 
the tendering process may represent an additional cost burden had they 
not decided to enter the subsidised part of the market - in terms of (a 
municipal company) they were not supported in that way and they have 
probably noted a different effect of the tendered process (CD). 
Furthermore, for the former operators, the new system has meant that 
today they only require information with regard to the services of which 
we have a contract to operate on their behalf... so really they get less 
information now than they did before (CD). These apparent 
disadvantages do not appear, nonetheless, to influence the number of 
bidders, and as has been observed by many, this is a market that 
remains contestable or, at least mildly conducive to competition 
(Beesley, 1991). 
2 Concessionary Fares 
The only requisite for any operator to take part in any concessionary 
fares scheme is to run a service which is eligible for fuel duty rebate. 
These schemes are operated by County Councils and basically-provide 
for certain categories of users eg. unemployed, elderly, handicapped - to 
travel at reduced fares. Bus operators are reimbursed for the incurred 
net loss of income. 
This type of subsidy has actually increased since deregulation (Beesley, 
1991) and can thus be assumed to represent an important part of the 
total revenue earned from commercial operations. The decision to enter 
a market is intrinsically associated with the potential amount of revenue 
that can be attained from the sale of the product. According to Beesley, 
two main obstacles are likely to arise as a result of the existing 
arrangements with regard to this type of subsidy. The potential entrant 
will find it difficult to assess the exact amount of subsidy that will accrue - 
most County Councils run schemes whereby the amounts reimbursed 
varies according to the time of day, day of the week travel, and 
validating its claims can be costly - most County Councils require some 
form of spot checking. If the volume of traffic that is generated as a result 
of a concessionary fare scheme is significant, Beesley argues, then a trial 
entry - the most simple way of judging demand - can be severely 
discouraged. Beesley thus concludes that subsidy in the form of 
concessionary fares is highly favourable to incumbents. It should also be 
noted that in a situation of local market dominance, further, benefits 
appear to accrue to the incumbent, operator.. In fact,., the "degree of 
sensitivity to price 'discounts' of the targeted segments has led to 
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increases in volume that have reduced the peak/off-peak vehicle 
requirements ratio -I would quite easily justify the 16 mini/midi buses 
working throughout the day... the off-peak demand is normally composed 
of women and senior citizens and certainly the existence of the County 
Council's senior citizen half fare schemes allows these people to travel 
enough peak periods that they would not do otherwise (DGM2, referring 
to the situation in a small town). 
Contestability though assigns a particular role for the regulator: to ensure 
low entry and exit barriers. Thus far this section has raised issues related 
to the legal restrictions introduced to attain that goal. 
For contestability theory, entry is perceived profitable only if the expected 
profits of success are higher than the sunk costs incurred to enter in the 
event of failure. However, the risks involved in this decision can be 
increased by factors other than those aimed at creating freedom of 
market entry and exit. Some of these factors relate to the specific 
conditions that prevailed a little before the new legislation was 
introduced, and that crystallised in possibly affecting an entrant's 
expectations of a successful entry. Others have evolved in the new 
market situation via deliberate acts of incumbent operators. The 
following section will consider some aspects associated with the former 
whereas the latter will be discussed in the next section. 
8.1.2 Access: the role of pre-deregulation conditions 
Developments in the industry since deregulation and particularly the 
absence of significant new entry propelled the supporters of deregulation 
(eg. Beesley, 1991) to ponder on factors, other than those originally 
anticipated (eg. the access to bus stations), that were likely to have played 
an adverse part in such an outcome. 
The effects of two of these can be said to have affected two potential sources 
of competitive advantage - costs and product characteristics. 
One of the most outstanding effects of deregulation was the significant 
reductions in labour costs relative to their pre-deregulation levels. These 
results refer to public sector operations. Given that operating costs of 
public operators are 30% to 40% higher than those of private operators 
(Department of Transport, 1984), it could be argued that part of the latter's 
potential source of competitive advantage was greatly reduced. This is to a 
great extent acknowledged by Beesley (1991) when he concluded that [the 
174 
incumbent's] position was strengthened relative to potential competitors, 
whose initial labour rents were probably lower. Furthermore, as observed 
earlier in this case study, it was the 'undefined' period that preceded 
deregulation that provided the opportunity for some incumbents to introduce 
labour contracts that greatly contributed to their subsequently lower 
operating costs. 
As far as product characteristics are concerned, it has been widely noted 
that the service features associated with minibus operations generated 
substantial volumes of traffic and that they provided an effective way of 
competing in the more open markets. Those operators that were able to 
anticipate and to effectively use this new product could thus gain a 
competitive advantage over others. The fact is that many incumbents started 
building this potential advantage even before their market position could 
have been contested - many incumbents anticipated innovating moves by 
investing heavily in minibuses before deregulation and then running them 
during the change-over, (Beesley, 1991). This case study provides further 
evidence - most of the generation of new business came with minibus 
services which we really introduced during 1985/86, before deregulation 
(CD). 
Incumbent operators can however enjoy other potential, although less 
visible, advantages whose roots can be traced to the length of time that they 
have been active in the industry. The bus industry was exclusive to only a 
few for nearly 30 years and a great part of the management expertise still 
remains in key positions. There are several areas where economies of 
experience can be expressed. One is associated with costs of production. A 
given level of output can be produced more efficiently depending on the 
production scheduling expertise acquired 
- the low number of non-driving hours is purely attributable to scheduling ... 
there is very little waste (DGM2) 
- the type of rotas that we have is the main reason for, the low number of 
non-driving hours. This is purely a separate skill which the Garage Manager 
does. It is not something that / do (DGM1)(l). 
Scheduling efficiency may also require modifications to existing products, 
the consequences of which can be better assessed by reference to previous 
1 DGM 1 is new to the industry, 
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experiments or to the knowledge acquired on demand characteristics., In 
other cases an efficient set of schedules is the result of choices with regard 
to diversified production that can best interrelate with the excess capacity of 
resources caused by the supply requirements of the dominant product: we 
have various school contracts that make up services, which is attributable to 
the fact that we have a very good planner (DGM1). Another area where 
experience can favour an incumbent is in assessing the most profitable 
areas of its operations in the sense that the extensive route cost and 
revenue allocation exercises imposed on them in the past, can provide 
valuable indicators on commercial opportunities in the new environment. 
Finally, there are two other factors that can be singled out as possibly having 
provided an advantage to incumbents, and thus constituting an obstacle to 
entry. 
Firstly, there are the effects of the reputation built by incumbents in the 
market prior to deregulation and subsequently enhanced by marketing or 
public relation activities. This is a feature particularly in evidence in this 
case study. When asked about his company's most outstanding features in 
the market at present, MF's CD pointed out that - Reputation is possibly one 
of the largest items. The means used were - the high profile which we have 
continued to maintain since 1984 when the red/yellow livery was launched 
(CD), and by trying to maximise our presence by image, by attention to detail 
and by explaining and apologising for any shortcomings, but more often 
than not, by trying to get it right (CD). 
It could be argued that, by definition, reputation should not constitute an 
additional obstacle for entry in the sense that an entrant does not have to 
incur costs that an incumbent has not incurred itself. It should be noted 
however that if an incumbent is able to sustain a good reputation, a greater 
amount of resources may be needed by a potential entrant to reverse that 
situation. The latter may also understand that, a longer market presence 
may be required because the incumbent has established such a high 
degree of salience in the community. 
However, it cannot be assumed that reputation will inevitably lead to 
customer loyalty. In fact, after deregulation, many incumbents maintained, 
and in some cases developed more intensely, the sale of off-bus ticketing 
with this aim. As Gwilliam (1989) pointed out, these devices may give the 
incumbent some protection against piecemeal competition. The extent to 
which these schemes affect a potential entrant's decision to penetrate a 
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market may however depend on a number of circumstances. For example, 
an incumbent's size of operations (eg. being a County supplier) can be 
relevant if the market entered serves a large number of users that require 
interchange and the entrant is unable to assure the necessary links - either 
because of timetable incompatibility or simply because it does not run the 
linking route. If on the contrary, the route entered is independent (or a 
through service), the benefits that accrue to pass holders (eg. cheaper 
price/journey) and to the company that runs those schemes (eg. retain 
patronage) may be dissipated by the higher passenger sensitivity to service 
characteristics - when a competitor comes on the road, the first thing that 
disappears is sales of season tickets, because passengers do not want to 
stand on the roadside and let the first bus go. If they have a season ticket for 
the second bus and not for the first one, they will abandon purchasing their 
season ticket (CD). 
So far this chapter has concentrated on the role played by a number of 
factors related to pre-deregulation conditions and practices which were 
judged to have had an impact on the market developments in one particular 
area of the UK after that policy was implemented. 
The purpose of the next section is to analyse the main facts of the strategic 
competitive behaviour of an ex-publicly owned incumbent in the new 
industry context. 
8.2 Competitive activity 
As observed in previous chapters, the role of potential entrants is 
fundamental for a market to be contestable. The structure of a market should 
not therefore affect the outcome normally associated with the model of 
perfect competition which requires an effective presence of many firms in the 
market. But as Beesley (1991) acknowledged, when in 1985 the new 
package of legislation came into effect it was unclear how the initial market 
position of incumbents would be used. This case study has produced some 
valuable information for an insight into and. an analysis of the competitive 
behaviour of a major incumbent with regard to actual and potential entry, as 
well as to rival incumbents. 
The current market position of MF is one of total dominance in the towns of 
the County and surrounding areas, and it shares the market of the only city 
in the County with a municipal incumbent. 
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The crucial issue of the analysis is to identify the key strategic competitive 
elements that have contributed to MF having achieved the aforementioned 
position. 
8.2.1 Incumbent versus actual entry 
Fig 8-1 is a chronological summary of events that led to MF becoming the 
sole operator in one of the major towns in the County. It is also the only 
major example of MF's competitive behaviour with regard to actual entry 
thus far. The most outstanding aspects of the competitive activity described 
in this figure are 
1 The last two companies to have survived in this town's market 
entered by having won tender contracts. If for potential entrants 
this strategy has been seen to represent a tactical move, in the 
sense that it could lead to expansion to commercial work, it has 
been less noted for incumbents to have used similar means to 
expand their operations into new markets. 
2 The most visible reason for LCB's subsidiary to have failed in 
sustaining its initial market success was poor reliability. This 
shows that success in the bus industry cannot be sustained if it is 
disproportionately based on one sector of the productive process 
(ie. traffic versus maintainance), or indeed if the objective pursued 
(further expansion) leads to such disequilibrium. 
3 MF has gained total market dominance of this market via one 
common means - acquisitions. Both these acquisitions - LCB's 
subsidiary (the Loughborough Coach and Bus Company) and the stage 
service part of Kinch's operations - cannot be disassociated from the 
predominant business philosophy of MF's management team to the 
extent that - it was a question of exploiting opportunities that came along 
(CD). However, these opportunities arose as a result of different 
circumstances. The former was in many ways not because of a success 
within the industry but because of failure within the industry by others and 
would have ultimately gone to the wall without any interference from MF 
(CD). The latter was, on the contrary, the result of a fairly prolonged 
competitive battle. Also, the acquisition of LB's subsidiary provided the 
opportunity to get ourselves well established within the town (CD), 
whereas Kinch's led to a dominant position in the town (CD). 
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It is important at this stage to outline the main characteristics of the 
competitive engagement between MF and the independent operator (Kinch). 
The method used to illustrate the way in which competition evolved in this 
particular market is to consider the competitive strategies adopted by both 
companies. 
The independent operator 
It is apparent from Fig 8-1 that the independent operator could not compete 
based on high frequency services. It just did not have the type of resources 
required - its fleet was composed exclusively of double deck buses. 
Therefore its competitive strategy was based on the lower costs it enjoyed - 
Kinch was quite an efficient operator (CD) that afforded lower fares (re: 
March 1988) and/or on other service characteristics (eg direct services) that 
could attract patronage (re March 89) - Kinch was quite an effective operator 
(CD). MF's acquisition of LCB's subsidiary had an important impact on MF's 
competitive attitude in this market - it did substantially raise its exit barriers. 
Following this acquisition, MF swiftly reorganised the operations in the town 
that it inherited and this involved not only changes in service characteristics 
but also the replacement of unreliable equipment (minibuses), together with 
major changes in existing labour practices. 
This market was now perceived to be part of MF's core business which 
meant that - the battle with Kinch would have lasted longer if it was 
necessary. We were committed to protecting the core business of MF (CD). 
Although Kinch attributed its exit from the market to reasons other than those 
related to the direct competition with MF - to, it was rather because MF 
became part of a major Transport Group (Drawlane) - it must be noted that 
there were increasing signs that it could no longer earn profits, in the short 
run, to justify its continued presence in the market. In fact, Kinch's last 
attempts to survive were to desperately appeal to users to support its local 
stage services. Nonetheless, the longer term consequences of MF's 
integration in Drawlane in terms of their effects on future competitive 
developments in this market, cannot be underestimated. These 
consequences must in turn be considered in the context of the interplay 
between the strategies adopted by both companies at the time of Kinch's 
decision to exit. 
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Figure 8-1 
A story of Market dominance - overcoming an incumbent's subsidiary and a small entrant's 
stage operations in the largest town in the north of the County. 
At deregulation Trent was the provider of the town services for many years. 
November 1986 Trent withdrew completely after 18.00 and abandoned Sunday 
operations completely. 
Kinch won the local authority contract, which gave the town half-hourly 
evening services, double the pre-deregulation frequency. 
March 1987 Trent recommenced evening operations. 
Late Spring 1987 MF took over the Sunday operations on contract. This brought the first 
minibus operation to the town. 
July 1987 LB formed a subsidiary company - Lcb - and launched an 11 strong fleet 
of Optare minicoaches entitled 'Trippits', on an intensive pattern around 
the Town. The new fleet was a success at first. They offered an evening 
service at an increased fare which meant the formerly subsidised evening 
services could be withdrawn, The Trippit network made a huge dent in 
the established but now relatively infrequent Trent service. 
November 1987 Trent closed its depot in the town. 
December 1987 Trippits had won sole possession of the Town services. 
MF, Kinch, County Bus - locked in competition on a trunk route between 
the Town and the big city. 
March 1988 Kinch announced cheaper services during the day with . 30 min frequencies against the roughly 15 min pattern of the Trippit day time 
service. 
Trippit network - expanded, both inside the town and outside with routes 
stretching out a long way. This was probably the zenith of the Trippit era, 
it began to suffer reliability problems and its hitherto good reputation 
began to wane. 
Mid '- 1988 MF acquired Fairtax. 
February 1989 It became known that LB, the parent company of the Trippit operation, 
was running at mounting losses... it was widely rumoured that Lcb and its 
assets were on the market to ease LB financial worries. 
March 1989 Kinch launched direct Shepshed-Loughborough journeys. 
This hit MF's routes which diverted through a major housing estate on its 
way to Loughborough. 
Fairtax, as a response, launched free routes on Loughborough Town 
services. 
Spring 1989 MF (Fairtax) and Kinch were locked in battle against the background of a 
beleaguered Trippit mini coach operation which was experiencing still 
more reliability problems. I 
End of May 1989 MF acquired Lcb. The new owner immediately revised the Trippit 
operation. The coach seated Optare were removed and replaced by Fox 
Cubs. 
MF and Kinch were still competing strongly. 
November 1989 MF was acquired by a Transport Group. ' 
December 1989 MF took over Kinch services. Source Gibson (1990) 
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The Incumbent 
Fig 8-1 indicates that the first' major competitive action taken by MF was to 
offer free travel on the network it operated prior to the successive 
acquisitions that led to its market dominance. This strategic move must be 
seen in terms of MF's longer term objectives, namely to increase its share of 
the market by inducing existing operators to exit from it in the shortest period 
of time - no company could engage in this inevitable loss-making exercise 
for a prolonged period of time. This type of predatory behaviour must also 
be considered in the context of the well publicised financial problems of LB's 
subsidiary parent company, and of the performance short-falls that the 
subsidiary itself was experiencing in the market. It could thus be said that 
this extreme case of predatory pricing has quickened the end of a rival 
incumbent's presence outside the major city in the County, enhanced the 
chances of an acquisition on more favourable terms and provided MF with 
the greatest - although not total - share of the market. From the independent 
operator's point of view it certainly discouraged any potential intentions it 
might have had, for extending its network into other areas in this Town. 
However, this kind of predatory behaviour was not adopted in any other 
subsequent situation. Nonetheless, it was not an isolated instance in the 
industry since 1986 (Public Transport Information Unit briefing, 1991). But it 
is clear that if the primary objectives of such practices are not attained 
quickly, it can have extremely costly effects on the predator. Furthermore, 
the intervention of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in similar cases has 
scared operators off this tactic (Dodgson and Katsoulacos, 1991). 
Predatory behaviour can be expressed in other ways. In fact actions taken 
by an operator that punish others either by forcing them to exit or by 
purposefully affecting the attractiveness of a market are predatory if in the 
process that operator incurs losses to accomplish these objectives. The 
incentive to prey arises from the expectation that these loses will be 
recovered once the market has been monopolised. In this context, matching 
fares and/or output levels have also to be considered as predatory strategic 
behaviour. In fact, the strategy adopted by MF comprises both these 
elements - we will as a rule match what the competition is doing (DGM1) by 
. matching the particular timetable the competition is doing and by matching 
his fares (DGMI). However, this case has shown that in some instances, 
predation of this kind can be more effectively achieved - ie, in the shortest 
period of time - if output and prices are used simultaneously - we tried for a 
long time not to reduce the fares and match Kinch's.. As a consequence he 
gained more impact, more penetration in the market. Therefore it took 
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longer for him to be pushed out (CD). Two major factors appeared to have 
played a crucial role in the timing of Kinch's exit. Firstly, the entrant was 
quite professional about the ways in which he turned out his buses (CD). 
Secondly, the routes where competition was more intense served relatively 
low income areas. Thus as Preston (1991) suggested, if there is not much 
product differentiation (re: reliability and frequencies) between two 
operations but there are differences in fares, high fare elasticities may 
reduce the tendency to board the first bus that arrives, when a cheaper 
alternative is available. 
After MF matched the independent operator's fares, the outcome of this 
competitive battle must be considered in the light of the 'long purse 
hypothesis'. According to this hypothesis an operator that has more 
resources of funding or better access to lending than another, can 
successfully sustain a price or service war for it will outlast the latter for at 
least one period longer (Benoit, 1984). MF enjoyed most of those 
requirements by this time. It was a larger operator able to generate profits 
from other relatively secured sources and it was being challenged on too 
few routes. It had also just became part of a major Transport Group which 
could have meant better access to lending. 
The main concern about predatory behaviour is that an operator, freed from 
the discipline imposed by those it forced to exit is likely subsequently to 
produce lower levels of output and to enforce higher prices on users. There 
is considerable debate on the nature of legal restrictions, if any, that should 
be introduced to restrict the practice of predatory behaviour. The main issue 
of contention can be seen in the context of market contestability. If a market 
is perfectly contestable and one operator, using predatory practices, has 
gained a monopoly position, it will not be able to impose monopolistic 
features of operation if it continues to be threatened by free and costless 
entry. If on the other hand, conditions arise in the market that makes it 
difficult to be easily contested, successful predatory behaviour can lead to 
post-predation advantages being exploited by the predator that are not in 
the interests of users. It is in this context that some observers have called for 
regulation aimed at forceably committing predators to the strategies used to 
purposefully empty the market (Gwilliam, 1989). Others, as Preston (1991) 
has suggested, believe that policy makers should instead concentrate on 
enforcing low barriers to entry and exit. 
There are two major aspects related to MF's market behaviour after it gained 
a monopoly position (in the area considered), that are noteworthy 
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1 The first one concerns the effect on fares. As DGM 2 pointed out - 
when competition disappears, it leaves you with a difficulty - do you 
automatically put your fares back where they were? There may be 
cases where there is a 12 month gap where you still may be earning 
less than you were earning before the competition arrived, despite 
the fact that he has disappeared (DGM2). Two factors were said to exert 
considerable influence in delaying the readjustment of fare 
levels. Firstly was the difference between the fares that the two 
operators charged whilst they were still both active in the market and 
those that the incumbent practised in similar services after the 
monopolisation of the market. Secondly was the concern that the 
adverse reputation that an immediate rise in fares would have on the 
public in general - here is the big bad MF having removed the 
competition putting the fare level back where it was. Didn't we all say 
that is what would happen? (DGM2), that is, restoring fares to the higher 
levels practised elsewhere in the network is an exercise that must not be 
perceived by the public to be the end result of predatory behaviour. 
Thus, fares will increase in the ex-competitive routes in the same way as 
when, for other reasons, fare increases are warranted, that is, - little and 
often rather than suddenly (DGM2). Therefore, it could be said that, as in 
Hereford and South Wales, fares varied by route. But in those cases, it 
seems that the fares varied according to whether, the route was 
competitive rather than with demand (Evans, 1991). 
2 The second major aspect is related to the effects of MF's dominant 
position on service characteristics. Evans, pointed out that real 
competition often leads to haphazard headings, and thus to 
some scheduling inefficiency and wasted bus mileage. When 
'head-on-competition' between MF and Kinch was more intense 
it was reported that situations were. created when a MF single deck 
bus appeared a minute or so before a, Kinch bus, followed very 
closely by a MF minibus (Gibson, 1990). . 
When an operator is 
committed to compete in this way, -that ; is, by looking at [the 
competition's] times and by matching everything (DGM1), it is likely 
that at best it will have. to , reschedule resources in an 
exercise that may lead to greater costs being incurred (eg excessive 
layovers, additional mileage and drivers time being paid as a result of 
A he need to design new duties to meet current, requirements) or in 
extreme cases having to acquire additional, resources to prosecute 
this type of strategy. 
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After MF acquired both competitors we have been able to reorganise service 
and re-establish the operations on a sound-footing (CD). MF's claim that 
the dominant position gained in this market has been to the benefit of the 
public (CD) is probably better understood in the context that 
1 competition was not predominantly fought on high frequencies but 
rather on matching timings and that 
2 by enlarge these have been maintained or subjected to limited 
reductions and have led to services being more stable, basically 
reliable and at fair prices (CD). 
Finally, it is important to note that this case of competition has constituted a 
major experience for MF in terms of the effects that specific competitive 
strategies can have on other competitors and eventually on the outcome of 
competition. Together with other minor competitive incidents, it has 
contributed to the formation of a number of general postulates with regard to 
the ways in which the Company is likely to compete with (smaller) entrants. 
The basic premise is that there is a need to take a balanced view to the long 
term effect (DGM1) of competing with different kinds of operators for it all 
depends very much on the manner in which the competitor acts and on his 
business philosophy (DGM2). In brief, the type of response depends on the 
sort of competition (FD). That is, if it was a small one-man operator the 
answer will be not to let him get a foothold in the market right from the outset. 
So you would compete aggressively and take the necessary measures right 
from the first move (FD). Furthermore, the scale of the response is usually 
restricted to the area of entry for a new entrant coming in to compete has got 
nothing which we can attack in terms of getting your own back (CD). 
However, there are other cases where you can live with a certain level of 
competition (DGM2) for it can be an advantage to you (DGM2). This 
accords with Porter's (1985) suggestion that there are strategic benefits that 
can accrue from the presence of the right competitors. A good competitor is 
one that does not overestimate industry growth potential and therefore 
overbuild capacity, or more specifically one that has six buses but whose 
aspirations (are not) 24 (CD). Two major advantages indicated by Porter 
that can arise from the existence of a competitor with'such characteristics 
were implicitly acknowledged in this study. The first concerns the'effects on 
demand, that is, of boosting demand (Porter, 1985). For DGM2, = if the 
existence of a competitor on a particular route generates traffic from which 
you can gain, that could be -an ý advantage. The second relates to the 
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advantages of having that competitor occupying unattractive segments in the 
sense that they could be too small for the major incumbent or which it would 
have otherwise to occupy for defensive purposes (eg. impede the entry of a 
bad competitor) or in order to continue to operate in other segments that 
benefited from those run by the competitor - There are a number of 
operators in the County who are quite happy' to stay with the volume of 
business that they are doing and in a stable market. We are more than 
happy that stays that way (CD). In these cases, the dividing line is between 
not retaliating and the competitor thinking -I am doing all right here, 'l shall 
expand - or retaliating at a considerable cost to yourself for a very little gain 
(DGM2). It is apparent therefore, that only under these circumstances the 
incumbent might be prepared to accommodate a competitor, a situation 
which has been generalised by those who consider predation as an 
irrational type of behaviour (McGee, 1958 and 1980). 
However, actual entry in contestability theory does not play the same 
influential role as in the perfect competition model. It is rather the threat of 
entry that determines whether the same results are achieved. 
8.2.2 The Incumbent and the threat of entry 
MF's competitive behaviour has so far been envisaged in terms of its 
response to effective entry. However, incumbents are also known to use 
strategic actions aimed at deterring others to enter their markets. One 
strategy consists of holding excess capacity. In this case, a potential entrant 
will anticipate an intensification of post-entry competition to the extent that it 
will make its entry unprofitable. This type of argument was developed by 
several authors (eg. Wenders, 1971; Salop, 1979; Lyons, 1986) but Simley's 
(1986) survey showed that this was the least used method amongst other 
alternative deterrent strategies. However, MF did originally consider 
carrying excess capacity (CD). In fact we thought about retaining reserve 
fleet and we almost got to the situation of how we would manage to retain 
reserve drivers (CD). The development of a second-hand market for buses 
where there are hundreds of cheap 2nd hand buses that are still able to 
provide a service (CD) has contributed to the abandonment of such 
strategic thinking. The crucial factor for not having pursued this strategy 
further - even if recruiting drivers is a more difficult task ' (CD) must thus be 
seen to have resulted from the belief that all that is needed is to have a 
shorter production lead time than the entrant, ` ie. - to be able to expand 
quicker than the entrant - In reality what you have to do'is being in a position 
to react quickly at the time and find those resources (CD). As Lieberman 
(1987) pointed out, this is equivalent to, but less costly than, excessive 
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capacity held in advance of a specific entry threat. 
Although MF's intentions of erecting this kind of barrier did not materialize - 
which for all purposes accords with Evan's (1988) finding in Hereford, where 
the main incumbent did not initially appear to pursue an entry- deterring 
strategy - it does nonetheless signal a strong commitment to retaliate against 
any entry that it perceives as constituting a threat. That is, as Evan's found - 
after the entrants had arrived, the main incumbent's strategy was aimed at 
getting rid of them. This kind of determination was clearly in evidence in 
MF's competitive battle with Kinch. It signalled the extent of retaliatory 
actions other potential entrants could expect to face if they attempted entry. 
Potential entrants can be further deterred if the incumbent effectively closes 
segments of the market that would otherwise prove attractive to them. This 
fact was explicitly acknowledged - you have to be careful not to leave a gap 
in the market that can be easily filled, profitability by another operator 
(DGM2). This barrier can be particularly effective in the case of those 
services that for reasons of profit, would not normally be run by bus 
operators without receiving direct public subsidy. It has been widely noted 
that the tendered sector of the market can be easily contested by small 
entrants. The potential threat that this type of entry poses to an incumbent is 
that -if an operator is successful, he will get a foot-hold in an evening 
[tendered service] and it will be relatively easy for him to look at the market 
for the middle of the day and to expand to provide a service throughout the 
day (DGM2). There are, however, circumstances where the risks to the 
incumbent from an entrant adopting this kind of strategy are worth taking to 
the extent that services can be deregistered with the aim of winning them 
back as a tender (DGM2). 
Nonetheless, the threat of entry is not underestimated by MF's management 
- of course we are concerned with the possibility that other companies might 
enter the market. We are always keeping an eye open to see if anybody 
else is likely to start operations (CD). I 
The threat of entry comprises a number of small companies whose range of 
products include services in the fringe of MF's markets and/or services 
operated under contract to the County Council. They constitute a threat to 
the extent that their current activities can be further developed into producing 
other types of products whose markets are occupied by the incumbent. 
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At the present time they are considered to be small and none of them have 
any resources - financial and depots - to see major expansion (CD). 
However, the presence of potential entrants appears to have some effect on 
the incumbent's behaviour. As DGM1 pointed out, if we put the fares too 
high, we may encourage a small competitor to come in at reduced fares or, 
as MF's Commercial Director remarked, the Depot General Manager has to 
realise that if he charges too much ... he is going to invite competition. 
Furthermore, according to the same source, one reason operators can't 
generate sufficient profits from their commercial activities is because they try 
to second guess competition and they don't limit the scale of their timetable 
ie, they overprovide in the relationship to the amount of custom that they get 
(CD). In other words, the fear that competition will see that there is 
something lucrative and will go for it (CD) has led incumbents to offer 
excess supply, thus raising costs of production and reducing returns to 
levels that cannot sustain the replacement needs of their already old capital 
base. The fact is that despite the kind of barriers to entry considered in 
previous sections, it is possible that the availability of cheap capital and/or 
spare capacity in terms of both labour and capital from other operations, can 
offer an entrant a'hit and run' type of incursion. It is in order to avoid entry of 
this kind that incumbents seek to preempt any entry opportunity. In some 
circumstances this may impede incumbents from benefiting from economies 
associated with the scope of their operations. That is, and entrant may be 
able to enter one route at prices that cover its costs but that are lower than 
the incumbent's if that particular service is taken separately. However, if that 
separability of output were not possible, the incumbent through the 
economies that it would achieve from simultaneously running a number of 
interlinking services, would have been able to charge lower overall prices. 
There is in fact evidence to support the idea that MF does enjoy some 
degree of economies of scope in the sense that - most of our services are at 
present all bedded in. They are all settled services (DGM3) - or - we are 
reasonably good here because the type of network that we have and the 
kind of contracts that we have fit in fairly well. They all interlink (DGM1). But 
as Shepherd (1982) pointed out, if public policy succeeds in maximising the 
separability of core services, then the viability of competition in 
quasi-monopoly settings will be enhanced. '. 
However, and because there is competition that doesn't have to look to 
sustaining the industry for the future, the industry is at present time wasted, 
and wasting away (CD). In the commercial sector the main question is who 
is going to invest in providing a service by spending £95,000 or £100,000 on 
a new double deck bus which in 12 months time is not going to look very 
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different to a bus that is 6 years old, which in turn will not look very different 
to another that is 10 years old? Who is going to invest that sort of money 
when a competitor comes along with a bus that he gets for £5,000 from a 
second-hand dealer and will take half of your revenue? (CD). For Burke et 
al (1988) one source of instability in an industry is the difference between 
time horizons amongst firms, that is, one looking for a 'cash cow' generating 
instant profits, another for long term growth investment. In the tendered part 
of the market a similar situation was said to arise - the only way that anyone 
can quote for tenders is to assume virtually fully depreciated vehicles or 
vehicles that the can pick up for pennies - say a 2nd hand double decker for 
£3,000 - £4,000 (CD). However, when local authorities attach requisites 
regarding the type of capital that ought to be used to run the services on 
tender it might indicate that they are looking towards getting investment in 
the industry through that clause (CD). Nonetheless, this clause is not 
welcomed by the majority of operators because they are simply looking for 
winning tenders in the short term (CD). For an incumbent operating a major 
network this clause can offer a potential advantage. Tender contracts 
comprise in general off peak services. If local authorities require newer 
vehicles as a basis for submitting tender prices, the incumbent will be able to 
renew its fleet and use the new buses in the commercial services thus 
reducing the costs of peak operations. 
The type of argument just described can be seen to accord in many ways, 
with the claims made by the opponents of deregulation in that both they and 
investment analysts were right in predicting that unregulated competition 
would tend chronically to be destructive because of the industry's perverse 
tendency to continue to add capacity in the face of poor financial results 
(Kahn 1988). But it could also. be seen to represent a way of advocating 
governmental intervention to protect the long-term major players in the 
industry that [at present time] can't generate sufficient profit to reinvest (CD) 
from cowboy operators who are not professional and are affecting those who 
are trying to be professional (CD). 
Overall, it could be concluded that, as Evans (1991) pointed out, monopoly 
operators are perhaps being controlled better than the analysis implies for 
despite the fact that there are little restrictions on fare increases, profits since 
deregulation have been low. For MF's management, the main reason for 
the repeatedly low profits in the industry since deregulation is the alleged 
existence of an excessive threat of 'hit and run' , competition. 
But for MF, the 
threat of entry represents only., one source of potential instability in the 
industry. Rivalry between incumbents is another: °s,.. 
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8.2.3 Competing incumbents: a case of rivalry 
MF's main competitor is the municipal company, Leicester City Bus (LCB), 
whose stage operations are entirely within the urban perimeter of the only 
city in the County. The relationship between the two incumbents is best 
described as one of historical rivalry. 
LCB's market share was greatly eroded by MF when it introduced a 
comprehensive minibus network, an exercise that started before the full 
deregulation of the industry. Also LCB have had their fingers burnt when 
they ventured out to the county. [One of its subsidiary] lost E112 m. in just 
over a year [and was later acquired by MFJ. They went out with services in 
town Z, lost a fortune and pulled back (CD). LCB was said to have lost 
£2.5m. in the last four financial years.. . at a time when we have had to make 
profits (CD). Furthermore another difficulty with which we are working 
presently is their current Chairman, who still has a very strong anti-MF 
feeling from the days when he was the General. Manager of all City 
Transport as it was then (DGM2) to the extent that his heart is ruling his 
head and that is difficult to compete with (CD). These events play a 
particularly important role in MF's competitive behaviour with regard to its 
main competitor. 
MF's position, after it gained a big share of this market was not to strive to 
attain dominance. It could be characterised more in terms of waiting until 
some uncertainties regarding the competitor were resolved, that is, 
privatised. However, when an incumbent fails to meet certain targets for 
prolonged periods of time and if it faces exit barriers, there may be an 
incentive for it to seek new positions in the market (Porter, 1985). If these 
actions lead to increases in capacity in the form of duplication - as they have 
done in this case - at times when the rival incumbent is itself facing a 
decrease in demand -I think that the total market in [the city] has peaked and 
it is beginning to decline slightly again (CD) -, the consequences are that 
higher costs to both operations will result in no major advantages being 
passed on to users in general. That is, this sort of competition is of benefit to 
nobody (CD) for it destroys the ability of both operators to invest in the 
future of the industry and is very much against the interests of the travelling 
public (CD). 
As noted before, MF's main competitive strategy evolves around defending 
its core business by adopting courses of action according to the nature of the 
competitors. The response to LCB's repositioning strategy can be-seen to 
have been influenced by the way in-which MF perceived LCB's relative 
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strengths and weaknesses. These were mostly associated with LCB's legal 
status as it is illustrated in the following statements: I would call them a very 
poor second. MF operate at a higher degree of standards... 1 would say that 
their levels of commitment are not as high - they are still run by the council 
(DGM1); - if making a loss is not a particular concern to him... where do you 
go then? It is costing you a lot of money to compete with him and you still 
don't get rid of him (DGM2). It is in this context that for some members of MF 
the twin competing principles of resource balancing and the long term view 
must be addressed as - the balance has got to be what sort of resources you 
plough into offsetting the effects of the competition and is the competition on 
the same levels ie. privatised or nationalised. If it is a nationalised Company 
they have got an endless pot... whereas a privatised company would tend, to 
purely lose its profitability the more it ploughed in to offset the competition 
(DGM1). 
This view, together with the weakness identified in the competitor, has led to 
the decision of retaining our own status quo - own fares and services - and 
rely that the reliability factor, in the long run, will win the battle (DGM1). 
It becomes clear that LCB's strategy has had some effects on MF's 
underlying beliefs with regard to its competitive behaviour. As Porter 
(1985) pointed out, a leader that must undermine its past strategy to respond 
to the challenge faces mixed motives. As DGM 1 remarked - If someone 
attacks me then I will expect to take appropriate action, but, the competition 
has been affecting us now for some 18 months, and here we are just doing 
nothing... It goes against the grain... but here you have to take a longer term 
view (DGM1). 
It is not clear however whether this kind of restrained response by MF has 
influenced the recent decision of the rival incumbents to de-resource (FD) or 
indeed, it is not certain that LCB will not take similar actions in the future for 
they have not a clear pattern of reactions (CD). 
MF has however indicated that one way- of achieving a degree of 
compatibility between the total capacity of both operators and the size of the 
market would be some kind of compromise to be allowed to take place. But 
the OFT would say that it would be illegal to talk to your competitors (CD): 
However as Burke et a) (1988) suggested, gentlemanly kinds of agreements 
intended to prevent grosser forms of competition can all too easily turn into a 
cosy conspiracy against the consumer, or as Khan (1988) pointed out, 
impede other firms' opportunities to compete with them. 
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On the other hand, the privatisation of the municipal company can also be 
seen as a means of creating a more rational commercial environment. It 
could provide MF with an opportunity to achieve a monopoly position in this 
market via its acquisition. But it could also create, in the case of unsuccess, 
an opening for MF to define, assertively, its dominance in the market for - 
assuming somebody else buys it with a view of actually making a profit-they 
will have to do what we have had to do three years ago which was to take a 
number of vehicles out of the system, take a number of jobs out and get the 
company again to a slimmer, more efficient unit running only those routes 
that you can actually afford to (MD). 
There appears to be one common feature in the competitive attitude of this 
kind of incumbent with regard to the various dimensions of competition: the 
long term financial needs of the professional operators involves restricting 
competition from both the outside (via entry) and inside the industry. But as 
Kahn (1988) pointed out, -a single firm monopolist, even if highly effective 
and energetic innovator is unlikely to be able to perceive or vigorously to 
exploit all the possible unsatisfied kinds of demand or fruitful lines of 
innovation. 
8.3 Competition and Contestability: a final note 
A major aspect of the impact of a policy that placed paramount importance 
on the values of competition is the analysis of competitive events and of the 
behaviours that they have provoked. One way in which the major findings of 
both these areas of research can be analysed is by reference to the most 
significant attributes of the 1985 Transport Act, which can be summarized as 
'to make things equal so that they can become unequal'. 
The reason for 'making things equal' in the bus industry is basically 
associated with the fact that the industry is not a natural monopoly in the 
sense that there are few economies of scale relative to company size (Lee 
and Steedman, 1970), which means that there is no justification for 
impeding competition. In this context, legislation was introduced in 1985 
aimed at providing equitable means of access to the industry. This would 
lead to the much desired, direct link between suppliers and users. However, 
as Preston (1991) pointed out - it is the business of government to legislate 
for competition. It is the business of businesses to ensure that this does not 
happen - or if it does happen, to ensure it doesn't work... There are many 
ways in which things can become unequal. 
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Firstly, the multiproduct nature of bus-services can lead to one bus operator 
supplying a group of services more cheaply than if they were produced by 
two or more companies separately. Economies of scope constitute a 
potentially genuine source of cost differences between bus companies in the 
sense that they result in lower costs being achieved through the production 
fit between the requirements of a range of bus services. This inequality can 
however be limited in a contestable market by the possibility that other 
companies may be able to accommodate, in their different patterns of 
production scheduling, those services run by an incumbent that are enjoying 
these economies but that in the process are earning excessive profits. The 
role of economies of scope in sustaining one single company in a 
contestable market requires that company to price these services in a way 
that only permits it to recover its (lower) costs. However, this case study has 
indicated the practice of cross-subsidisation between services as a strategic 
instrument sometimes we don't worry too much. If there are sound strategic 
reasons to offset the commercial criteria (MD) and can arise-as a result of a 
non-differentiated fare structure. 
Secondly, this research has shown how an incumbent was able to use 
residual regulation during the transition period to seek additional 
advantages. However, it must be pointed out that there may be differences 
in the way in which incumbents were able to take advantage of this situation. 
As Meredith (1988) noted, the operating efficiency of NBC subsidiaries was 
higher than for the generality of other bus operators. They were more tightly 
run and potential interference was further away than PTEs and municipal's. 
Nonetheless, this case study. has confirmed that incumbents invariably 
focussed on those operating areas that recognizably offer greater returns, 
namely labour costs and the impact that a new product can have to revitalise 
pockets of potential demand. In the former there are indications that they 
were negotiated long before the central machinery broke up (Hargreaves, 
1988) and in the latter the increases in patronage generally associated with 
minibus networks were achieved before deregulation - most of the 
generation of new business came with minibus services which we really 
introduced during 1985 early 1986 (CD). 
It is unquestionable that these factors have played an important role in 
enhancing the position of . this company in the market. The potential 
advantages that 'late movers' might have had (eg. labour costs) were greatly 
reduced. ,.. 
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However, the extent to which things can become irremediably unequal 
depends on whether conditions are created in the industry for incumbents to 
be ' effectively challenged or feel that they could be by others operating on 
the fringes of their markets. This research has shown that actual competition 
has been met with predatory behaviour by the incumbent but also that the 
threat of entry plays a greater policing role than it has been assumed by 
other observers. However, it could be argued that competition is not 
rewarding reasonably competent competitors even if more some than 
others. The current system appears to be supporting the continued 
existence of potentially inefficient operators - namely those still owned by 
local authorities - and permitting competent operators to be wiped out of 
markets as a result of the progressive reconcentration in the industry. In fact, 
the incentive for predation appears to increase with the threat posed by the 
most effective competition when it seeks to challenge profitable parts of an 
incumbent's core business. 
However, throughout this study . one major and apparently contradictory 
issue has arisen. The findings of this case study have confirmed the 
evidence from other sources about the lack of widespread effective 
competition. Yet this incumbent shares the concern felt by others about their 
inability to attain returns capable of ensuring much needed capital 
investment in the industry. The most important factor has been identified as 
the need to over-provide (CD). This in effect means that incumbents carry 
excess capacity and/or that surplus capacity is not being kept idle. 
It is apparent from this case, that new entry is likely to draw retaliation by the 
incumbent in the form of predatory behaviour. The major concern about 
predatory practices is their effects on users. Although present users may 
benefit whilst such practices last (lower prices and/or higher output) future 
users may be harmed if they succeed. Furthermore, MF's success must be 
seen to constitute a signal to other potential entrants, for they are now aware 
that their main competitive entry features will, at least, be matched by the 
incumbent. As'a result, the entrant will effectively know that if he attempts 
entry both operators would simply lose revenue (Evans, 1991). For the 
proponents of contestability, however, all that suffices for market 
contestability is that there should be potential entrants with the authority to 
enter the market readily (Preston,, 1991). Additionally, for entry to constitute 
a threat it must be profitable for a certain period of time - no matter how short 
(Bailey, 1982). 
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According to Schweiterman and Schofer (1985), because of imperfect 
information, an operator may not choose the true-maximum profit 
characteristics of output, but instead operate within a profitable service-price 
region. If this profitable combination of price and service is large, it is 
relatively easy for a carrier to enter the industry and to make a profit. In this 
context, and despite retaliation, the opportunities for 'hit and run' type of 
incursions are enhanced. Also, the fact that an excess supply of fully 
depreciated buses in the second hand market exists, means that an entrant 
faces low entry costs. But as observed earlier, incumbents are resorting to 
the same market as a means of deterring entry, by reducing the scope of the 
profitable region to levels which in turn they claim do not sustain future 
investment needs. 
Kahn (1988) has defined a sick industry as one where, because demand 
has declined or ceased to grow, excess capacity arises because of an 
inelastic supply, and all or the preponderant proportion of firms in it are 
failing to cover their total costs, including a normal return on investment. He 
concludes that, interestingly, aggregate capacity in a sick industry is typically 
not idle, and it is the failure to keep it idle that makes it sick. 
In the context of the bus industry, it could be said that excess capacity is not 
being shed through effective competition - to a certain degree it does not 
exist - and it is likely that it will persist as long as incumbents pursue 
strategic entry deterrents of the type observed in this case study, or as long 
as the stock of used buses sustains the threat of entry. 
Nonetheless, the formation of large holding groups -a trend that has been 
associated with a reduction in competition - is not regarded by the 
proponents of contestability as an eliminator of efficiency and effectiveness 
as long as the threat of entry remains, which in the case of the bus industry 
must be seen as a question of it being able to survive. 
At the moment this threat is being sustained and to a great extent is 
dependent on the existence of low entry capital costs, that is, of cheap 
second hand buses, as it is acknowledged by MFs Managing Director - 
competition, / think, will always be there. There is always scope for the local 
guy to pick up a small garage somewhere and go out and buy cheap second 
hand buses. There is always ' an opportunity for him to do his little bit at a 
very much cheaper, cost base., But he will never be in a situation to afford to 
buy brand new buses F (MD). 
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Notwithstanding the- above, the scope for further reconcentration remains 
strong. - MF's Managing Director identified three main areas where 
opportunities for acquisitions can arise: 
Firstly, a lot of the 70 odd companies that went to management buy-outs 
have not done the right things and haven't got the sort of profit levels to 
reinvest or to maintain a secure future. These companies are going to run 
into difficulties or their main shareholders are in their mid-50s, in 2 to 4 years 
they will start to think -I actually want to sell the shares now (MD); secondly, 
there are a lot of small operators that developed post-deregulation.... that in 
the current economic climate are running into severe difficulties and at the 
moment I have people phoning me literally every day, wanting to sell-up 
(MD); finally, "there is still a large proportion of the bus industry in the UK that 
is still regulated (eg. and PTE's). If the next Government is actually 
Conservative and moves privatisation further, this will create phenomenal 
opportunities. This suggests that the shift away from on-the-road 
competition to board room competition (Oxford University Transport Studies 
Unit, 1990) noted during 1989 is likely to continue and lead to an increase in 
the power of a few large groups. 
The benefits of size are the usual economies of scale situation (MD) 
expressed by "the prospects of better financial dealings.... being able to 
exert more weight in fuel prices... the ability within a large group to invest in 
other aspects such as management development and training to provide the 
managers of the future (MD). Equally important is the realisation 
that... people will perceive MF as something different because it is now part 
of a major holding group which might deter anyone from having too much of 
ago at us" (MD). 
The major concern about the current trend towards reconcentration in the 
bus industry is that it can lead, in a non-contestable market, to a gradual 
erosion of the most beneficial changes achieved thus far. As Hay and 
Vickers (1987) suggested, creating alertness in dominant firms may not be 
the ability of entrants to replicate the activities of existing firms but their 
threats to introduce new and better ways of doing business that matters. But 
the advantages of lower operating costs attained in the industry can also be 
dissipated in low vehicle passenger loads as a result of competition or the 
threat of entry that does not lead to shedding excess capacity. (1) 
(1) According to Windle (1988) capital would have to be reduced by 50% to minimise the total cost of 
providing the industry's current service levels 
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Furthermore, as Windle (1988) remarked, a contraction in passenger miles 
within a fixed network will result in sharp increases in unit costs. This 
explains why MFs management considers that the replacement situation is 
going to be into larger vehicles (MD). That is, a sufficiently strong dominant 
position in a market provides an incentive to reap the benefits of economies 
of network. As Windle suggested, unit costs decline as passenger miles 
increase by increasing capacity through larger buses, holding load factors, 
average speed, average trip length and route miles constant. Finally, it 
should also be noted that greater pressures in operating costs will arise if 
the levels of road congestion continue to increase. This situation is further 
aggravated in the face of declining or constant levels of patronage - 
currently, the way things (congestion) are going, we may have to increase 
resources just to match current usage (DGM 1). 
The operating rationale of the bus industry was for nearly 30 years 
determined by political considerations. The change of policy in 1985 has 
not eliminated this link. Four years of experience have on the contrary 
highlighted the unease in the relationship between competition and 
regulation. Furthermore, they have exposed the vulnerability of the 
industry's product to its substitutes and its inability to attenuate this situation 
without political interference. Competition between operators may in effect 
be over due to acquisitions, but competition from product substitutes remains 
strong. 
The future of the bus industry, remains politically dependent but not in the 
sense that there is further control of the provision of bus services (CD). The 
kind of intervention that is envisaged is rather one that ought to be directed 
towards seeking to ensure profits within the industry (CD). From an 
incumbent's point of view this requires raising, statutory barriers to entry - 
some sort of parameter that is required (for entry to be, permitted) eg. a 
target for profit that an operation is required to, achieve (CD) 
There is, however, one progressive, way of: envisaging, the role of 
Government in the future of the bus industry: - to, stimulate interest in public 
transport for long term purposes . 
(DGM1),, for. the more people we drive 
away from using public transport in all forms, the less people are getting 
educated from using public transport in the future, (DGM1).. 
This view is shared_ by, others: for example, Hayward, (1991 ) contends that 
the task of changing the downgrade perception of public transport must start 
in schools, for children are the future potential 
, 
users.. In his view, 17 and 18 
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year olds must be made aware of the effects that the current trends in traffic 
congestion can cause on the quality of life. 
8.4 Organisational Leadership and Culture 
The concept of corporate culture has attracted considerable interest in 
recent literature to the extent that it has been seen to play an important role 
in the performance of companies. Culture has been associated with the 
values, beliefs and principles that form the framework in which management 
practices and behaviours evolve. At the same time, the leadership of 
organisations is seen to constitute the key instrument for the creation and/or 
support for a family of concepts (Pettigrew, 1979) which, in successful 
companies, are said to be in harmony with the visions of their leaders. 
Although Bennis and Nanus' study (1985) of 90 leaders in the US implied 
that success was related to the fact that all these leaders had a clear sense 
of the direction that the organisation should take, Pettigrew (1979) observed 
that visions also represent the system of beliefs that uses a distinctive 
language to define roles, activities, challenges and purposes and in so 
doing help to create the patterns of meanings and consciousness defined as 
organisational culture. 
This research has identified various dimensions of the belief system that 
characterised the organisational settings prior to the deregulation and partial 
privatisation of the bus industry. It did not attempt to quantify it in relation to 
organisational efficiency and effectiveness, although the general tendency is 
to associate the negative trends in the industry in that era with some of the 
characteristics of the belief system. It is nonetheless apparent that 
regulatory control has created a framework in which company leaders 
lacked the space with which to lead (Bryman 1989a), but also one in which 
they showed the inability to peer over the onrush of administrative demands 
emanating from various quarters, and therefore the lack of opportunity to ask 
fundamental questions about direction, mission, goals and routes (Bennis, 
1976). This situation was clearly acknowledged by MFs Managing Director: 
... without being disrespectful to bus company people, they have been in the 
industry all their lives and to be honest they haven't really got a profit ethic. 
It could be argued that a change to a more commercial environment would 
inevitably expose a system of beliefs designed to legitimise the prosecution 
of fundamentally different and often contradictory goals. However, the 
realisation of the extent of the cultural discrepancies must be seen in this 
case in the context that two of the senior organisation Directors were new to 
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the industry and that the Managing Director was described as -the 
entrepreneurial force in the Company, which, conventionally is associated 
with risk-taking. This was clearly in evidence in MFs Managing Director's 
statement about the effects that incoming members from acquired 
companies have had on the values of the industry's grown management - ... 
the guys that we have learnt a lot from these guys who knew what it is like on 
the other side of the fence without a big brother behind and a large bank 
account giving them buses whenever they want (MD). 
Although successful companies are those where a relationship is said to 
exist between culture and leadership visions, this discussion is concerned 
with the way in which such a relationship was seen to have been achieved 
for the philosophy and the culture of the company works (MD). Visions are 
not detailed plans and can be envisaged as long term assertions of a 
company's direction. However, as Tichy and Devanna's study (1986) of 12 
chief executives showed, leaders must also be prepared to force through 
the practical ramifications of their visions, or as Handy (1989) suggested, 
they must make sense to others: relate to people's work and be responsive 
to the needs and views of others. The profitability of MFs existing core 
business, essential to its current survival, is also crucial as revenue 
generator for the prosecution of its leadership's strategy based on growth by 
acquisition. 
The crucial element for the formation of a new culture in MF was the 
introduction of the depot approach - ... the culture of the company is now that 
there is a profit centre management who is running the garage (MD). The 
restructuring of organisational variables that followed was not intended as a 
question of putting new rules and regulations to restrict people. It (was) just 
getting culturally the people to think in terms of working as a team, within a 
team, within a garage. At the end öf the day it is the profitability of the whole 
garage that counts (MD) and ... we attempt to involve people, listen to views, 
agreeing strategy (MD). 
The role of the Depot General Managers was thus crucial for the adoption, 
acceptance and spreading of a distinctively different set of values that the 
leadership of MF sought to establish. In, this context, this research has 
, shown that Depot General . 
Managers were encouraged to suppress 
management styles (autocratic and participative) whose characteristics were 
not entirely in accordance with the new ways of doing things. It is thus not 
surprising to note that the new culture comes from the top down (MD) in the 
sense that - the guy thinks -I actually know now what the criteria is that I will 
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be measured against. What my job really is. Now 1 have got to make sure 
the fitter knows precisely the same (MD). It could be concluded that the 
most important cultural feature in MFs reform of management practices 
comprised of instilling a profit ethic based on financial discipline which for 
all purposes represents an important vehicle used by the leadership to 
inspire others to greater achievement (Bryman, 1984). It is in effect a 
sufficiently broad and flexible concept capable of accommodating the more 
entrepreneurial beliefs of newcomers but also of inspiring bus industry 
members of the organisation to commit their expertise to the achievement of 
higher goals. 
It is also important to note that the leadership was determined to expand the 
new cultural base within the company. This commitment was expressed in 
the recruitment of newcomers, eg. DGM1 described his past 
professional experience as =a trouble shooter ... I used to go round 
into problematic areas, introduce new systems and try to make 
unprofitable areas into profitable ones (DGM1) and 
ii in the criteria for acquisitions - the companies that we get involved in 
are small operations, usually a guy who has an entrepreneurial spirit 
... has got his own culture which is running your own business ... is 
very much profit motivated ... the guy who has a profit ethic who 
knows what he is doing. When we get involved with other companies 
we are not really interested unless the managers are there because 
their culture is right (MD). 
Finally this research has indicated that the categorization of leadership into 
two main mutually exclusive group - 'transactional' and 'transformational' - 
may not necessarily be appropriate in all circumstances. Transactional 
leaders are described as those that "reward subordinates for successfully 
attaining goals set by the leader" whereas Transformational leaders 
"provide organization members with the environment in which they become 
fully committed" (Bryman, 1989). MF's leaders showed both these 
characteristics, although the emphasis during the most uncertain and 
volatile period (soon after 1985) was on creating environmental 
compatibility, whereas presently the attainment of objectives plays a greater 
role. That is, Transactional and Transformational kinds of leadership 
appear to interact even though certain characteristics are more visible than 
others at different stages of organizational life. 
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This chapter has analysed the most important elements of competition - 
conditions of entry (exiting rules and pre-deregulation effects) and 
competitive activity (actual entry, the threat of entry and a case of rivalry 
between two incumbents) - in the context of the case studied. Furthermore, 
it established major links between the findings and the aims and 
expectations of the 1985 Transport legislation. Finally, it addressed the role 
that organizational leadership and culture has played in the forum of change 
observed in this case study. 
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Part IV 
Chapter 9: Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
The case study research of MF consisted of a detailed study of change at the 
level of one bus operator in response to a new operating and regulatory 
environment. 
In the first part of this research the main opposing ideas of the debate 
surrounding the most radical public policy of bus transport in the UK in the 
last 30 years were presented and discussed. Concomitantly, the most 
relevant areas of organization theory were reviewed. Together, 
contestability and organization theories formed the general framework in 
which the impact of deregulation on the strategic adaptation mechanisms of 
this bus operator were investigated. It is in this context that this research has 
covered several dimensions of change. 
The first main area of analysis comprised corporate strategy formation and 
considered MF's business philosophy concerning its output and 
organizational matters. The second area focussed on various aspects of the 
management of change, that is, on the way in which MF decided to compete 
in the public transport business. The main functional areas were considered 
as well as the main trends in the company's competitive behaviour. 
The description of behaviours and evidence, their interpretation in the light 
of theoretical propositions and of other empirical evidence, and an emphasis 
on the innovative aspects as seen from the data collected, were the main 
methodological elements used to enhance the general knowledge and 
understanding of a deregulated bus industry, from the point of view of one 
bus operator. 
Many conclusions have been drawn in the course of this research. 
However, the four most important contributions to knowledge can be 
summarized as follows: 
1 Corporate Issues 
The main conclusion of this part of the research is the recognition of the 
strong commitment shown. by MF in relation to a successful industry. 
Despite the fact that bus operators are searching for corporate interests 
outside the industry (MF is no exception), the evidence is that there is a 
genuine concern about the : issues associated with deregulation. More 
importantly, this concern focuses on the ways in which the deregulation 
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policy can evolve and be improved in order to achieve many of its 
proclaimed goals. That is, from an operator perspective, deregulation 
appears to be an accepted principle even though it is generally recognised 
to be in need of some form of evolution. 
2 Organizational Issues 
The main reason for studying organizational issues was to understand the 
link between what MF set out to achieve and how it was guided to achieving 
it. The roles of leadership and of a new organizational culture were in 
evidence throughout this case study and the most visible change in the post 
deregulated company - the depot approach - was analysed extensively. 
The depot approach appears to be the most common organizational change 
that has occurred in the industry since deregulation. The general aim of this 
change is to contribute to reducing environmental uncertainty. However, this 
research has shown that it also has organization-wide implications and that 
it brings to the fore many issues that are, in effect, common to divisionalised 
structures In any industry. The contribution of this project has been to 
provide an understanding of the way in which these issues have been dealt 
with (or left unanswered by) within the specific context of the bus industry. 
The structural characteristic that emerged to accommodate the new role of 
the depots is akin to the loosely coupled type of system described by Aldrich 
(1979). Furthermore, there is implicit support for Mintzberg's (1989) view 
that it is the centralisation of power within divisions that is most compatible 
with a divisionalised form of structure, to the extent that MF's depots are 
clearly loosely coupled but also each is tightly coupled internally. Two main 
issues associated with this type of organisational setting have emerged 
throughout this research: 
1 Coordination amongst depots may be difficult to attain thus limiting the 
scope for the gains that can accrue from interrelationships. As Porter 
(1985) asserted, nothing compels coordination among business units, 
whilst the functions within a business unit must coordinate in order to do 
business and business unit managers may jealously guard their turf. A 
number of factors can contribute to the emergence of this type of 
situation. Porter suggests that business units separated geographically 
can, have difficulty achieving the ongoing coordination to , make 
interrelationships a success and points out that if there are differences of 
skills and 'types of management between units, contacts may be 
uncomfortable or strained. Furthermore, the disparity of operating 
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procedures and environmental characteristics between business units 
can reduce generic similarities and thus the scope for the exchange of 
know-how. 
This research has shown that depot general managers exercise 
considerable control over their operations and are aware that their 
personal aspirations within the company depend on the performance 
achieved by the depot that they manage. However, it has also become 
clear that the way in which interrelations have evolved, are perceived 
differently by the depot general managers. DGM1, a newcomer to the 
industry stated that there is no systematic feeding of ideas between 
General Managers - one may implement one thing that may be 
appropriate to another depot which may eventually reach the same 
solution whereas DGM2's opinion is that there is as much cooperation 
as there needs to be. DGM3 in turn, points out that I am really the odd 
one out, because I don't operate double decker vehicles. I am a bit of a 
loner in many ways. The others liaise more between themselves than 
with me. Furthermore, this case study has also shown that the 
relationships between newcomers to the industry and 'busmen' is not an 
easy one - the relationships between depot general managers is very 
much between busmen general managers and non-busmen general 
managers. Once I suggested that the depot general managers could 
meet more regularly on their, own to feed each other with ideas and 
discuss problems. This was agreed by the two non-busmen but fell on 
'deaf ears' (DGM1). It should also be noted that the scope for 
interrelationships between depot general managers may be further 
diminished as a result of the hierarchy that was established namely that 
there is no single Director responsible for all the depot general 
managers. However, the issues raised herein must be put into 
perspective. In fact, there needs to be a balance between the costs of 
improving and sustaining inter-relationships and the benefits that may 
accrue as a result. -, 
2 Aldrich (1979) pointed out that loose coupling may permit greater self 
determination by persons in organisational subunits thus raising levels of 
involvement and generating a greater sense of efficiency among them. 
Furthermore. in environments changing in unpredictable ways, the only 
route, to survival may be through granting a great deal of self- 
determination to members in positions having an immediate grasp of 
external events. ,. 
These views are clearly relevant to the case studied. 
Depot General Managers showed keen concern about the most efficient 
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and effective way of using their resources given the specific 
environmental demands that they face. Also, the reformulation of the 
organisational framework must be seen to have enhanced innovation as 
a means to attain higher levels of achievement. A critical factor in this 
process is the positioning of key members of the organisation (re: Depot 
General Managers) empowered to make decisions with regard to both 
market events and production responses. That is, as Stalk (1988) 
pointed out, organisation structures should enable fast responses for 
today's new generation of companies compete with flexible production 
and rapid response systems, expanding variety and increasing 
innovation. The reduction in time consumption between an event 
occurring in the market - be it the creation of new demand or a move by a 
competitor - and the response in terms of product development must 
therefore be seen as one important contribution of the organisational 
changes, based on the depot approach, observed in this case study. 
3 Operating Issues 
This research has not, however, concentrated solely on the role of 
organisational factors in order to study strategic change in the bus industry. 
It has also analysed in detail areas of managerial involvement that have not 
been documented before in the context of the new environment in the 
industry. As Patton (1987) pointed out in the examination of the impact of 
policy, case studies are increasingly recognised as having an important role 
since they are able illuminate the effects of implementation on everyday 
activities. It is in this context that a set of operational subjects was included 
in this research (ie. production, design and pricing of bus services). The 
1985 transport legislation generated many expectations with regard to 
changes in the operating methodologies of bus operators. The research 
undertaken in MF has revealed and to a certain degree confirmed the 
evidence of other studies concerning innovative aspects of operations. 
However, it has also exposed the continued existence of practices usually 
associated with the past and which were part of the argument in favour of 
deregulation. 
The emphasis 1) on the need to achieve cumulative cost savings compatible 
with the quality of services (including the elimination of the 'us' (Traffic) and 
'them' (Maintenance) syndrome, 2) on the requisites of product integration 
(drivers scheduling and the supply, of other products) and 3) on the 
decentralization of operational matters, must be seen to constitute important 
departures from old practices. - 
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However, 1) the limited market analysis observed in this case study, 2) the 
continued cross-subsidization between services - if only practised for 
different reasons, 3) the inability to compete with private transport, and 4) the 
non-adoption of a more differentiated fare structure, constitute operational 
characteristics that have prevailed despite the changes brought about by the 
1985 policy framework. 
4 Competition 
This research has analysed in some detail the competitive behaviour of a 
typical incumbent. The analysis was undertaken within the framework of a 
number of postulates concerning the conditions of access to the industry 
(institutional and pro-deregulation) and covered three major areas which are 
crucial (and controversial) aspects associated with the policy of deregulation 
- a) actual competition, b) the threat of entry, and c) competition between 
incumbents. 
Actual competition 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the competitive events analysed in 
Chapter 8 can be summarized according to: 
sources of success / failure 
the scope of competitiveness in the market 
the effects of subsequent dominance of the market. 
The study of actual competition has shown that failure is strongly related to 
disequilibrium in the two main sectors of the productive process - Traffic and 
Maintenance (the case of LCB). On the other hand, failure in the case of an 
operator that is recognizably efficient and effective (the case of Kinch) but 
small in size, is the result of the conjunction of a number of factors, namely: 
1 Predatory behaviour on the part of the bigger operator by simultaneously 
matching fares and frequencies. 
2 The fact that the bigger operator possesses or has access to wider 
resources (eg. by belonging to a major transport group). 
3 The existence of high, barriers to exit encourages an intransigent 
defence of what the competitor regards as its own business. 
4 The fact that competition is limited to only a few routes that are part of a 
wider network run by the competitor. 
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However, this research has indicated that there are a number of factors 
capable of increasing the competitiveness of a market, namely if the 
following two conditions occur simultaneously: 
1 Competition occurs on an independent route in a low-income area so 
that users do not have to benefit and/or pay for connecting services, and 
2 There is little product differentiation (reliability and frequencies) but there 
are differences in fares, for high fare elasticities reduce the 
tendency of passengers to board the first bus that arrives when a 
cheaper alternative is available within a short space of time. 
Notwithstanding this scope for market competitiveness, the fact is that the 
outcome of the events observed in this case study was the monopolisation of 
the local market. However, the level of fares did not rise soon after 
competition ended. The major deterrent being the detrimental effects on the 
reputation of the new monopolist. Furthermore, the quality of services did 
not deteriorate substantially as competition was, in this case, fought on 
matching timings rather than on high frequencies. 
The threat of entry 
This research has portrayed an incumbent strongly committed to deterring 
new entrants. Soon after deregulation the incumbent envisaged carrying 
excess capacity but afterwards the concern about potential entry was 
expressed by the need to close gaps in the market - even if this led to 
over-provision - and to avoid overpricing its services - even if this meant 
cross-subsidisation. 
The consequences that the threat of entry had on the incumbent were that: 
1) overprovision reduced the benefits of economies of scope that MF 
claimed to be enjoying - services may have all been nicely bedded in 
(DGM1) but . this may have been based on higher than necessary 
frequencies; and 2) charging lower fares than those that reflected the higher 
costs of overprovision meant that in the well-protected areas of the network, 
passengers were paying more than the costs of services that they used. 
The combination of these two effects means that MF was unable to meet its 
capital replacement needs ; and was forced to resort to purchasing 
second-hand buses in an attempt to lower its costs. 
The threat of entrywas also felt in the tender market. The calls by MF for 
longer-term contracts and for clauses that required certain types of vehicles 
as well as new ' ones , must be seen as an attempt to deter 'hit and run' 
206 
incursions. It is noticeable that MF had an easier and potentially more 
favourable access to finance than a smaller, less resourceful operator. At 
the same time the benefit that can accrue to an incumbent from the 
requirement of having to use new buses on tender services is that it can 
earn a guaranteed return and still enable it to renew its fleet. 
Competing Incumbents 
The case studied was one of rivalry between two incumbents - MF and LCB. 
It was a case of permanent market tension due, in great part, to the fact that 
both had high exit barriers. This case of rivalry was also associated with a 
background of declining market demand. That is, demand had recognizably 
peaked, and had brought an additional source of conflict, for demand was 
increasingly unable to sustain the profitability of two comprehensive 
networks. As in other instances, the strategy of the private incumbent was to 
wait until the Municipal rival was privatized. The expectation was that 
whatever the outcome of privatization, it would lead to a clearer and 
expectedly more advantageous situation (re: the need for a major 
rationalization of the rival's operations). 
Overall conclusion 
This research has shown that, despite all the proclaimed advantages to 
incumbents (namely those of pre-deregulation) and the market dominance 
attained by incumbent operators, overprovision is significant and is 
sustained by cross-subsidization. There is also an underlying concern 
about avoiding direct competition. Actual entry is not occurring on the scale 
that could effectively shed excess capacity and ensure that the industry's 
product is produced at minimum cost. Potential entry, on the other hand, 
appears to be playing an important disciplinary role and the main issue is 
how to maintain, reinforce and make it more effective in the face of the 
barriers that incumbents build to avoid its materialization. One of the most 
important effects of the present situation is that the industry is not renewing 
its capital base at the required rate. It is true that the lack of investment has 
been a chronic problem in the industry, but it must also be pointed out that in 
the current deregulated environment, the scope for government intervention 
in this field has not diminished.. The renewal of fleets and the concomitant 
generation of more intense, -effective competition may require institutional 
arrangements which encourage new entry (on a bigger scale) via 
longer-term contracts that demand the use of new buses. This would 
strengthen the resources of new operators, provide them with experience of 
the market and enable them to challenge more effectively, in the longer term, 
the position of slow-innovative incumbents. 
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Finally, it must be stressed that part of the waste of resources that occurs in 
the industry at present is attributable to traffic congestion. The role of public 
authorities in this area is crucial and the benefits that accrue to all bus 
operators from a reduction in the levels of congestion are undisputable. 
This research has shown that there have been significant changes in one 
company of the bus industry which would not have been possible without a 
break with the entrenched regulatory regime. However, it has also shown 
the need for regulators to remain attentive to developments in the industry, 
for as Kahn (1988) noted, regulatory agencies do not establish rules of 
conduct that last forever; they are supposed, within the limit of the law and of 
fair and prudent administration, to adapt their rules and practices to the 
nation's needs. 
Future research needs 
In terms of the examination of the impact of the 1985 transport policy, it is 
clear that one case study does not allow a generalisation of its results. 
However, this type of research has proved to be an important means of 
identifying patterns of response and theoretical linkages that have valuable 
implications for future institutional areas of intervention. In this context, this 
research has established a methodological framework for the study of other 
cases aimed at understanding supply side behaviour in a deregulated 
environment. Further research in other parts of the UK would inevitably lead 
to different and varied trends. It would nonetheless constitute a valuable 
input to the debate concerning the extend of further regulation in the bus 
industry. 
From an organisational point of view, the analysis of the impact of the depot 
approach could be extended to include an investigation of the process of 
strategic decision-making and of the criteria and the ways in which they are 
arrived at. This area of research could lead to a clearer understanding of the 
corporate role and the role of the new corporate culture. It could also 
establish the gains resulting from abandoning the traditional feature of one 
single corporate member in control of all business units. Furthermore, the 
wave of bus company acquisitions raises a number of organisational issues 
that are new to the industry's management. Research could help document 
some of these issues, particularly the identification of the objectives of these 
acquisitions and the effectiveness of the integration processes that followed. 
From a bus operator's standpoint, there is a need to mould many of the 
operational topics of previous research to the new kind of environmental 
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requirements and opportunities facing bus companies. Research could 
focus on identifying the most effective cost saving practices in areas of 
labour productivity and of peak costs. In the latter, research could 
concentrate on assessing the ways in which the present method of 
subsidisation available to bus operators may be used to ease current 
problems without having to adopt a comprehensive franchise system (eg. 
forcing tenders for the least rewarding peak services). Equally important is 
the instrumental role of future research in investigating product strategies 
(eg. the design of bus services) aimed at halting the persistent decline in 
passenger traffic. 
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15. Organizational issues - reasons for changes - internal 
external 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
form of organization structure 
targets for subunits - decentralisation 
participation 
personal methods of decision-making 
implementation strategies 
21. The role of marketing 
22. Cost reductions - labour 
- maintenance 
- measures to counter effects 
23. Service Design 
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24. Setting fares - who 
- how 
- fare structure 
25. Vehicle replacement 
- financing 
- who and how influential 
- types of vehicles 
26. Competition - characteristics of competitors 
- responses to sudden increase in competition 
27. Strategies to deal with near-insolvency situation 
28. Strategies to fight a take-over bid. 
- general 
- contract services 
- commercial 
network 
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2.2 Interview Guide 
0.1 When was your company privatised? 
0.2 As you know, general economic policies bear a great influence on the major 
strategic decisions that are made at company level. The cost of borrowing is 
certainly a major factor in such decisions. 
What major opportunities have been foregone as a result of the potential burden 
of interest payments? 
e. g. establishing a sounder market position/permitting further expansion in 
related and/or unrelated business areas. 
To what extent do current financial demands on your company's assets further 
inhibit borrowing the additional funds required for adopting some of these 
strategies? e. g. 
Would you say- that there are significant financial pressures e. g., 
a "heavy scheduled debt repayments "-, which place important limits on your 
company's borrowing capability? 
Would you say - that current performance and expectations - e. g., current and/or 
projected profit levels - do not facilitate further financial commitments? 
0.3 The 1985 Transport Act sets out a number of rules aimed at regulating the 
functioning of the market. 
I would like to focus on some specific areas of the legislation. 
Registration. 
The period of time required before any changes in services can be implemented 
can cause some degree of uncertainty to the exact timing of when resources can 
be deployed. 
To what extent has this ruling interfered with your planning process? 
1. NOT OFTEN 
intensive efforts have been taken to avoid technical errors - To what extent 
has this led to higher administrative costs? 
Traffic Commissioner has shown a flexible approach in the application of the 
legislation. - Do, you consider that this is the result of the wider discretionary 
powers given to the T. C. in the recent ammendments to the Act? 
Why? - it has meant speedier decisions and these have been essentially 
unbiased. 
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2. OFTEN 
problems in the internal administrative arrangements 
Traffic Commissioner's attitudes and performance. - The amendments made 
to the 1985 Act gave the T. C. considerable discretionary powers for applying 
the legislation. Why do you think that these measures have not achieved the 
results that were expected (to bring more flexibility into the system)? 
- introduced excessive subjectivity to the decision process. 
Tendering Process 
To what extent has the new method for subsidising services affected your 
company? 
1. NO 
- information required is simple and easy to gather. 
2. YES 
- excessive information required by the authorities 
- considerable overlapping of commercial and tendered services (which has 
led to a significant increase in administrative intensity). 
0.4 To what extent has the local authority taken the initiative (or supported your 
initiatives) to deter the use of private transport in your area? 
1. Satisfactory intervention How? - restricting parking facilities - encouraging 
park/ride initiative - creating bus lanes. 
2. Unsatisfactory record. Is there any specific reason for such behaviour? 
- historic reasons - lack of resources to monitor trends. 
0.5 In 1985, the percentage of households with regular use of one car in the East 
Midlands was approximately 50% - the highest in the U. K. What have been 
the major strategies that you have adopted to try and capture this market? 
- use of minibuses. - What are the main characteristics of your minibus 
operations that make you believe will succeed in attracting car users into your 
services? high frequency/improved accessibility - aspects that are most 
valued by those who use cars. To which part of this segment do you attach 
more importance? peak or off peak travel. Why? (cost of provision) Have 
you ever considered promoting your services with the main employers who 
provide extensive parking facilities for their employees? 
0.6 What have been the other major strategies that your company has developed to 
increase patronage? 
- quantity and quality improvements (re-routing services to penetrate 
housing estates, hail and ride operations). 
It is clear that the market is composed of different people who have different 
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transport needs. Has your company 
-, focussed on developing separate strategies to meet these different needs? - 
providing services which have distinct characteristics (e. g. limited stop services) 
to cater for the different customer segments (e. g. the elderly/the commuter/the 
young/the suburban housewife) - which of these segments does your company 
regard as having the most prospects of growth? 
or 
- has your company developed as a territorial provider? - provide an extensive, 
high frequency network. 
0.7 What is the range of services that your company provides? 
bus services: % commercial and tendered, express services, private hire, 
excursions, engineering related, others. 
0.8 What do you believe constitute the most outstanding features of your company's 
standing in these markets? i. e., 
Does your company strive to transmit distinctive signals to the market that 
differentiates it from other operators? 
- by being the lower cost provider 
- by continually trying to create something that is perceived as being unique 
- by trying to perfect a system introduced by some other operator. 
0.9 It is important for operators to have an idea about how the public perceive their 
services. 
Which particular aspect(s) do you believe your company is better known for? 
- Reputation (being responsive to changes in demand, possess a good 
community relation, open to criticism) 
- Product Quality (providing a reliable service, having friendly drivers, 
maintaining vehicles clean, providing frequent services) 
- Price (practice prices which provide good value for money). 
0.10 What were in your opinion the most important factors that have contributed to the 
current market position of your company? i. e., 
To what extent does the current market situation of your company reflect the 
extent of recent changes - own efforts and/or events in the market since 1986 - 
and how much can it be attributed to your company's record at the time of 
privatisation? 
e. g. 
- already providing good quality services or - patronage declining fast 
- financially stable or - facing increasing financial difficulties 
- valuable assets or - assets deteriorating fast 
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- staff attitudes and behaviour were in accordance with new demands 
or major obstacles to achieve improvements (low staff morale, unionised staff) 
- intensive competition which significantly strained resources - or lack of 
significant competition which permitted a smooth establishment in the market. 
Would you say that, as a whole, the expectations that you held at the time of 
privatisation fairly reflect your current market situation? 
Q. 11 A recent study of 113 operators - around 1/2 of which were former NBC - showed 
pre-tax profit margins at about 3% for the period 1986/87, and some of the 
managing directors expressed the view that a return of less than 10% would be 
unsatisfactory for funding future needs. 
Do you consider that the recent trends and characteristics of the bus industry 
constitute a sufficient assurance to meet your targets of growth? 
Do you think that the industry is in general decline? - meaning a shrinkage 
and/or a shift in consumer demand 
or 
Do you see the industry as being turbulent? - where changes follow a pattern of 
cyclical variations around a stable income 
or 
Do you believe that above all, there are good opportunites in the market that 
have not yet been fulfilled? - existing areas of operation orin other geographical 
markets? 
0.12 Has your company expanded geographically? 
1. YES 
By own development or by acquisition? 
1.1 By acquisition 
Why has the decision to expand resulted in an acquisition rather than by internal 
development? 
- exploit better utilization of the other company's resources 
- acquire additional capacity to use immediatedly (there were physical and 
organizational limitations which constrained the efficiency and speed at which 
the firm could acquire those resources separately and put them together). 
What were the main aims of the acquisition(s)? 
- increase market shares and at the same time prevent a competitor from 
increasing its share of the market 
- obtain business in a new territory, new markets and utilize resources more 
fully. 
- take advantage of potential economies of network utilization and configuration 
from joint productions. 
- acquire valuable freehold land and properties (sell and take back on lease, 
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gain capital profit and acquire substantial holding of cash to be reinvested in 
other assets). 
What do you think are the most important factors to overcome in the integration 
process? 
- establish consistent general policies 
- revise administrative structure: coordinate procedures 
- integrate personnel 
- establish scope of responsibilities and authority. 
An expansion involves widening the range of services which some people argue 
can cause increased difficulties in maintaining high quality standards. A more 
homogenous environment on the other hand permits greater concentration of 
efforts on specific needs and thus assures a superior quality product. 
Would you like to comment on this statement? 
1.2 By own development 
Why has your company decided to expand by own development? 
- the spread of cost is more favourable and realistic 
- cash or sufficient standing forborrowing were not available 
- minimize disruption to other activities and avoid behavioural problems 
- no real attractive company in the market to acquire. 
2. NO 
Has your company decided to serve only the most important markets and 
embarked on a disinvestment programme? 
What have been the major causes and consequences of such a policy? 
- to lessen capital needs 
- to make the environment more homogeneous - thus simpler and more 
standardized. 
- reduce the level of services - operating a limited service (at the times that 
demand is high - but not necessarily at the highest - and the cost of provision is 
low? ) 
- upgraded the quality of services 
An expansion usually results in a company being able to widen the scope of its 
business of reaching new markets and thus exploring new opportunities. 
Would you like to comment on this statement? 
Q. 13 The process of supplying bus services often creates idle resources and at the 
same time involves the production of valuable specialised services which need 
not be increased proportionately for larger ourputs. 
Maintenance work constitutes a specialised service with real potential for 
development and a source of extra revenue. 
Has your company considered the opportunity to further develop this or other 
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apparently advantageous factors associated with your business activity? 
1. YES 
To what extent has this policy contributed to enhance your company's market 
position? 
" significant source of revenues 
- enhanced reputation 
- created more than expected problems - sychronization and priority problems. 
2. NO 
- "the smaller the output, the less resources can be used in a specialised 
manner" 
- there are no satisfactory market conditions in the local environment. 
0.14. As you are aware, many bus companies have decided to diversify their output, 
whether this be related to the supply of bus services or not. 
Has your company ever considered this course of action? Why? 
1. NO 
Wouldn't you agree that 
- producing a single product makes a company more exposed to extreme 
occurrences? - major shift in consumer demand 
" producing different products increases the flexibility in which resources can be 
used? - being able to cross-subsidise and if needed use some form of predatory 
pricing to enhance its market share in a particular product area? 
- the fluctuations in earnings that occur in the bus industry can be lessened by 
finding other products which can be produced in the periods when demand for 
the major product is low and which do not conflict with the ability to take full 
advantage of opportunities when demand is high 
- e. g. products that can be produced in the "off season" using some of the 
existing resources and that can be abandoned in the peak season in favour of 
the major product? 
- your profits could increase at a more rapid rate than the existing products 
permit? - and thus allocate investments to alternative uses. 
2. YES 
Wouldn't you agree that 
- product diversification absorbs significant amounts of cash reserves and that 
those may be needed on a continuous basis? - sustain a rate of investment to 
keep up with competition in the various fields. 
- entering into a new field, scarcely known, constitutes a risk? e. g. 
profit margins can drop drastically as total capacity exceeds demand. 
- the length of time to move into profits once a new product is launched involves 
severe losses in the first years and that this can be terminal? 
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0.15 I would like to concentrate now on the issue of organizational change. I would 
like to start by focussing on the major reasons or impetus that led to the changes I 
assume have taken place in your company since privatisation. 
1. Significant changes 
Let us firstly consider the influence of internal issues or pressures that might have 
somehow contributed to the changes. 
Could you identify the most important ones? 
Would you say that the changes were needed to: 
- accommodate redefined priorities - from a technical organization to a more 
market-oriented one. 
- accommodate the size of the organization - to meet the growth (to deal with a 
merger/contraction in the company's activities). 
- improve communication channels and facilitate the processing of information or 
other inputs for decision-making purposes? change administrative system and 
procedures to enhance problem-solving ability. 
- redefine management levels at which problems were handled - decisions could 
be taken at lower levels without detrimental effects to their quality/change span 
of control. 
Let us turn now to the external forces. Could you identify the most important 
ones? e. g. 
Would you say that the changes were needed to: 
- deal more promptly with the variations in the external environment 
- accommodate new/different work patterns that emerged as a result of a more 
complex environment - i. e. the more complex environment exposed the 
inadequancy of important aspects in the existing organizational form (e. g. 
planning and control systems needed radical changes). 
2. Limited changes 
Why? e. g. 
Would you say that: 
- the pace of change in the industry has not allowed the introduction of major 
changes 
there is a satisfactory interlocking between the environmental demands and the 
form of your organization. 
0.16 How is the current structure of your organization differentiated? 
functionatldepartmentalized/divisionalised/other. 
Which specific feature has been introduced in your company's organizational 
process which in your opinion reflect the commitment to reduce environmental 
uncertainty? 
- the establshment of separate centres which has permitted a superior/closer 
scrutiny of the environment (led to quicker responses to individual market 
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demands). 
- the introduction of "institutionalised" links between market "agents" and 
decision making centres. 
0.17 What kind of targets are set for the subunits? 
Is the emphasis on results or on procedures? 
Are they basically expressed in financial terms or are they based on "conceptual" 
principles? 
Who is involved in the definition of the targets? 
- set by the board and translated into specific objectives for the subunits 
- wider involvement. 
To what extent are the targets set for the different subunits differentiated 
according to their different market conditions? 
What kind of resources are put under the control of the subunits? 
- produce and/or sell the services 
To what extent are the subunits dependent on decisions over issues that affect 
them but over which they have no control? 
" pricing strategies, investment requirements i. e. factors that may constrain the 
attainment of their targets. 
i. e. 
What sort of decision-making has been decentralised and what sort remains 
centralised? e. g. 
- wage rates, pricing strategies, major network restructuring, infrastructure 
projects, competitive responses, operational issues - scheduling of production 
hiring of personnel. 
1. Limited 
What are the main reasons for limiting the scope of decentralisation of 
decision-making? e. g. 
- staff unable to exercise judgement and self-control 
- integration problems 
2. Extensive 
Don't you think that this autonomy may lead to attitudes of independence which 
can result in a subunit drifting away from the overall organizational goals? 
0.18 One of the most broadly accepted ideas in organizational practice is that there 
should be participation. 
In general, how much influence does the work force have on the decisions made 
in your company? i. e. 
Is it limited to giving employees the opportunity to present suggestions or 
opinions when the locus of final authority rests elsewhere? orto membership in 
the group which exercises final authority over an issue? 
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1. Limited 
Why do you believe participation should be limited to the extent that you have 
described? 
- distrust amongst the parts (different conceptions of authority, personality 
barriers) 
- the process becomes excessively long. 
2. Some 
What were the main objectives for encouraging participation? 
- to create greater job satisfaction and sense of achievement 
- to enhance individual integration into the organization (a better understanding 
of the problems facing the company) to increase the member's motivation to 
achieve organizational objectives) 
-a devise to gain acceptance for changes. 
Do you believe that as a result of increased participation, your members work 
harder? At making the decisions? at implementing the decisions? or at 
accepting and implementing other decisions with which they were not involved? 
0.19 I would like now to ask you some questions with regard to your personal methods 
of making decisions. 
On average, do you make decisions solely on the basis of the information you 
receive from your departments? 
1. NO 
What do you actually do? 
- Do you simply ask for the additional information which you have evaluated as 
necessary? 
- Do you ask other members to contribute towards the decision by presenting 
their opinions although you make the final decision? 
- Do you put all the cards on the table and negotiate a solution which is 
acceptable to all parties? 
0.20 As you know, in any organization there are groups of people who are more ready 
for changes than others. 
What kind of method do you adopt to implement changes? 
e. g. major organizational restructuring - changes in procedures, spans of control 
- Preceded by meetings 
- setting up pilot experiments - evaluate changes in a small segment of the 
organization before implementing them on a wider scale 
- Top-down unilateral decree approach - force the changes through. 
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0.21 Although many operators acknowledge the role marketing should play, few have 
yet adopted a marketing approach for managing their services. For example, in 
a recent study it was found that on average marketing expenditures represented 
only about 2.2% of total operating expenses. 
Why do you think that bus companies have been so modest in the allocation of 
resources to marketing activities? 
e. g. 
- other more pressing commitments 
- difficult to relate marketing expenditures to changes in demand. 
What is the importance attached to marketing in your organization structure? 
How does it compare for example with operations and finance functions? 
Can you give me an idea of the allocation of your marketing budget to its various 
acitivities? -e. g. 
customer services (production of timetables or maps)/ promotion (newspaper and 
press releases) / market research (consumer behaviour, service demand 
surveys). 
0.22 The Government argued that the changes introduced in the industry by the 1985 
Act, would lead to significant reductions and changes in pay conditions, 
improvements in productivity and that big reductions in capital and maintenance 
costs would be achieved. I would like to start with the labour costs. 
What have been the major changes in the conditions of pay? 
reductions in basic pay/reductions in overtime, evening and weekend rates 
and/or restrictions on the eligibility for these payments/reductions in the 
employer's benefits (e. g. reduce number of sick days allowed) 
What have been the major initiatives taken to improve flexibility and utilization of 
your work force, namely drivers? e. g. 
more flexible scheduling/longer working hours/less time allowed for signing on 
and signing off/utilizing drivers for routine maintenance, fuelling, cleaning and 
other duties during off-peak periods thus minimising the extra staff required to 
cover peak periods/contract part-time drivers - do they really solve the capacity 
surplus that exists in the hours before and after the "rush-hour"? /other initiatives 
aimed at paying only for the actual driving time. 
How difficult has it been to attract competent skills in the local labour market? 
(e. g. higher wages being paid in other industries/other operators) 
I would like now to turn to maintenance costs. 
In what ways has your company tried to reduce these costs? e. g. 
by having less elaborate and costly depot facilities e. g. some maintenance 
facility in open air rather than under cover 
- by more intensive use of resources and facilities - offering maintenance 
services to outsiders. 
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- by subcontracting out - maintenance, repairs, cleaning 
Many of these changes have probably caused either some degree of 
dissatisfaction or indifference amongst your labour force. 
What major initiatives has your company taken to minimise and at the same time 
turn to your own advantage the effects of your strategies aimed at reducing 
costs? 
- by increasingly recognizing their work and importance of their position on an 
informal basis. 
- by stressing the effects of competition and the potential threat of job losses if 
pay demands and some work rules are not moderated or revised? 
- by developing a formal " internal marketing programme" to "determine 
employee attitudes, convince employees of their importance and that of their 
work, obtain ideas and suggestions for improvements and to make them feel 
involved in the delivery of the services" 
Q. 23 It has been said that "the process of constructing route structures and defining 
service levels is as much of an art as it is a science". In any case, it should aim at 
producing services which are competitive and utilized to capacity. 
What do you consider to be the fundamental conceptual elements in the practical 
design of competitive services? 
e. g. consumer preference v. s cost efficiency (e. g. transfers, frequency timings, 
service integration). 
0.24 What do you consider to be the most important objectives in establishing fares? 
e. g. 
- achieve revenue generation targets/encourage new ridership/induce riders to 
change travel behaviours). 
Who is involved in the internal process of setting fares? 
As you know, not only different people are willing to pay different amounts for 
different services, but people differ on the amount that they are prepared to pay 
for the same service. It has been suggested that off peak demand is nearly twice 
as sensitive to fare changes as that in the peak period e. g. shoppers and the 
elderly are for instance more price sensitive than commuters. 
On what data/analysis do you base your forecasts of the effects of changes in 
fares on revenue and ridership? e. g. 
- rule of thumb/past results/passenger surveys. 
What is the fare structure used by your company? e. g. 
- proportional to the distance travelled with longer distance passenger effectively 
paying less per mile travelled than short distance passengers. 
Would you have favoured a more differentiated fare structure? - to reflect 
additonal costs of providing particular services - What do you think constitutes 
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the major barriers for adopting such a structure e. g. marketability problems, adapt 
existing fare collection system. 
0.25 It has been noted that for most bus companies, the assets acquired relate to the 
period of state support. 
If you were advised that in the next 3-5 years an important part of your fleet 
needed replacing, who would be involved in such a decision? e. g 
- financial, marketing, operating, engineering, divisional, depot managers. 
As you know organization members perceive the environment in different ways 
and this is to a certain extent influenced by their positions in the organizational 
structure. 
Given the general situation of your company in terms of resources, market 
positioning and facilities, which factors would be predominant in this decision? 
e. g. 
- acquire the smallest number of vehicles and those which are financially less 
demanding? 
- acquire greater number and mix of vehicles 
acquire the same kind of vehicles - permit greater standardization 
Who would make the final decision? i. e., to which decision-making centre would 
the final decision be referred to? 
Let us assume that the commitment to replace part of your fleet has been 
endorsed. Which course of action would you like to see your company take for 
financing this decision and why? e. g. 
Would you take the view that there are opportunities that justify a permanent 
commitment to be taken and thus advocate the need to raise the required funds - 
own and/or borrowing - to purchase the vehicles? Preferably new or 
second-hand? or 
Would you favour a leasing/renting option because you believe there is a need to 
experiment and at the same time ease the short term financial burden? 
The decision to replace vehicles is generally seen as being intrinsically 
associated with the long term strategy of the bus company. 
What type of vehicles would you advise your company to acquire and why e. g. 
Minibuses e. g. 
because market potentials require high frequency and accessible services in 
more comfortable vehicles. 
because the competitive environment demands a greater mix of vehicle. 
because of capital savings - at 88/89 prices, a 25 seater costs £18000 compared 
with £55000 and £61500 for a single deck and double deck bus respectively - 
and other operating expences - lower wages to the drivers of these vehicles. 
Full-size vehicles e. g. 
because of lower costs per mile of providing a seat 
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because demand surveys indicate a preference for this kind of buses - more 
attractive, bigger luggage space. 
because they are more suited to the characteristics of the network - heavy 
commuter flows, frequent traffic congestions which do not permit sustaining high 
frequency levels, school services to and from large comprehensive schools. 
Q. 26 One of the most important strategies that an organization can develop for dealing 
with the environment is to anticipate the action of its competitors. To what extent 
does your company attempt to analyse the main characteristics of its 
competitors? 
It does not. Why? e. g. 
- because it feels unthreatened - it has established a strong position in the 
market. 
- because coping with a superior product or a lower-cost substitute constitutes 
the main strategic priority. 
- because there are many unrealised opportunities in the market. 
It does. how? e. g. 
systematically (permanent market sensors)/based on informal conjectures and 
intuition. 
In both cases. How would you describe your main competitor e. g. 
in terms of 
- having outstanding organizational values and beliefs which strongly affect its 
goals e. g. does it feel strongly about service design, quality, cost effectiveness, 
does it strive to be a leader or a follower, does it have any locational 
preferences, has it allocated a particular important role to a specific functional 
area in its organizational structure. 
- having a clear pattern of reactions to particular strategic moves e. g rationally, 
emotionally, quickly) 
If your company's services were to face a sudden increase in competition by 
another company, which would be the most important aspect in your company's 
strategic response? i. e., Would your company retaliate immediately on a wide 
scale? or Would your company carefully consider the best battle ground for 
fighting the competitor? e. g. choose a specific market segment in which the 
competition is judged to be ill prepared or least enthusiastic about competing? 
Let me confront you with two particular areas from which the threat of competition 
might arise: 
a. It has been established that out of 200 cases in which bus companies 
commenced operations outside their traditional territories, 3/4 were based on 
local authority contracts. Furthermore, once these operators managed to 
establish an income base in the new areas, it is likely that they will diversify into 
full commercial operations. Under these circumstances, what would be your 
249 
company's response? e. g. register services that would not otherwise be 
commercial, submit tenders that require low subsidy requirements. 
b. Let us assume now, that another operator decides to compete in a significant 
part of your commercial network. 
What tactics would you adopt to respond to this challenge e. g. 
- reinforce service frequencies e. g. to a level at which there is little potential for 
the competitor to pick up usual customers at intermediate bus stops - To what 
extent would you be prepared to accept decreasing returns on these services? 
- reduce the prices of fares - If competition is restricted to parts of your network, 
would you consider a price discount in the whole of the network? 
- introduce/enhance off-bus ticketing to maintain loyality? 
- embark on a "cat-mouse" service adjustments? wouldn't it create uncertainty 
amongst your users and thus have a detrimental effect on future ridership? 
- encourage new marketing techniques which addresses the superior 
characteristics of your services? 
Assuming that your company is forced to react to a sudden increase in 
competition, what particular aspects in your internal organization do you think 
might change as a result? e. g. 
- increase in formalization and in the specification of decision procedures 
- greater decentralisation of decision-making. 
0.27 There are probably as many reasons to justify the success of a particular 
company as there are causes that determine its failure. If your company were to 
be confronted with a near -insolvency situation, what strategy(ies) would you 
advise? e. g. 
- selling and/or sale-leaseback of property 
- rescheduling of borrowed funds 
- reinforcing company manoeuvres - develop a new strategy, remove the 
management team who caused the poor performance, impose further reductions 
in the wage bill. 
0.28 The reasons for a company attempting gain control over another are diverse. 
What strategies would you advise your company to adopt if it faced a take-over 
bid? e. g. 
- disclose plans for future development - present plans for a more intensive use 
of resources and show "impressive" forecasts of the future growth expected in 
profits and the value of other investments. 
- make the company unattractive by placing restrictions on the use of or disposal 
of its properties. 
Thank you for co-operating with our research study. 
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Appendix 3 
Demographic Characteristics 
1 The County's geography 
Leicestershire is the third largest county in the East Midlands with an area of 
2553 sq km which is just below the average size of the English Counties 
(2855 sq km). 
Leicestershire is a County that comprises a major city - Leicester, the towns 
of Loughborough, Coalville and Hinckley in the Western part of the County 
and Melton Mowbray, Oakham and Market Harborough in the Eastern part. 
The rural areas are situated mainly in the North and South East of the 
County. Leicestershire is composed of nine districts (see Fig A3-1). 
2 The County's population 
Leicestershire's population was 885,000 in 1989/90 and has increased at a 
rate of 1.9% during the period between 1984/85 - 1989/90 which is well 
above the UK rate (0.7%). This increase has not been evenly spread out in 
terms of age and location. 
2.1 Population distribution 
a By age groups 
The most recent data shows two significant trends in the changes in the 
distribution of the population according to age groups. In the period 
1987/88 and 89/90, there has been a reduction of 2.7% in the 5-17 year 
old age group. Secondly, the numbers of those over 65 years of age 
increased by 9.0% over the same period, with the 75 year old age group 
increasing by 7.0%. Furthermore, in 1989/90 the % of the Leicestershire 
population who were 65 years and older represented 14.6% of the total 
of the County's population. 
b By district 
As far as the distribution of the population of Leicestershire by Districts is 
concerned, the 1989/90 data indicates that 48.2% of the total population 
was concentrated in the Leicester (31.5%) and 
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Figure A3-1 
Leicestershire County and its constituent District Councils 
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Charnwood (16.7%) Districts. However, whilst in the latter the population 
has increased by an average of 1033 between 1986/87 and 89/90, in the 
former there has been an average decrease of over 800 during the same 
period. At the same time, Harborough District shows the highest average 
increase - 1133 - between the same dates. Hinckley & Bosworth and Blaby 
were the third and fourth Districts with the highest average increases (800 
and 700 respectively). 
The % distribution of Leicestershire population in 1989/90 by age and by 
District is shown in Table A3-1. 
Table A3-1 
Population Distribution - Leicestershire 1989/90 
By Age 
Under 5 years of age 
5-17 years of age 
18-64 years of age 
65-74 years of age 
75 years and over 
(%) By District (%) 
6.8 Rutland 4.1 
16.9 Melton 4.9 
61.7 Oadby & Wigston 5.8 
8.2 Harborough 7.6 
6.4 North West Leicestershire 9.0 
Blaby 9.5 
Hinckley & Bosworth 10.9 
Charnwood 16.7 
Leicester 31.5 
Source : Regional Trends, CSO, 1990 
2.2 Population density and the use of the private car 
Two additional indicators related to population data are particularly 
important to the bus industry. 
a The first concerns the County's population sparseness as measured by 
the number of persons per sq km. The 1988 data shows that 
Leicestershire was the third sparsest County in the East Midlands - 346.8 
people per sq km - which was well below the UK average of 235.4. The 
smallest district in Leicestershire (Oadby & Wigston) - 24 sq km - had the 
second highest population density (2172 persons per sq km) only behind 
Leicester District (3796). The sparsest districts were Melton (which is the 
second biggest district) and Rutland (which is the third biggest) with 90 
and 52 persons per sq km respectively. Blaby was the third most densely 
populated District (646 persons per sq km in-just 130 sq km). 
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b The second indicator relates to the number of households that make 
regular use of a car. The data available refers only to the biggest areas 
of Great Britain and not to individual counties. Nonetheless, it is worth 
noting that in 1985 the East Midlands had the highest % of households 
with a regular use of one car in GB - 50% - compared with the national 
percentage of 45%. Furthermore 65% of households in the East 
Midlands had the regular use of one or more cars (or light vans) which 
constituted the third highest percentage in GB, behind the South East 
(except Greater London) and the South West (75%). By 1987 however, 
the number of one car regular users in the East Midlands was down by 
2% which was nonetheless compensated by a corresponding increase in 
the number of these households with a regular use of two or more cars. 
The incidence of private transport use in individual counties can also be 
illustrated by resorting to a more general indication - the number of cars 
per 1000 population. In 1984, there were 300 cars per 1000 population 
in Leicestershire which was marginally higher than the UK figure of 298. 
By 1986 the situation was reversed with the Leicestershire figure of 317 
and the UK one at 319. 
3 Economic and employment characteristics 
According to the latest data on the distribution of employees into the main 
economic activities (1987), Leicestershire was the East Midlands county 
whose economy was more dependent upon the manufacturing industry - 
38% of all employees in employment - which represents a percentage well 
above the UK taken as a whole (24%). At the same time, the services sector 
in Leicestershire represented 32% of employees, a figure which was the 
lowest in the East Midlands and much lower than the UK figure (41.5%). 
According to 1987 data, Harborough had the highest percentage of 
employees working in the Agricultural and Forestry sectors of the economy. 
The biggest employees in North West Leicestershire - where two major 
county towns are situated - were the coal, construction, distribution transport 
and commerce industries. Charnwood, on the other hand was more 
dependent on manufacturing and related industries for employment than 
any other in the county. Blaby by contrast employed more people in the 
service industry and had the least employees engaged in manufacturing. 
Furthermore, approximately half of those employed in manufacturing worked 
in textiles, footwear and clothing, and engineering (the county's more 
traditional industries). At the same time, there is no single industry or group 
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of companies that dominates the local economy. However, over 2/3 of the 
county's total employment is centred in Leicester (45%) and in the county's 
towns (25%). 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the average gross weekly earnings in 
Leicestershire for both male and female full-time workers were in April 1989 
(£239.8 and £157.1) amongst the lowest of all the counties in the UK, and 
well below the UK averages (£268.7 and £181.9). 
4 Unemployment trends 
Unemployment rates in Leicestershire have been 2-3 points below the UK 
rate since 1985. From a peak of 10.5% in October 1985, the unemployment 
rate in January 1990 was 3.9% compared with the UK figure of 5.9%. 
However, the number of people unemployed (17,731 in January 1990) was 
not evenly spread out over the different areas of the county. On the contrary, 
there were certain areas which have endured higher than the counties 
average unemployment rates. Greater Leicester has been the most 
outstanding case, with an average rate 5 points above the counties rate. 
The North west of the county is an area that has not recovered from the 
decline in the mining industry. In January 1990, the number of these 
unemployed in the former area represented 56.3% of the country's total 
unemployment and Charnwood and the North West Leicestershire districts 
together, accounted for one fifth of the unemployed at that date. 
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